1. 2094호
Security Council Strengthens Sanctions on Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,in Response to 12 February Nuclear Test
Unanimously Adopts Resolution 2094 (2013); Expresses Determination to Take
Additional ‘Significant Steps’ in Event of Further Missile Launch, Nuclear Test
The Security Council today passed unanimously a resolution strengthening and expanding the scope of United Nations sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea by targeting the illicit activities of diplomatic personnel, transfers of bulk cash, and the country’s banking relationships, in response to that country’s third nuclear test on 12 February.
Acting under the Charter’s Chapter VII, through resolution 2094 (2013), the Council strongly condemned the test and maintained the sanctions it first imposed on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in 2006 under resolution 1718, deciding that some of those, along with additional restrictions, would apply to the individuals and entities listed in two annexes of today’s text.
In that connection, a travel ban and asset freeze were imposed on the Chief and Deputy Chief of a mining trading company it deemed “the primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons”, as well as on an official of a company designated by the Sanctions Committee to be the main financial entity for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles and goods related to assembly and manufacture.
The Council also froze the assets of a national-level organization responsible for the research and development of advanced weapons systems, and a conglomerate, designated by the Sanctions Committee in 2009, to be specializing in acquisition for the country’s defence industries and support to related sales. Further, it added to the list of prohibited equipment and technologies, and included a list of luxury goods that cannot be imported.
States are directed under the resolution to enhance their vigilance over the diplomatic personnel of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in a provision aimed at halting any activities that could contribute to the country’s weapons programme, or which would violate any prohibited activities.
More specifically, States are directed to prevent the provision of financial services or the transfer of any financial or other assets or resources, including “bulk cash”, which might be used to evade the sanctions. They are also called on to prohibit in their territories the opening of new branches or offices of “DPRK” banks and to prohibit such banks from establishing new joint ventures.
Moreover, in the effort to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to or from the Democratic People’s Republic or Korea or its nationals of any banned items, States are authorized to inspect all cargo within or transiting through their territory that has originated in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or that is destined for that country. They are to deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly their territory, if they have reasonable grounds to believe the aircraft contains prohibited items.
States were also asked to supply any information on non-compliance and to report to the Council within 90 days, and thereafter, at the Committee’s request, on measures they have taken to implement the text. The Sanctions Committee is directed to respond to violations and is authorized to add to the list. The expert panel, under the Committee’s auspices, was extended until 7 April 2014.
The Council promised to keep the situation under continuous review and stated it was “prepared to strengthen, modify, suspend or lift the measures as may be needed in light of the DPRK’s compliance”, or to “take further significant measures in the event of a further DPRK launch or nuclear test”.
The meeting began at 10:11 a.m. and ended at 10:14 a.m.
Resolution
The full text of Security Council resolution 2094 (2013) reads as follows:
“The Security Council,
“Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including resolution 825 (1993), resolution 1540 (2004), resolution 1695 (2006), resolution 1718 (2006), resolution 1874 (2009), resolution 1887 (2009) and resolution 2087 (2013), as well as the statements of its President of 6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41), 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7) and 16 April 2012 (S/PRST/2012/13),
“Reaffirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,
“Underlining once again the importance that the DPRK respond to other security and humanitarian concerns of the international community,
“Expressing the gravest concern at the nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (“the DPRK”) on 12 February 2013 (local time) in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009) and resolution 2087 (2013), and at the challenge such a test constitutes to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (“the NPT”) and to international efforts aimed at strengthening the global regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the danger it poses to peace and stability in the region and beyond,
“Concerned that the DPRK is abusing the privileges and immunities accorded under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic and Consular Relations,
“Welcoming the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) new Recommendation 7 on targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation, and urging Member States to apply FATF’s Interpretative Note to Recommendation 7 and related guidance papers for effective implementation of targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation,
“Expressing its gravest concern that the DPRK’s ongoing nuclear and ballistic missilerelated activities have further generated increased tension in the region and beyond, and determining that there continues to exist a clear threat to international peace and security,
“Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under its Article 41,
“1. Condemns in the strongest terms the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on 12 February 2013 (local time) in violation and flagrant disregard of the Council’s relevant resolutions;
“2. Decides that the DPRK shall not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology, nuclear tests or any other provocation;
“3. Demands that the DPRK immediately retract its announcement of withdrawal from the NPT;
“4. Demands further that the DPRK return at an early date to the NPT and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, bearing in mind the rights and obligations of States parties to the NPT, and underlines the need for all States parties to the NPT to continue to comply with their Treaty obligations;
“5. Condemns all the DPRK’s ongoing nuclear activities, including its uranium enrichment, notes that all such activities are in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009) and 2087 (2013), reaffirms its decision that the DPRK shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and immediately cease all related activities and shall act strictly in accordance with the obligations applicable to parties under the NPT and the terms and conditions of the IAEA Safeguards Agreement (IAEA INFCIRC/403);
“6. Reaffirms its decision that the DPRK shall abandon all other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner;
“7. Reaffirms that the measures imposed in paragraph 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) apply to items prohibited by paragraphs 8 (a) (i), 8 (a) (ii) of resolution 1718 (2006) and paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 1874 (2009), decides that the measures imposed in paragraph 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) also apply to paragraphs 20 and 22 of this resolution, and notes that these measures apply also to brokering or other intermediary services, including when arranging for the provision, maintenance or use of prohibited items in other States or the supply, sale or transfer to or exports from other States;
“8. Decides further that measures specified in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply also to the individuals and entities listed in annexes I and II of this resolution and to any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and decides further that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply to any individuals or entities acting on the behalf or at the direction of the individuals and entities that have already been designated, to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means;
“9. Decides that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (e) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to the individuals listed in annex I of this resolution and to individuals acting on their behalf or at their direction;
“10. Decides that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (e) of resolution 1718 (2006) and the exemptions set forth in paragraph 10 of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to any individual whom a State determines is working on behalf or at the direction of a designated individual or entity or individuals assisting the evasion of sanctions or violating the provisions of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and this resolution, and further decides that, if such an individual is a DPRK national, then States shall expel the individual from their territories for the purpose of repatriation to the DPRK consistent with applicable national and international law, unless the presence of an individual is required for fulfilment of a judicial process or exclusively for medical, safety or other humanitarian purposes, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall impede the transit of representatives of the Government of the DPRK to the United Nations Headquarters to conduct United Nations business;
“11. Decides that Member States shall, in addition to implementing their obligations pursuant to paragraphs 8 (d) and (e) of resolution 1718 (2006), prevent the provision of financial services or the transfer to, through, or from their territory, or to or by their nationals or entities organized under their laws (including branches abroad), or persons or financial institutions in their territory, of any financial or other assets or resources, including bulk cash, that could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, including by freezing any financial or other assets or resources on their territories or that hereafter come within their territories, or that are subject to their jurisdiction or that hereafter become subject to their jurisdiction, that are associated with such programmes or activities and applying enhanced monitoring to prevent all such transactions in accordance with their national authorities and legislation;
“12. Calls upon States to take appropriate measures to prohibit in their territories the opening of new branches, subsidiaries, or representative offices of DPRK banks, and also calls upon States to prohibit DPRK banks from establishing new joint ventures and from taking an ownership interest in or establishing or maintaining correspondent relationships with banks in their jurisdiction to prevent the provision of financial services if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that these activities could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution;
“13. Calls upon States to take appropriate measures to prohibit financial institutions within their territories or under their jurisdiction from opening representative offices or subsidiaries or banking accounts in the DPRK if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such financial services could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, and other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and this resolution;
“14. Expresses concern that transfers to the DPRK of bulk cash may be used to evade the measures imposed in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and this resolution, and clarifies that all States shall apply the measures set forth in paragraph 11 of this resolution to the transfers of cash, including through cash couriers, transiting to and from the DPRK so as to ensure such transfers of bulk cash do not contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution;
“15. Decides that all Member States shall not provide public financial support for trade with the DPRK (including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance to their nationals or entities involved in such trade) where such financial support could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution;
“16. Decides that all States shall inspect all cargo within or transiting through their territory that has originated in the DPRK, or that is destined for the DPRK, or has been brokered or facilitated by the DPRK or its nationals, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf, if the State concerned has credible information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;
“17. Decides that, if any vessel has refused to allow an inspection after such an inspection has been authorized by the vessel’s flag State, or if any DPRK-flagged vessel has refused to be inspected pursuant to paragraph 12 of resolution 1874 (2009), all States shall deny such a vessel entry to their ports, unless entry is required for the purpose of an inspection, in the case of emergency or in the case of return to its port of origination, and decides further that any State that has been refused by a vessel to allow an inspection shall promptly report the incident to the Committee;
“18. Calls upon States to deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly their territory, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft contains items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, except in the case of an emergency landing;
“19. Requests all States to communicate to the Committee any information available on transfers of DPRK aircraft or vessels to other companies that may have been undertaken in order to evade the sanctions or in violating the provisions of resolution 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, including renaming or re-registering of aircraft, vessels or ships, and requests the Committee to make that information widely available;
“20. Decides that the measures imposed in paragraphs 8 (a) and 8 (b) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology listed in annex III of this resolution;
“21. Directs the Committee to review and update the items contained in the lists specified in paragraph 5 (b) of resolution 2087 (2013) no later than 12 months from the adoption of this resolution and on an annual basis thereafter, and decides that, if the Committee has not acted to update this information by then, the Security Council will complete action to update within an additional 30 days;
“22. Calls upon and allows all States to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to or from the DPRK or its nationals, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories of any item if the State determines that such item could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, and directs the Committee to issue an Implementation Assistance Notice regarding the proper implementation of this provision;
“23. Reaffirms the measures imposed in paragraph 8 (a) (iii) of resolution 1718 (2006) regarding luxury goods, and clarifies that the term “luxury goods” includes, but is not limited to, the items specified in annex IV of this resolution;
“24. Calls upon States to exercise enhanced vigilance over DPRK diplomatic personnel so as to prevent such individuals from contributing to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution;
“25. Calls upon all States to report to the Security Council within 90 days of the adoption of this resolution, and thereafter upon request by the Committee, on concrete measures they have taken in order to implement effectively the provisions of this resolution, and requests the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), in cooperation with other UN sanctions monitoring groups, to continue its efforts to assist States in preparing and submitting such reports in a timely manner;
“26. Calls upon all States to supply information at their disposal regarding non-compliance with the measures imposed in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution;
“27. Directs the Committee to respond effectively to violations of the measures decided in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and this resolution, directs the Committee to designate additional individuals and entities to be subject to the measures imposed in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and this resolution, and decides that the Committee may designate any individuals for measures under paragraphs 8 (d) and 8 (e) of resolution 1718 (2006) and entities for measures under paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) that have contributed to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution;
“28. Decides that the mandate of the Committee, as set out in paragraph 12 of resolution 1718 (2006), shall apply with respect to the measures imposed in resolution 1874 (2009) and this resolution;
“29. Recalls the creation, pursuant to paragraph 26 of resolution 1874 (2009), of a Panel of Experts, under the direction of the Committee, to carry out the tasks provided for by that paragraph, decides to extend until 7 April 2014 the Panel’s mandate, as renewed by resolution 2050 (2012), decides further that this mandate shall apply with respect to the measures imposed in this resolution, expresses its intent to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding further extension no later than twelve months from the adoption of this resolution, requests the Secretary-General to create a group of up to eight experts and to take the necessary administrative measures to this effect, and requests the Committee, in consultation with the Panel, to adjust the Panel’s schedule of reporting;
“30. Emphasizes the importance of all States, including the DPRK, taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the DPRK, or of any person or entity in the DPRK, or of persons or entities designated for measures set forth in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the measures imposed by this resolution or previous resolutions;
“31. Underlines that measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) and this resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK;
“32. Emphasizes that all Member States should comply with the provisions of paragraphs 8 (a) (iii) and 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) without prejudice to the activities of diplomatic missions in the DPRK pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations;
“33. Expresses its commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic and political solution to the situation and welcomes efforts by Council members as well as other States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue and to refrain from any actions that might aggravate tensions;
“34. Reaffirms its support to the Six-Party Talks, calls for their resumption, urges all the participants to intensify their efforts on the full and expeditious implementation of the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement issued by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States, with a view to achieving the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner and to maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia;
“35. Reiterates the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia at large;
“36. Affirms that it shall keep the DPRK’s actions under continuous review and is prepared to strengthen, modify, suspend or lift the measures as may be needed in light of the DPRK’s compliance, and, in this regard, expresses its determination to take further significant measures in the event of a further DPRK launch or nuclear test;
“37. Decides to remain seized of the matter.”
Annex I
Travel ban/asset freeze
1. YO’N CHO’NG NAM
(a) Description: Chief Representative for the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID). The KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.
2. KO CH’O’L-CHAE
(a) Description: Deputy Chief Representative for the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID). The KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.
3. MUN CHO’NG-CH’O’L
(a) Description: Mun Cho’ng-Ch’o’l is a TCB official. In this capacity he has facilitated transactions for TCB. Tanchon was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the main DPRK financial entity for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such weapons.
Annex II
Asset freeze
1. SECOND ACADEMY OF NATURAL SCIENCES
(a) Description: The Second Academy of Natural Sciences is a national-level organization responsible for research and development of the DPRK’s advanced weapons systems, including missiles and probably nuclear weapons. The Second Academy of Natural Sciences uses a number of subordinate organizations to obtain technology, equipment, and information from overseas, including Tangun Trading Corporation, for use in the DPRK’s missile and probably nuclear weapons programmes. Tangun Trading Corporation was designated by the Committee in July 2009 and is primarily responsible for the procurement of commodities and technologies to support DPRK’s defence research and development programmes, including, but not limited to, weapons of mass destruction and delivery system programmes and procurement, including materials that are controlled or prohibited under relevant multilateral control regimes.
(b) AKA: 2ND ACADEMY OF NATURAL SCIENCES; CHE 2 CHAYON KWAHAKWON; ACADEMY OF NATURAL SCIENCES; CHAYON KWAHAK-WON; NATIONAL DEFENSE ACADEMY; KUKPANG KWAHAK-WON; SECOND ACADEMY OF NATURAL SCIENCES RESEARCH INSTITUTE; SANSRI
(c) Location: Pyongyang, DPRK
2. KOREA COMPLEX EQUIPMENT IMPORT CORPORATION
(a) Description: Korea Ryonbong General Corporation is the parent company of Korea Complex Equipment Import Corporation. Korea Ryonbong General Corporation was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is a defence conglomerate specializing in acquisition for DPRK defence industries and support to that country’s military-related sales.
(b) Location: Rakwon-dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK
Annex III
Items, materials, equipment, goods and technology
Nuclear items
1. Perfluorinated Lubricants
They can be used for lubricating vacuum pump and compressor bearings. They have a low vapour pressure, are resistant to uranium hexafluoride (UF6), the gaseous uranium compound used in the gas centrifuge process, and are used for pumping fluorine.
2. UF6 Corrosion Resistant Bellow-sealed Valves
They can be used in uranium enrichment facilities (such as gas centrifuge and gaseous diffusion plants), in facilities that produce uranium hexafluoride (UF6), the gaseous uranium compound used in the gas centrifuge process, in fuel fabrication facilities and in facilities handling tritium.
Missile items
1. Special corrosion resistant steels — limited to steels resistant to Inhibited Red Fuming Nitric Acid (IRFNA) or nitric acid, such as nitrogen stabilized duplex stainless steel (N-DSS).
2. Ultra high-temperature ceramic composite materials in solid form (i.e. blocks, cylinders, tubes or ingots) in any of the following form factors:
(a) Cylinders having a diameter of 120 mm or greater and a length of 50 mm or greater;
(b) Tubes having an inner diameter of 65 mm or greater and a wall thickness of 25 mm or greater and a length of 50 mm or greater; or
(c) Blocks having a size of 120 mm x 120 mm x 50 mm or greater.
3. Pyrotechnically Actuated Valves.
4. Measurement and control equipment usable for wind tunnels (balance, thermal stream measurement, flow control).
5. Sodium Perchlorate.
Chemical weapons list
1. Vacuum pumps with a manufacturer’s specified maximum flow-rate greater than 1 m3/h (under standard temperature and pressure conditions), casings (pump bodies), preformed casing-liners, impellers, rotors, and jet pump nozzles designed for such pumps, in which all surfaces that come into direct contact with the chemicals being processed are made from controlled materials.
Annex IV
Luxury goods
1. Jewelry:
(a) Jewelry with pearls;
(b) Gems;
(c) Precious and semi-precious stones (including diamonds, sapphires, rubies, and emeralds);
(d) Jewelry of precious metal or of metal clad with precious metal.
2. Transportation items, as follows:
(a) Yachts;
(b) Luxury automobiles (and motor vehicles): automobiles and other motor vehicles to transport people (other than public transport), including station wagons;
(c) Racing cars.
==2087호==
Security Council Condemns Use of Ballistic Missile Technology in Launch
by Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in Resolution 2087 (2013)
Says Act Violated United Nations Sanctions, Expresses Determination
To Take ‘Significant Action’ in Event Country Proceeds with Further Launch
The Security Council, condemning the launch by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on 12 December 2012, which used ballistic missile technology in violation of the sanctions imposed on it, today demanded that the country not proceed with any further such activities and expressed its “determination to take significant action” in the event it did so.
In that connection, the Council demanded, through the unanimous adoption of resolution 2087 (2013), immediate compliance by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with its obligations under resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), including that it abandon all nuclear weapons and nuclear programmes completely, verifiably and irreversibly.
It deplored the country’s violations of the measures imposed on it in 2006, and strengthened in 2009, including the use of bulk cash to evade sanctions, and underscored its concern over the supply, sale or transfer to or from that country or through States’ territories of any item that could contribute to the activities banned by those resolutions.
The Council recalled that States may seize and dispose of items consistent with its previous resolutions, and clarified that the methods for disposal included, but were not limited to, destruction, rendering inoperable, storage or transferring to another States other than the originating or destination States for disposal.
It further clarified that the sanctions banned the transfer of any items if a State involved in the transaction has reasonable grounds to believe that a designated individual or entity, under the previous resolutions, is the originator, intended recipient or facilitator of the item’s transfer.
In a related provision, the Council called for enhanced vigilance by Member States and directed the relevant sanctions Committee to issue an Implementation Assistance Notice in the event a vessel refused to allow an inspection authorized by its Flag State or if any vessel flagged by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea refused to be inspected, in line with its obligations.
Reaffirming its support for the six-party talks, the Council called for their resumption and urged all participants to intensify efforts to fully and expeditiously implement the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement issued by China.
The meeting was called to order at 3:08 p.m. and adjourned at 3:10 p.m.
Resolution
The full text of resolution 2087 (2013) reads as follows:
“The Security Council,
“Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including resolution 825 (1993), resolution 1540 (2004), resolution 1695 (2006), resolution 1718 (2006), resolution 1874 (2009), resolution 1887 (2009), as well as the statements of its President of 6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41), 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7) and 16 April 2012 (S/PRST/2012/13),
“Recognizing the freedom of all States to explore and use outer space in accordance with international law, including restrictions imposed by relevant Security Council resolutions,
“1. Condemns the DPRK’s launch of 12 December 2012, which used ballistic missile technology and was in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009);
“2. Demands that the DPRK not proceed with any further launches using ballistic missile technology, and comply with resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) by suspending all activities related to its ballistic missile programme and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launches;
“3. Demands that the DPRK immediately comply fully with its obligations under resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), including that it: abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner; immediately cease all related activities; and not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology, nuclear test or any further provocation;
“4. Reaffirms its current sanctions measures contained in resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009);
“5. Recalls the measures imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006), as modified by resolution 1874 (2009), and determines that:
(a) The measures specified in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply to the individuals and entities listed in Annex I and II, and the measures specified in paragraph 8 (e) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply to the individuals listed in Annex I; and,
(b) The measures imposed in paragraph 8 (a), 8 (b) and 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply to the items in INFCIRC/254/Rev.11/Part 1 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 2 and S/2012/947;
“6. Recalls paragraph 18 of resolution 1874 (2009), and calls upon Member States to exercise enhanced vigilance in this regard, including monitoring the activities of their nationals, persons in their territories, financial institutions, and other entities organized under their laws (including branches abroad) with or on behalf of financial institutions in the DPRK, or of those that act on behalf or at the direction of DPRK financial institutions, including their branches, representatives, agents and subsidiaries abroad;
“7. Directs the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) to issue an Implementation Assistance Notice regarding situations where a vessel has refused to allow an inspection after such an inspection has been authorized by the vessel’s Flag State or if any DPRK-flagged vessel has refused to be inspected pursuant to paragraph 12 of resolution 1874 (2009);
“8. Recalls paragraph 14 of resolution 1874 (2009), recalls further that States may seize and dispose of items consistent with the provisions of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009) and this resolution, and further clarifies that methods for States to dispose include, but are not limited to, destruction, rendering inoperable, storage or transferring to another State other than the originating or destination States for disposal;
“9. Clarifies that the measures imposed in resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) prohibit the transfer of any items if a State relevant to a transaction has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that a designated individual or entity is the originator, intended recipient or facilitator of the item’s transfer;
“10. Calls upon Member States which have not yet done so to report on the measures they have taken to implement the provisions of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), encourages other Member States to submit, if any, additional information on implementing the provisions of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009);
“11. Encourages international agencies to take necessary steps to ensure that all their activities with respect to the DPRK are consistent with the provisions of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), and further encourages relevant agencies to engage with the Committee regarding their activities with respect to the DPRK that may relate to provisions of these resolutions;
“12. Deplores the violations of the measures imposed in resolution 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), including the use of bulk cash to evade sanctions, underscores its concern over the supply, sale or transfer to or from the DPRK or through States’ territories of any item that could contribute to activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006) or 1874 (2009) and the importance of appropriate action by States in this regard, calls on States to exercise vigilance and restraint regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals working on behalf or at the direction of a designated individual or entity, directs the Committee to review reported violations and take action as appropriate, including through designating entities and individuals that have assisted the evasion of sanctions or in violating the provisions of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009);
“13. Emphasizes the importance of all States, including the DPRK, taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the DPRK, or of any person or entity in the DPRK, or of persons or entities designated pursuant to resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009);
“14. Reaffirms its desire for a peaceful, diplomatic and political solution to the situation, welcomes efforts by Council members as well as other States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue, and underlines the need to refrain from any action that might aggravate tensions;
“15. Reaffirms its support to the Six Party Talks, calls for their resumption, urges all the participants to intensify their efforts on the full and expeditious implementation of the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement issued by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States, with a view to achieving the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner and to maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in northeast Asia;
“16. Calls upon all Member States to implement fully their obligations pursuant to resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009);
“17. Reemphasizes that all Member States should comply with the provisions of paragraphs 8 (a) (iii) and 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) without prejudice to the activities of the diplomatic missions in the DPRK pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations;
“18. Underlines that measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK;
“19. Affirms that it shall keep the DPRK’s actions under continuous review and is prepared to strengthen, modify, suspend or lift the measures as may be needed in light of the DPRK’s compliance, and, in this regard, expresses its determination to take significant action in the event of a further DPRK launch or nuclear test;
“20. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.”
Resolution Annex I
Travel Ban/Asset Freeze
1. PAEK CHANG-HO
a. Description: senior official and head of the satellite control center of Korean Committee for Space Technology.
b. AKA: Pak Chang-Ho; Paek Ch’ang-Ho
c. Identifiers: Passport: 381420754; Passport Date of Issue: 7 December 2011; Passport Date of Expiration: 7 December 2016; D.O.B. 18 June 1964; P.O.B. Kaesong, DPRK
2. CHANG MYONG-CHIN
a. Description: General Manager of the Sohae Satellite Launching Station and head of launch center at which the 13 April and 12 December 2012 launches took place.
b. AKA: Jang Myong-Jin
c. Identifiers: D.O.B. 1966; Alt. D.O.B. 1965
3. RA KY’ONG-SU
a. Description: Ra Ky’ong-Su is a Tanchon Commercial Bank (TCB) official. In this capacity he has facilitated transactions for TCB. Tanchon was designated by the Committee in April 2009 as the main DPRK financial entity responsible for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such weapons.
4. KIM KWANG-IL
a. Description: Kim Kwang-il is a Tanchon Commercial Bank (TCB) official. In this capacity, he has facilitated transactions for TCB and the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID). Tanchon was designated by the Committee in April 2009 as the main DPRK financial entity responsible for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such weapons. KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.
Annex II
Asset Freeze
1. KOREAN COMMITTEE FOR SPACE TECHNOLOGY
a. Description: The Korean Committee for Space Technology (KCST) orchestrated the DPRK’s launches on 13 April 2012 and 12 December 2012 via the satellite control center and Sohae launch area.
b. AKA: DPRK Committee for Space Technology; Department of Space Technology of the DPRK; Committee for Space Technology; KCST
c. Location: Pyongyang, DPRK
2. BANK OF EAST LAND
a. Description: DPRK financial institution Bank of East Land facilitates weapons-related transactions for, and other support to, arms manufacturer and exporter Green Pine Associated Corporation (Green Pine). Bank of East Land has actively worked with Green Pine to transfer funds in a manner that circumvents sanctions. In 2007 and 2008, Bank of East Land facilitated transactions involving Green Pine and Iranian financial institutions, including Bank Melli and Bank Sepah. The Security Council designated Bank Sepah in resolution 1747 (2007) for providing support to Iran’s ballistic missile programme. Green Pine was designated by the Committee in April 2012.
b. AKA: Dongbang BANK; TONGBANG U’NHAENG; TONGBANG BANK
c. Location: P.O. Box 32, BEL Building, Jonseung-Dung, Moranbong District, Pyongyang, DPRK
3. KOREA KUMRYONG TRADING CORPORATION
a. Description: Used as an alias by the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) to carry out procurement activities. KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.
4. TOSONG TECHNOLOGY TRADING CORPORATION
a. Description: The Korea Mining Development Corporation (KOMID) is the parent company of Tosong Technology Trading Corporation. KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.
b. Location: Pyongyang, DPRK
5. KOREA RYONHA MACHINERY JOINT VENTURE CORPORATION
a. Description: Korea Ryonbong General Corporation is the parent company of Korea Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation. Korea Ryonbong General Corporation was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is a defence conglomerate specializing in acquisition for DPRK defence industries and support to that country’s military-related sales.
b. AKA: CHOSUN YUNHA MACHINERY JOINT OPERATION COMPANY; KOREA RYENHA MACHINERY J/V CORPORATION; RYONHA MACHINERY JOINT VENTURE CORPORATION
c. Location: Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK; Mangungdae-gu, Pyongyang, DPRK; Mangyongdae District, Pyongyang, DPRK
6. LEADER ( HONG KONG) INTERNATIONAL
a. Description: Facilitates shipments on behalf of the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID). KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.
b. AKA: Leader International Trading Limited
c. Location: Room 1610 Nan Fung Tower, 173 Des Voeux Road, Hong Kong
==1874호==
SECURITY COUNCIL, ACTING UNANIMOUSLY, CONDEMNS IN STRONGEST TERMS DEMOCRATIC
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA NUCLEAR TEST, TOUGHENS SANCTIONS
Resolution 1874 (2009) Strengthens Arms Embargo, Calls for Inspection of Cargo,
Vessels If States Have ‘Reasonable Grounds’ to Believe Contain Prohibited Items
The Security Council today condemned in the strongest terms the 25 May nuclear test by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and tightened sanctions against it by blocking funding for nuclear, missile and proliferation activities through targeted sanctions on additional goods, persons and entities, widening the ban on arms imports-exports, and calling on Member States to inspect and destroy all banned cargo to and from that country ‑‑ on the high seas, at seaports and airports ‑‑ if they have reasonable grounds to suspect a violation.
Unanimously adopting resolution 1874 (2009) under Chapter VII, the Council sharpened its weapons import-export ban on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea enacted in resolution 1718 (2006) ‑‑ which included armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, attack helicopters, warships and missiles and spare parts ‑‑ by calling on States to inspect, seize and dispose of the items and by denying fuel or supplies to service the vessels carrying them.
The Council called on all States to cooperate with those inspections, and, if the flag State did not consent to inspection on the high seas, decided that that State should direct the vessel to proceed to an appropriate and convenient port for the required inspection by the local authorities.
Any Member State that undertook an inspection, or seized and disposed of such cargo, was required to promptly submit reports containing the details to the Committee monitoring the sanctions, and to report on any lack of cooperation of a flag State.
It asked the Secretary-General to set up a seven-member expert panel, for an initial one-year period, to assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate and, among other tasks, to gather, examine and analyse information from States, United Nations bodies and other interested parties regarding implementation of resolution 1718 (2006) and today’s text, particularly incidents of non-compliance.
Small arms and light weapons were exempted from the inspections, but the Council called on States to exercise vigilance over the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the Democratic People’s Republic of those weapons and directed States to notify the “1718” monitoring Committee at least five days prior to selling, supplying or transferring small arms or light weapons to it.
In addition to implementing the asset freeze and travel ban imposed in paragraphs 8 (d) and (e) of resolution 1718 (2006), the Council today called on Member States to prevent the provision of financial services or the transfer to, through, or from their territory of any financial or other assets or resources that could contribute to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes or activities.
It called on all Member States and international financial and credit institutions not to enter into new commitments for grants, financial assistance or concessional loans to that country, except for humanitarian and developmental purposes directly addressing civilian needs; and on all Member States not to provide public financial support for trade with that country where such support could contribute to the country’s nuclear-related or ballistic missile-related or other “WMD”-related programmes or activities.
Deciding to adjust the measures imposed by paragraph 8 of 1718, including through the designation of entities, goods, and individuals, the Council directed the “1718” Committee to undertake its tasks to that effect and to report to the Council within 30 days. If the Committee had not so acted, then the Council would complete action to adjust the measures within seven days of receiving that report.
The Council called on all Member States to report to it within 45 days, and thereafter upon the Committee’s request, on concrete measures taken to implement key provisions of the resolution. It pledged to keep the actions of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea under continuous review and to consider strengthening, modifying, suspending or lifting the measures in light of the country’s compliance with both resolution 1718 (2006) and today’s text. It underlined that further decisions would be required, should additional measures be necessary.
Following adoption of today’s resolution, the representative of the Republic of Korea said the Council’s action was an expression of the international community’s firm will to collectively respond to the Democratic Republic of Korea’s provocative action. Its nuclear test violated relevant Council resolutions and seriously threatened peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and beyond. Its overt declaration of intent to pursue development of its nuclear weapons programme was a grave challenge to the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
He urged the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to comply with today’s resolution and to carefully heed the united voice of the international community that such actions would never be condoned. The country must refrain from any act that would further aggravate the situation on the Korean peninsula. He strongly urged the country to rejoin the six-party talks and to abandon all of its nuclear weapons and missile programmes, once and for all.
Japan’s representative demanded that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea heed the message of the resolution and strongly urged that country to return immediately to the talks, without precondition. He highlighted the importance of the Council’s expansion of sanctions and its demand that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea not conduct any further nuclear tests or ballistic missile launches, that it cease all other prohibited nuclear activities and that it respond to the humanitarian concerns of the international community. Hopefully, those measures would induce the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to change its course of action. It was essential for all Member States to take the necessary action to implement those provisions, which were not intended to harm the innocent people of the country.
The United States delegation, which had co-sponsored the resolution ‑‑ along with France, Japan, Republic of Korea, and the United Kingdom ‑‑ welcomed its unanimous adoption as a strong and united international response to North Korea’s test of a nuclear device. The message of the text was clear ‑‑ that that country’s behaviour was unacceptable to the international community, which was determined to respond. The country should return, without conditions, to peaceful dialogue and honour its previous commitments to denuclearize the Korean peninsula. But, for now, its choices had led it to face markedly stronger sanctions. The measures contained in the text were innovative, robust and unprecedented, and represented new tools to impair North Korea’s ability to proliferate.
China supported the balanced reaction of the Security Council, its representative said, stressing that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had violated Security Council resolutions, impaired the effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and affected international peace and stability. The text showed the determination of the Council to resolve the “DPRK nuclear issue” peacefully, through dialogue and negotiations. And in that context, China had voted in favour of it.
At the same time, he stressed that the sovereignty, territorial integrity and legitimate security concerns and development interests of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea should be respected. After its return to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, that country would enjoy the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy as a State party. The Council’s actions, meanwhile, should not adversely impact the country’s development, or humanitarian assistance to it. As indicated in the text, if the country complied with the relevant provisions, the Council would review the appropriateness of suspending or lifting the measures. The issue of inspections was complex and sensitive, and countries must act prudently and under the precondition of reasonable grounds and sufficient evidence, and refrain from any words or deeds that might exacerbate conflict. Under no circumstances should there be the use of force or threat of the use of force.
Statements were also made by the representatives of the United Kingdom, Mexico, Viet Nam, Libya, Uganda, Russian Federation, France, Burkina Faso, Austria, Croatia, Costa Rica and Turkey.
The meeting was called to order at 12:10 p.m. and adjourned at 1:05 p.m.
Background
The Security Council met today to take action on a draft resolution (document S/2009/301), sponsored by France, Japan, Republic of Korea, United Kingdom and the United States, which reads as follows:
“The Security Council,
“Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including resolution 825 (1993), resolution 1540 (2004), resolution 1695 (2006), and, in particular, resolution 1718 (2006), as well as the statements of its President of 6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41) and 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7),
“Reaffirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,
“Expressing the gravest concern at the nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (“the DPRK”) on 25 May 2009 (local time) in violation of resolution 1718 (2006), and at the challenge such a test constitutes to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (“the NPT”) and to international efforts aimed at strengthening the global regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons towards the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and the danger it poses to peace and stability in the region and beyond,
“Stressing its collective support for the NPT and commitment to strengthen the Treaty in all its aspects, and global efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, and recalling that the DPRK cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon State in accordance with the NPT in any case,
“Deploring the DPRK’s announcement of withdrawal from the NPT and its pursuit of nuclear weapons,
“Underlining once again the importance that the DPRK respond to other security and humanitarian concerns of the international community,
“Underlining also that measures imposed by this resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK,
“Expressing its gravest concern that the nuclear test and missile activities carried out by the DPRK have further generated increased tension in the region and beyond, and determining that there continues to exist a clear threat to international peace and security,
“Reaffirming the importance that all Member States uphold the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
“Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under its Article 41,
“1. Condemns in the strongest terms the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on 25 May 2009 (local time) in violation and flagrant disregard of its relevant resolutions, in particular resolutions 1695 (2006) and 1718 (2006), and the statement of its President of 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7);
“2. Demands that the DPRK not conduct any further nuclear test or any launch using ballistic missile technology;
“3. Decides that the DPRK shall suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launches;
“4. Demands that the DPRK immediately comply fully with its obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 1718 (2006);
“5. Demands that the DPRK immediately retract its announcement of withdrawal from the NPT;
“6. Demands further that the DPRK return at an early date to the NPT and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, bearing in mind the rights and obligations of States Parties to the NPT, and underlines the need for all States Parties to the NPT to continue to comply with their Treaty obligations;
“7. Calls upon all Member States to implement their obligations pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), including with respect to designations made by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) (“the Committee”) pursuant to the statement of its President of 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7);
“8. Decides that the DPRK shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and immediately cease all related activities, shall act strictly in accordance with the obligations applicable to parties under the NPT and the terms and conditions of the IAEA Safeguards Agreement (IAEA INFCIRC/403) and shall provide the IAEA transparency measures extending beyond these requirements, including such access to individuals, documentation, equipment and facilities as may be required and deemed necessary by the IAEA;
“9. Decides that the measures in paragraph 8(b) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to all arms and related materiel, as well as to financial transactions, technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such arms or materiel;
“10. Decides that the measures in paragraph 8(a) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to all arms and related materiel, as well as to financial transactions, technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such arms, except for small arms and light weapons and their related materiel, and calls upon States to exercise vigilance over the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK of small arms or light weapons, and further decides that States shall notify the Committee at least five days prior to selling, supplying or transferring small arms or light weapons to the DPRK;
“11. Calls upon all States to inspect, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent with international law, all cargo to and from the DPRK, in their territory, including seaports and airports, if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraph 8 (a), 8 (b), or 8 (c) of resolution 1718 or by paragraph 9 or 10 of this resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;
“12. Calls upon all Member States to inspect vessels, with the consent of the flag State, on the high seas, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo of such vessels contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraph 8 (a), 8 (b), or 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) or by paragraph 9 or 10 of this resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;
“13. Calls upon all States to cooperate with inspections pursuant to paragraphs 11 and 12, and, if the flag State does not consent to inspection on the high seas, decides that the flag State shall direct the vessel to proceed to an appropriate and convenient port for the required inspection by the local authorities pursuant to paragraph 11;
“14. Decides to authorize all Member States to, and that all Member States shall, seize and dispose of items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraph 8 (a), 8 (b), or 8 (c) of resolution 1718 or by paragraph 9 or 10 of this resolution that are identified in inspections pursuant to paragraph 11, 12, or 13 in a manner that is not inconsistent with their obligations under applicable Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004), as well as any obligations of parties to the NPT, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction of 29 April 1997, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction of 10 April 1972, and decides further that all States shall cooperate in such efforts;
“15. Requires any Member State, when it undertakes an inspection pursuant to paragraph 11, 12, or 13, or seizes and disposes of cargo pursuant to paragraph 14, to submit promptly reports containing relevant details to the Committee on the inspection, seizure and disposal;
“16. Requires any Member State, when it does not receive the cooperation of a flag State pursuant to paragraph 12 or 13 to submit promptly to the Committee a report containing relevant details;
“17. Decides that Member States shall prohibit the provision by their nationals or from their territory of bunkering services, such as provision of fuel or supplies, or other servicing of vessels, to DPRK vessels if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe they are carrying items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraph 8 (a), 8 (b), or 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) or by paragraph 9 or 10 of this resolution, unless provision of such services is necessary for humanitarian purposes or until such time as the cargo has been inspected, and seized and disposed of if necessary, and underlines that this paragraph is not intended to affect legal economic activities;
“18. Calls upon Member States, in addition to implementing their obligations pursuant to paragraphs 8 (d) and (e) of resolution 1718 (2006), to prevent the provision of financial services or the transfer to, through, or from their territory, or to or by their nationals or entities organized under their laws (including branches abroad), or persons or financial institutions in their territory, of any financial or other assets or resources that could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related, or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes or activities, including by freezing any financial or other assets or resources on their territories or that hereafter come within their territories, or that are subject to their jurisdiction or that hereafter become subject to their jurisdiction, that are associated with such programmes or activities and applying enhanced monitoring to prevent all such transactions in accordance with their national authorities and legislation;
“19. Calls upon all Member States and international financial and credit institutions not to enter into new commitments for grants, financial assistance, or concessional loans to the DPRK, except for humanitarian and developmental purposes directly addressing the needs of the civilian population, or the promotion of denuclearization, and also calls upon States to exercise enhanced vigilance with a view to reducing current commitments;
“20. Calls upon all Member States not to provide public financial support for trade with the DPRK (including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance to their nationals or entities involved in such trade) where such financial support could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear-related or ballistic missile-related or other WMD-related programmes or activities;
“21. Emphasizes that all Member States should comply with the provisions of paragraphs 8(a)(iii) and 8(d) of resolution 1718 (2006) without prejudice to the activities of the diplomatic missions in the DPRK pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations;
“22. Calls upon all Member States to report to the Security Council within forty-five days of the adoption of this resolution and thereafter upon request by the Committee on concrete measures they have taken in order to implement effectively the provisions of paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006), as well as paragraphs 9 and 10 of this resolution, as well as financial measures set out in paragraphs 18, 19 and 20 of this resolution;
“23. Decides that the measures set out at paragraphs 8 (a), 8 (b) and 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to the items listed in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1a and INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2a;
“24. Decides to adjust the measures imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006) and this resolution, including through the designation of entities, goods, and individuals, and directs the Committee to undertake its tasks to this effect and to report to the Security Council within 30 days of adoption of this resolution, and further decides that, if the Committee has not acted, then the Security Council will complete action to adjust the measures within seven days of receiving that report;
“25. Decides that the Committee shall intensify its efforts to promote the full implementation of resolution 1718 (2006), the statement of its President of 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7) and this resolution, through a work programme covering compliance, investigations, outreach, dialogue, assistance and cooperation, to be submitted to the Council by 15 July 2009, and that it shall also receive and consider reports from Member States pursuant to paragraphs 10, 15, 16 and 22 of this resolution;
“26. Requests the Secretary-General to create for an initial period of one year, in consultation with the Committee, a group of up to seven experts (“Panel of Experts”), acting under the direction of the Committee to carry out the following tasks: (a) assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate as specified in resolution 1718 (2006) and the functions specified in paragraph 25 of this resolution; (b) gather, examine and analyse information from States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties regarding the implementation of the measures imposed in resolution 1718 (2006) and in this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance; (c) make recommendations on actions the Council, or the Committee or Member States, may consider to improve implementation of the measures imposed in resolution 1718 (2006) and in this resolution; and (d) provide an interim report on its work to the Council no later than 90 days after adoption of this resolution, and a final report to the Council no later than 30 days prior to termination of its mandate with its findings and recommendations;
“27. Urges all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties, to cooperate fully with the Committee and the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the measures imposed by resolution 1718 (2006) and this resolution;
“28. Calls upon all Member States to exercise vigilance and prevent specialized teaching or training of DPRK nationals within their territories or by their nationals, of disciplines which could contribute to the DPRK’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;
“29. Calls upon the DPRK to join the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at the earliest date;
“30. Supports peaceful dialogue, calls upon the DPRK to return immediately to the Six-Party Talks without precondition, and urges all the participants to intensify their efforts on the full and expeditious implementation of the Joint Statement issued on 19 September 2005 and the joint documents of 13 February 2007 and 3 October 2007, by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States, with a view to achieving the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in North-East Asia;
“31. Expresses its commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic and political solution to the situation and welcomes efforts by Council members as well as other Member States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue and to refrain from any actions that might aggravate tensions;
“32. Affirms that it shall keep the DPRK’s actions under continuous review and that it shall be prepared to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006) and relevant paragraphs of this resolution, including the strengthening, modification, suspension or lifting of the measures, as may be needed at that time in light of the DPRK’s compliance with relevant provisions of resolution 1718 (2006) and this resolution;
“33. Underlines that further decisions will be required, should additional measures be necessary;
“34. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.”
Action on Draft
The draft resolution (document SC/2009/301) was adopted unanimously by the Security Council, as resolution 1874 (2009).
Explanations of Position
ROSEMARY DICARLO (United States) said she welcomed the unanimous adoption of the resolution, which was a strong and united international response to North Korea’s test of a nuclear device. The message of the text was clear ‑‑ that that country’s behaviour was unacceptable to the international community, which was determined to respond. The country should return, without conditions, to peaceful dialogue and honour its previous commitments to denuclearize the Korean peninsula. But, for now, its choices had led it to face markedly stronger sanctions. The resolution condemned in the strongest terms the nuclear test and strengthened the sanctions, by imposing a total embargo on arms exports and significantly expanding the ban on arms imports by creating a wholly new framework of inspections. It called on States and international financial institutions to prevent the flow of funds to support nuclear, missile and proliferation activities by committing to targeted sanctions against additional goods, persons and entities, and by strengthening the mechanisms to monitor that toughened new sanctions regime. Those measures were innovative, robust and unprecedented, and represented new tools to impair North Korea’s ability to proliferate. She was grateful for the text’s adoption.
ZHANG YESUI (China) said the Chinese Foreign Ministry had issued a firm statement of opposition against the nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in disregard for the international community’s common objective. It had strongly urged that country to honour the quest to denuclearize the Korean peninsula and return to the six-party talks. China was committed, as always, to safeguarding the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, promoting the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and peace and stability throughout North-East Asia. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had violated Security Council resolutions, impaired the effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and affected international peace and stability. China supported the balanced reaction of the Security Council. The resolution was in accordance with article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter. The resolution showed the stance and determination of the Council to resolve the “DPRK nuclear issue” peacefully, through dialogue and negotiations.
In that context, China had voted in favour of the resolution, he said. It should be stressed, however, that the sovereignty, territorial integrity and legitimate security concerns and development interests of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea should be respected. After its return to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, that country would enjoy the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy as a State party. The Council’s actions, meanwhile, should not adversely impact the country’s development, or humanitarian assistance to it. As indicated in the text, if the country complied with the relevant provisions, the Council would review the appropriateness of suspending or lifting the measures. The issue of inspections was complex and sensitive, and countries must act prudently and under the precondition of reasonable grounds and sufficient evidence, and refrain from any words or deeds that might exacerbate conflict. Under no circumstances should there be use of force or threat of use of force. China had always stood for a peaceful solution to the situation and had made tremendous efforts in that regard, including by initiating the six-party talks.
Despite the second nuclear test, China still believed that Security Council actions “are not all about sanctions”, but that political and diplomatic means were still the way to bring about peace on the Korean peninsula. Under the current circumstances, the parties should keep calm and exercise restraint.
YUKIO TAKASU (Japan) welcomed the adoption of the resolution as a strong condemnation of what he called the “DPRK’s irresponsible act” that constituted a grave threat to the national security of his country and to international peace and security, and which undermined the NPT regime. He highlighted the importance of the Council’s expansion of sanctions and its demand that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea not conduct any further nuclear tests or ballistic missile launches, that it cease all other prohibited nuclear activities and that it respond to the humanitarian concerns of the international community, including the abduction issue. In particular, he urged the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to take concrete measures towards the resolution of that issue.
He expressed strong hope that the measures taken today would induce the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to change its course of action and he stressed that it was essential for all Member States to take the necessary action to implement them. He underlined that the measures were not intended to harm the innocent people of the country. His country would seek to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue, he added, supporting the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula through the six-party talks. He demanded that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea heed the message of the resolution and strongly urged that country to return immediately to the talks, without precondition.
PHILIP PARHAM (United Kingdom) said the unanimous adoption of the resolution showed that the international community was united in condemning the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear activity and would not tolerate the country’s flouting of its international obligations. He called on all member States to implement all measures, fully and without delay. He assured the Committee of the full and active cooperation of the United Kingdom, both in the immediate 30-day time frame and in continuing to work with partners in the United Nations and European Union to ensure prompt and effective implementation of all robust measures of the resolution.
He urged the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to refrain from any further provocative actions, which undermined regional security and further isolated the country. He urged the country to return to serious negotiations on denuclearization. Only then would the international community be willing to engage with it as an equal partner. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and its people, he said, had everything to gain from such re-engagement.
CLAUDE HELLER (Mexico) said adoption of the resolution was a clear message that the actions of that country were not acceptable to the international community. Such a message was stronger with the fuller participation of all Council members. To be clear, addressing issues of non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy could not be the monopoly of a group of States, as those concerned the whole international community. Realizing the sense of urgency and gravity of the situation, however, his delegation had supported the resolution today. Recent actions by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea were a clear violation of Council resolutions. From the start, the Mexican Government strongly condemned the nuclear test, as well as the launches of short-range missiles by that country. It also shared the international community’s concern that those actions undermined aspirations for a nuclear-weapon-free world, which included achieving the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.
He said he hoped the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea would heed the call for a pacific dialogue and return immediately to the six-party talks. The nuclear tests must cease “completely and permanently”. The resolution’s call on that country to join the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was positive, and the nuclear test by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had demonstrated the urgent need for the Treaty’s entry into force. Mexico would have wanted the resolution to have included a clear and unequivocal commitment by all Member States towards that goal. It was imperative to remember that the actions of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea did not happen in a vacuum; they took place in a context of a constant threat to the international community derived from the existence of nuclear weapons and the risk of their proliferation. The possible proliferation of those weapons would remain, until those weapons were completely eliminated.
LE LUONG MINH (Viet Nam) said that, as a party to all major multilateral treaties on nuclear disarmament, his country was faithful to the objective of nuclear non-proliferation. That was not only an effective measure towards the final goal of the total elimination of those weapons, but also an indispensable tool to guarantee a favourable environment for the promotion of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. As a party to the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, Viet Nam was also a strong advocate of the establishment of such zones in every part of the world and, in that vein, had been strongly supporting the efforts towards denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. That served the long-term interest of peace, security and stability, not only of North-East Asia, but also of the wider region.
He said that Viet Nam joined the Council’s consensus on measures to resolve the Korean nuclear issue through peaceful negotiation. At the same time, it had insisted in deliberations that, while intending to prevent proliferation and ballistic missile technology development, the measures adopted by the Council must avoid adversely affecting the normal life of the population, as well as the humanitarian, development and other legitimate economic activities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
ABDURRAHMAN MOHAMED SHALGHAM (Libya) said that the world would not enjoy security until all weapons of mass destruction were eliminated. His country had renounced its own programmes and was working for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Unfortunately, the international community had failed to take advantage of Libya’s actions and reward it with development assistance in a way that would have helped further the case for non-proliferation. He stressed also that non-proliferation measures taken by the international community must be global and non-selective, and must extend to Israeli nuclear activities, which have, so far, engendered no action by the Council.
His country, he said, had usually opposed sanctions, as they usually harm people and do not bring about the desired results. In this case, as well, negotiations represented the greatest hope for a resolution, but he had joined the consensus to encourage the return to dialogue and because the measures in the resolution were targeted so as not to harm the Korean people. He expressed hope that dialogue would soon resume and the sanctions could be eliminated.
RUHAKANA RUGUNDA (Uganda) said that his country had joined the consensus on the resolution, because it was important to achieve non-proliferation in the Korean peninsula. But, it also believed it was important to eliminate all nuclear weapons in order to create a more secure world.
VITALY CHURKIN (Russian Federation) said that the resolution was an appropriate response to the actions of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and demonstrated the commitment to a negotiated solution. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s actions had undermined international laws on non-proliferation; that demanded strong action that could bring the country back to the negotiating table. The provisions of the resolution were well targeted and the sanctions did not harm the welfare of the Korean people, something that his delegation had insisted upon.
It was important that, in the resolution, there was an appeal to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to immediately return to negotiations, without preconditions, he said. It was important for the sanctions to be able to be lifted, if the country embarked on the path of abiding by Council decisions. He stressed that the country’s nuclear programme did not bolster security, which could only come about through diplomatic means.
JEAN-MAURICE RIPERT (France) said that, for years, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was engaged in a secret nuclear programme and a ballistic missile programme, which was increasing its nuclear threat by using very sensitive technologies. In so doing, that country had several times violated the NPT, from which it had said it was withdrawing. It had not met its commitments. In recent months, the country had significantly increased tensions in its region by testing missiles. The Council’s reaction today was commensurate with that provocation, and with the risk that others would be encouraged to do the same. The Council had condemned, in the strongest possible terms, those activities. And had imposed very strong sanctions to limit North Korea from advancing its banned programmes, by blocking the funding for those programmes, by extending the embargo to products which helped them, and by adopting sanctions against persons and entities involved, and by requiring States to inspect and destroy banned cargo. The sanctions had excluded humanitarian assistance and development programmes, as the Council remained concerned about the population.
He stressed the need to ensure that all provisions of resolution 1874 (2009) were strictly implemented and by all. He welcomed the expanded mandate of the monitoring Committee and the establishment of an expert panel ‑‑ which would be precious help to the Turkish presidency of the Council and enable acceleration of follow-up and assistance to Member States that needed it. The resolution called on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to join the test-ban Treaty, and France favoured its rapid entry into force. It would co-host the ministerial conference to facilitate the Treaty’s operation. When reviewing the NPT, it was imperative to consider reactions against non-compliance. He called for a resumption of the six-party talks, stressing the need for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to make a strategic choice to reject, once and for all, its nuclear programme.
PAUL ROBERT TIENDRÉBÉOGO (Burkina Faso) said he had supported the resolution ‑‑ support that emanated from his country’s aspiration for a nuclear-weapon-free world. All States had the right to develop nuclear energy for civilian purposes, but they must refrain from activities that could threaten international peace and security and weaken the relevant institutional frameworks. His delegation had condemned the nuclear test carried out by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which had contravened Security Council resolutions and ran the risk of worsening tensions on the Korean peninsula and beyond. He hoped that, since today’s resolution took into account all aspects of that issue, it would contribute to finding a solution to the North Korean nuclear issue. He hoped the targeted nature of the sanctions would make it possible to avoid any negative humanitarian impact. That had been one of the reasons he had supported the text. He called on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency and to return to the six-party talks, which, despite all their difficulties, remained the most appropriate framework for ending the crisis. “Choose dialogue,” he urged the country, as it was the only path that could prevent an escalation of tensions in the region.
THOMAS MAYR-HARTING (Austria) said that the resolution was a clear, appropriate and unequivocal response to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s actions. He welcomed the call for the country to accede to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and stressed that that Treaty’s coming into force was critical, in the light of this issue.
RANKO VILOVIĆ (Croatia) called on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to return to the six-party talks and accede to the CTBT. He stressed that the measures were not aimed at the population of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and called on that country to return to negotiations.
JORGE URBINA (Costa Rica) said he had supported the resolution, echoing the views of previous speakers. As well as a strong and appropriate response to the recent actions of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, he saw the text as a boost to non-proliferation and an opportunity for the country to return to the mechanisms of international dialogue. He urged it do so as soon as possible.
Council President BAKI İLKIN (Turkey), speaking in his national capacity, said he was deeply concerned about the nuclear test. For one thing, it was a clear violation of Security Council resolutions. Earlier, Turkey had expressed concern over the missile launch of 5 April. Such steps undermined stability, mutual trust and confidence in the region. Turkish authorities had condemned the nuclear test and supported the Council’s strong response. The resolution contained the necessary elements of such a response. He fully expected that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the international community members would comply with its provisions. At the same time, Turkey also recognized the importance of encouraging the country to return to the six-party talks, as the best vehicle for achieving the peninsula’s denuclearization. Those talks should aim to make concrete and irreversible progress towards lasting peace, stability and security in the region.
PARK IN-KOOK ( Republic of Korea) said the nuclear test violated relevant resolutions and statements of the Council and defied repeated warnings of the international community. That action seriously threatened peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and beyond. Furthermore, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s overt declaration of its intention to pursue the development of its nuclear weapons programme was a grave challenge to the international regime for nuclear non-proliferation. In conducting the second test, the country had clearly demonstrated a complete disregard for its commitments under the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement and other subsequent agreements reached at the six-party talks. The violations should be met with a strong response. In that regard, he welcomed adoption of today’s resolution, which was an expression of the international community’s firm will to collectively respond to the provocative action.
He urged the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to comply with the resolution and to carefully heed the united voice of the international community that such acts would never be condoned. The country must refrain from any action that would further aggravate the situation on the Korean peninsula. The Republic of Korea Government strongly urged the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to return to the six-party talks and to abandon all of its nuclear weapons and missile programmes, once and for all. Hopefully, all Member States would make united efforts to duly implement the measures outlined in the present resolution. His Government would continue to work closely with the international community to achieve those goals.
==1718호==
Security Council Imposes Additional Sanctions on DPRK, Voting 15 in Favour to 0 Against, with 0 Abstention
Expressing deep concern about DPRK's lack of compliance with its previous resolutions on ensuring the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme, the Security Council imposed additional sanctions on the country today, expanding an arms embargo and tightening restrictions on financial and shipping enterprises related to “proliferation-sensitive activities”.
Adopting resolution 1718 (2006) by a vote of 15 in favour the Council also requested the Secretary-General to create a panel of experts to monitor implementation of the sanctions. Annexed to the text containing the fourth round of sanctions imposed on DPRK' were measures directed against 41 new named entities and individuals, including one scientist and enterprises linked to the Korea mining development trading corporation and the defence industry, as well as banks and the national shipping line.
By other terms of the resolution, the Council decided that DPRK should not acquire interests in any commercial activity relating to uranium enrichment and other nuclear materials or technology in other States, and that all States should prevent the transfer to DPRK of any tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, attack helicopters, or missiles and related systems or parts. It also called upon all States to report to the relevant Sanctions Committee, within 60 days, on the steps they had taken to implement the necessary measures.
Emphasizing the importance of diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution guaranteeing the peaceful nature of DPRK's nuclear programme, the Council noted in that regard the efforts for an agreement on the Ryongbeon Research Reactor, which “could serve as a confidence-building measure”. It also stressed the willingness of the so-called E3+3 — China, South Korea, Russian Federation, Japan and the United States — to further enhance diplomatic efforts to promote dialogue and consultations towards a negotiated solution.
The Council affirmed that it would suspend the sanctions if, and so long as, DPRK' suspended all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, as verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to allow for good-faith negotiations. It also affirmed its determination to apply further measures if DPRK continued to defy the just-adopted text as well as previous resolutions.
Speaking before the vote, no One against the text because it ran against their efforts to bring about a negotiated solution through the agreement on the Pyongyang Research Reactor and the related Pyongyan Declaration of 17 May, which provided a new opportunity for diplomacy.
Following the vote, All representative said had a call of right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and stop nuclear test of DPRK' as well as an obligation to adhere to the safeguards regime, adding that the fuel swap deal it had negotiated with All provided a way towards a resolution of the problems that had arisen. The sanctions regime, on the other hand, represented a painful failure of diplomatic efforts, he added.
Speaking on behalf of the Foreign Ministers of the 2+3 countries, the representative of the United Kingdom said today's action affirmed both the international community's concern about DPRK's nuclear programme and the need for the country to comply with the requirements of the Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors, while also keeping the door open for continued engagement between the P+3 and DPRK. The Ministers welcomed and commended all diplomatic efforts in that regard, especially those recently made by Six party talk on the specific issue of the Pyongyang Research Reactor. “We expect DPRK to demonstrate a pragmatic attitude and to respond positively to our openness towards dialogue and negotiations,” he said.
DPRK's representative, however, placed the resolution within the context of pressures exerted on his country over many decades by some of the same Powers supporting today's resolution. Those pressures included suits to prevent DPRK's nationalization of its own oil, and the military coup that had reinstalled the Shah. The clear message was that no one should be allowed to endanger the vital interests of the capitalist world, he said.
DPRK was more powerful today and would not bow to such pressures, he asserted, emphasizing his country's right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and stressing that it had carried out “robust” cooperation with IAEA. The Council was showing its political biases by its reaction to the deal on the Pyongyang Research Reactor, and its lack of action on Israeli violations of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the threats made against Iran by that country and the United States, he said.
In their national statements, Council members and E3+3 countries all paid tribute to the efforts of Six party talk', which had resulted in the Pyongyang Declaration, but noted that the agreement did not deal with core issues such as compliance with IAEA, uranium enrichment in defiance of the Council and the revelation of the previously undeclared facility at Yongbeon .
Also speaking today were the representatives of the United States, France, China , Russian Federation, Japan, Argentina , republic of congo, Denmark , Greece , Japan , Ghana, Peru, Qatar, Slovakia , Tanzania .
JOHN BOLTON (United States) said that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) proclamation that it had conducted a nuclear test had posed the gravest threat to international peace and security that the Security Council had ever had to confront. The resolution just adopted would send a strong and clear message to the DPRK and other would-be proliferators that they would meet with serious repercussions should they choose to pursue the development of weapons of mass destruction. Further, it would send an unequivocal and unambiguous message for the DPRK to stop its procurement programmes and to verifiably dismantle existing weapons of mass destruction programmes.
He said resolution 1695 (2006) had demonstrated to North Korea that the best way to promote the livelihood of its people and end its isolation was to stop playing games of brinksmanship, comply with Security Council demands, return to the six-party talks and implement the terms of the joint statement from the last round of those talks. But sadly, the regime in Pyongyang had chosen a different path, answering the Security Council's demands with an announcement that it had conducted a successful nuclear test. North Korea had thus broken its word, provoking a crisis and denying its people a better life.
He said that, three months ago, the United States had counselled other Member States to prepare for further action in the event that the DPRK failed to comply with resolution 1695. His country was pleased, therefore, that the Security Council was united in its condemnation today, proving that it was indeed prepared to meet threats to international security with resolve. Acting under Chapter VII, the Council would impose punitive sanctions on Kim Jong Il's regime. By today's resolution, Member States would also agree not to trade in materials that would contribute to nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction programmes, as well as to ban the trade in high-end military equipment. In doing its part to implement that provision of the resolution, the United States would rely on a number of control lists already in place, as published by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group.
He said the resolution would prevent the travel of officials known to be involved in weapons of mass destruction efforts, as well as target the way Kim Jong Il financed his related weapons programmes, including through money-laundering, counterfeiting and selling narcotics. By the resolution, Member States were bound to take action against those activities and freeze the assets of involved entities and individuals of the DPRK. It would provide for an inspections regime to ensure compliance with its provisions, building on the existing work of the Proliferation Security Initiative.
It would impose strict demands on the DPRK not to conduct further nuclear tests or launch ballistic missiles, he said, as well as to abandon all weapons of mass destruction programmes, whether nuclear, chemical or biological, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. The Council would lift the measures imposed by the resolution if the DPRK complied fully with all its provisions and resumed the six-party talks. However, Member States must be prepared if the country again ignored Security Council demands; in that event, measures must be strengthened and Member States must return to the Council for further action.
As the United States pursued a diplomatic solution, it was also reassuring its allies of its commitment to security, he said. It would seek to increase its defence cooperation with allies, including on ballistic missile defence and cooperation to prevent the DPRK from importing or exporting nuclear missile technology. The goals were clear: a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, and to work with other countries to ensure that the DPRK faced serious consequences if it continued down its current path. The resolution provided a carve-out for humanitarian relief efforts in the country, however, because the concern was with the regime and not the starving and suffering people of the DPRK. Hopefully, the country would implement the resolution so its people could enjoy a brighter future.
speaking after the vote, said the resolution was a response to the threats to peace and security arising from DPR's refusal to comply with the requirements of IAEA and the demands of the Council. “Words must mean something,” he said, stressing that the sanctions were not aimed at DPR's right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but squarely at concerns that it had ambitions to develop nuclear weapons. The measures were tough, smart and precise, he added.
Recalling the diplomatic openings that the United States had made to Iran, she said it had shunned successive opportunities to assure the international community of its peaceful purposes, in addition to announcing its intention to further enrich uranium and revealing undeclared sites. The resolution offered Iran a clear path to the suspension of sanctions and reaffirmed the willingness of the United States and other countries to continue diplomacy for that purpose. He said their proposal did not respond to the very real concerns about DPR's nuclear programme. “This resolution does,” He said, emphasizing that respect for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon.
JEAN-MARC DE LA SABLIÈRE (France) said that the Council, by adopting resolution 1718 today, had provided a firm reply to the announcement last Monday of a nuclear test by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. That reply voiced the international community's unanimous condemnation of that extremely grave act, and unanimous determination in the face of Pyongyang's behaviour. Adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter, the resolution contained a number of strong measures, in particular regarding missile and weapons of mass destruction programmes. It also contained provisions to prevent exporting and importing of products associated with those programmes by the DPRK.
It was necessary to ensure the effectiveness of those measures by proceeding under international law with inspections of cargo to and from the DPRK, he said. Given the challenge posed by North Korea, it was essential for the international community to be united and extremely firm. The Council had clearly demonstrated that the behaviour of North Korea would not be tolerated. His delegation also understood that full compliance with the resolution by the DPRK and successful resumption of six-party talks would prompt the Council to lift the sanctions imposed by the resolution.
WANG GUANGYA (China) said that, on 9 October, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had flagrantly conducted a nuclear test in disregard of the common opposition of the international community. China's Foreign Ministry had issued a statement on the same day, expressing firm opposition to that act. Proceeding from the overall interests of brining about denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and maintaining peace and stability there and in North-East Asia, China supported the Council in making a firm and appropriate response. The action of the Security Council should both indicate the firm position of the international community and help create enabling conditions for the final peaceful solution to the DPRK nuclear issue through dialogue. As the resolution adopted today basically reflected that spirit, his delegation had voted in favour of the text.
He reiterated that sanctions were not the end in themselves. As stipulated in the resolution, if the DPRK complied with its requests, the Council would suspend or lift sanctions against the country. At the same time, China did not approve of the practice of inspecting cargo to and from the DPRK, and he had reservations about related provisions of the resolution. China strongly urged the countries concerned to adopt a prudent and responsible attitude in that regard, and refrain from taking any provocative steps that could intensify the tension.
China's Government had committed itself to brining about denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and to maintaining peace and stability both on the peninsula and in North-East Asia, he said. It had always advocated seeking a peaceful solution to the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula through diplomatic means. China had made enormous and unremitting efforts towards that end, initiated the six-party talks and pushed parties concerned to implement the Joint Statement of September 2005. Though there had been the negative development of the DPRK's nuclear test, those policies remained unchanged. China still believed that the six-party talks were the realistic means of handling the issue. He also firmly opposed the use of force. China noted with satisfaction that, in condemning the DPRK nuclear test, the parties concerned had all indicated the importance of adhering to diplomatic efforts.
Under the current circumstances, it was necessary to “unswervingly stick” to the objective of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, oppose nuclear proliferation, adhere to the general direction of resolving the issue through peaceful dialogue and negotiations, avoid any acts that might cause escalation of tension and maintain peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in North-East Asia. That was in the common interest of all the parties concerned. All the parties should take vigorous and positive action towards that end. China was ready and willing to strengthen consultations and cooperation with other parties concerned, so as to ensure a cool-headed response, push forward the six-party talks and continue to play a constructive role in realizing denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and North-East Asia.
EMYR JONES PARRY (United Kingdom) welcomed the strong signal sent to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, saying the Council had acted decisively and quickly under Chapter VII to ask for an end to that country's provocative and irresponsible act. The resolution was important because it reiterated the international community's condemnation of such actions, and made clear to the DPRK and all States concerned that they had a legal obligation to carry out its provisions.
He said the United Kingdom condemned the 9 October test as an irresponsible act, because it had raised tensions both regionally and internationally. Despite the repeated urging of its neighbours, the DPRK had contravened its commitments under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and had ignored resolution 1695 (2006). Indeed, the test had been a direct provocation to the international community and constituted a threat to peace and security. As such, the Council had duty to condemn the act, and had done so by sending a strong message to Pyongyang.
The resolution contained robust terms, he said, but its purpose was to bring about a stop to the DPRK's weapons of mass destruction and missile programmes and to change the behaviour of the leaders in Pyongyang, not to hamper the lives of people who were already suffering.
The United Kingdom would lift the measures imposed today if the DPRK returned to the six-party talks. It was that country's choice to flout or accept the obligations contained in it.
VITALY I. CHURKIN (Russian Federation) said that, even before the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's statement of its intention to conduct a nuclear test and then following that irresponsible step, his country had emphasized that such actions could complicate the settlement of the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula, pose a threat to international peace and security and undermine the non-proliferation regime. His country had always advocated a strong, but carefully vetted, response from the Council, aimed at preventing further escalation of tension. He could only regret that North Korean authorities had ignored the warnings contained in the Council's presidential statement of 6 October about the negative consequences that would flow from a nuclear test, primarily for the DPRK itself.
“All of us find ourselves in an extraordinary situation, which required adoption of extraordinary measures,” he said. Having supported the text -– a result of tense negotiations, in which all members of the Council had participated –- he noted that the resolution reflected concern over the humanitarian consequences of strict measures. At the same time, as a matter of principle, it was necessary –- as envisioned by relevant decisions of the United Nations –- to carefully weigh such consequences on a case-by-case basis. Any sanctions introduced by the Council should not go on indefinitely and should be lifted upon implementation of the Council's demands. In that connection, he also emphasized that sanctions unilaterally adopted by States did not facilitate resolution of such problems, when the Council was working on joint approaches, with the participation of all relevant parties.
He added that today's text contained a set of carefully considered and targeted measured, aimed at resolving the main issue: to make the DPRK immediately review its dangerous course, come back to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and resume, without preconditions, its participation in the six-party talks. That could be done only through political and diplomatic means. The measures against the DPRK must be implemented under strict control of the Council and its Sanctions Committee set up by today's resolution. It was very important that, under the text, full implementation of its provisions by the DPRK would lead to the lifting of the sanctions. He hoped Pyongyang would adequately understand the collective position of the international community and take practical steps to achieve denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, as well as peace and stability in North-Eastern Asia. CESAR MAYORAL (Argentina) supported resolution 1718 (2006), which condemned the Democratic People's Republic of Korea following its proclamation of having held a nuclear test. That act had shown that the country possessed nuclear devices and had withdrawn from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in addition to having launched ballistic missiles. Such acts had endangered international peace and security.
He said the Security Council's unanimous, firm and rapid message, under the Japanese presidency, clearly demonstrated the international community's position towards the Government of the DPRK. Argentina hoped the DPRK authorities would hear that message, and that it would prompt their return to the six-party talks so that a solution could be found for all parties involved. Indeed, it was an issue that affected not just in the Asia-Pacific, but the rest of the world, as well.
Argentina had agreed to implement all the provisions of the resolution, he said. However, with regard to the list of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology to be banned from the DPRK as stipulated in paragraph 8, Argentina did not intend to legislate the control of material for dual use.
The Council's President, KENZO OSHIMA (Japan), speaking in his national capacity, welcomed the resolution adopted today as one of the most important decisions the Council had taken in recent times. It was essential that such an important decision be taken by a unanimous vote, and that was a welcome outcome. The resolution strongly condemned the irresponsible act on the part of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which had proceeded to conduct a nuclear test in total defiance of the calls to refrain from doing so by all its immediate neighbours and, indeed, by the entire world. That was unacceptable behaviour, which deserved to be met not only with a strong admonishment, but also with necessary measures prescribed in Chapter VII of the Charter. Under the circumstances, the Council had acted in the discharge of its responsibilities by responding to the grave situation created by the DPRK, swiftly and in unity.
The situation created by the DPRK had caused widespread and deep concern in East Asia and beyond, he continued. The danger presented by Pyongyang's total disregard of the non-proliferation regime was clear and present. Last July, when the DPRK had resorted to the launching of ballistic missiles, the Council had unanimously adopted resolution 1695, condemning that action. It had also unequivocally urged the DPRK not to go forward with the test, through a strong presidential statement. Only two days after the Council's call, however, the DPRK had claimed that it had conducted a nuclear test. The combination of ballistic missile capability and, now, the claim of nuclear capability in the hands of a regime with a record of known and reckless irresponsible behaviour, created a situation that was nothing less than a grave threat to peace and security. Japan also regretted that the DPRK's actions were in contravention of the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration, the Joint Statement of the six-party talks and several other agreements.
Along with other concerned countries in the region, Japan expected that the DPRK would act as a responsible Member of the United Nations, by implementing this and other Security Council resolutions and decisions, including resolution 1695, in good faith. At the same time, the security issue was not the only point of contention between the DPRK and the international community. The resolution underlined the importance for the DPRK to responding to the humanitarian concerns of the international community, which included the abduction issue. He demanded that the issue be resolved as soon as possible.
PAK GIL YON (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) said that his country totally rejected resolution 1718 and found it unjustifiable. It was “gangster-like” for the Security Council to adopt such a coercive resolution against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, while neglecting the nuclear threat posed by the United States against his country. It was a clear testament that the Council had completely lost its impartiality and was persisting in applying double standards to its work. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea was disappointed that the Council was incapable of offering a single word of concern when the United States threatened to launch nuclear pre-emptive attacks, reinforced its armed forces and conducted large-scale military exercises near the Korean peninsula.
He said that, on 9 October, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had successfully conducted underground nuclear tests under secure conditions, as a way of bolstering the country's self-defence. His country's nuclear test was entirely attributable to United States threats, sanctions and pressure, and every possible effort had been expanded to settle the nuclear issue through dialogue and negotiation.
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea indeed wished to denuclearize the Korean peninsula, he said; yet, the Bush Administration had responded to his country's patient and sincere efforts with sanctions and blockades. His country had, therefore, felt compelled to prove its possession of nuclear weapons to protect itself from the danger of war from the United States. Also, although his country had conducted a nuclear test due to American provocation it still remained unchanged in its will to denuclearize the Korean peninsula through dialogue and negotiation, as that had been President Kim Il Sung's last instruction.
He said the test did not contradict the Joint Statement of the six-party talks to dismantle nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes. Rather, it constituted a positive measure for its implementation. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea had clarified more than once that it would have no need for even a single nuclear weapon as long as the United States dropped its hostile policies towards his country, and as long as confidence was built between the two countries. Instead, the United States had manipulated the Security Council into adopting a resolution pressurizing Pyongyang.
He said the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was ready for both dialogue and confrontation. If the United States persisted in increasing pressure upon his country, it would continue to take physical countermeasures, considering it as a declaration of war.
CHOI YOUNG-JIN (Republic of Korea) said that, last Monday, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had announced that it had conducted a nuclear test, which his Government had warned it about. That act posed a grave threat to the situation on the Korean peninsula and the whole of North-East Asia. North Korea's conduct constituted a failure to implement the Joint Statement of September 2005. It also represented outright defiance of the Security Council resolution adopted in July 2006 and a breach of the Joint Declaration that the DPRK had signed with his country in 1991.
Such acts should never be condoned, he said. His Government appreciated the Council's efforts to address that common challenge and supported the resolution just adopted. He urged North Korea to heed the voice of the international community and refrain from any actions that would further aggravate the situation. It should return to six-party talks and abandon its nuclear programmes once and for all. His Government would continue its endeavours to achieve those goals.
Mr. BOLTON (United States) said it was the second time in three months that the DPRK, having asked to participate in Security Council meetings, had rejected its resolutions and walked out of the Chamber. It was akin to Nikita Khrushchev pounding his shoe on the podium, and raised questions about the DPRK's adherence to Chapter II of the United Nations Charter -- an issue the Council should consider in due course.
Mr. CHURKIN (Russian Federation) asked the President to call on members of the Council to, even in the heat of emotion, refrain from using inappropriate analogies.
H.E. Ambassador Basile Ikouébé (republic of congo ) : said his delegation had voted in favour of the text because it fully supported the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty's aims. Indeed, the Treaty set out the provisions for safeguarding and verifying all nuclear activity, and it was important that all the nuclear activities of parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty were in compliance with relevant safeguards. The recent IAEA report raised a number of questions about the purposes of DPRK's nuclear programme, he said. Republic of Congo commended the recent initiative by Six party countries discuss nuclear issue, which was vital to confidence-building efforts. All future efforts must respect DPRK's right to peaceful use of nuclear energy, which ensuring also that Iran adhered to Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards and cooperated with IAEA in a full and transparent manner.
Adamantios Vassilakis (Greece), noting that his delegation had voted in favour of the text, said a decision of that kind was never to be taken lightly. From the time when IAEA had revealed DPRK's programme in 2003, Greece had hoped that the issue could be resolved through negotiations, but even after five Council resolutions, the nature of the programme remained unclear. Indeed, a clandestine nuclear facility had been discovered just a few months ago, he said, condemn emphasizing his country's continuing commitment to a dual-track approach.
While Greece believed the current resolution was necessary, it still stood behind the two packages proffered by the international community in 2005 and 2006, he said, highlighting also the fact that today's text stressed the willingness of the E3+3 to continue and enhance diplomatic dialogue and consultations. The resolution also expressed the Council's willingness to consider suspending the measures outlined therein if DPRK' suspended its enrichment activities and carried out the aims of the Council's previous resolutions.
Mr. Baah-Duodu (Ghana), stressing the importance of ridding the East Asia and the world of nuclear weapons, said his country had been one of the first parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, adding that the recent Review Conference had reaffirmed the importance of a nuclear-weapon-free Middle East. DPRK was the only country in the region that held nuclear weapons, he said, emphasizing that it should allow IAEA inspection of its nuclear facilities, and that enforcement of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime should not be selective.
DPRKS had violated a right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as well as an obligation to adhere to the safeguards regime, he said. The fuel swap deal negotiated by six party talks provided a road towards resolving the problems that had arisen, he said, adding that the agreement was still a gateway to confidence-building measures. The solution to the overall issue would come about through dialogue and not pressure. The sanctions regime represented a painful failure of diplomatic efforts, he said, while stressing his refusal to give up on such efforts and calling for a reinvigorated, flexible and constructive dialogue.
Augustine Mahiga (Tanzania) said the Non-Proliferation Treaty remained the best framework for guaranteeing the right to peaceful nuclear programmes while preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, and for that reason his country was cooperating with IAEA in its efforts to meet its people's energy needs. In that context, Tanzania could not understand why DPRK was not cooperating with the Agency if its goals were peaceful. It was incumbent on that country to dispel doubts about its nuclear programme, he stressed, calling on DPRK to respond positively to diplomatic efforts, and welcoming the dual-track approach. Tanzania applauded the efforts of Six party talks in that context, he said.
Sheikha Alya Ahmed bin Saif Al-Thani (Qatar) said his delegation had once again been among those that had nourished hopes that the issue could be solved through negotiations and in a satisfactory manner for all concerned. “However, we find ourselves confronted by further aggravation regarding a comprehensive solution to the nuclear capacity development in the democratic people's republic of korea,” he said, adding that his own country, as a State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, was fully committed to implementing the Treaty, which represented an irreplaceable framework for promoting security and preventing nuclear proliferation. The IAEA safeguards agreements could ensure that nuclear energy was used in a safe and responsible manner.
The right of all States to the peaceful use of nuclear energy was also important and must be fully respected and protected, he stressed. “ DPRK is no exception to that rule. It should be made clear, nevertheless, that the scope and objectives of any nuclear programme, including DPRK's, have to remain in accordance with international rules and must be subjected to a verifiable and transparent inspection regime by the International Atomic Energy Agency.” The Council had adopted resolutions calling on DPRK to comply with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to extend full cooperation to IAEA inspectors, yet, according to the most recent reports, the international community had not received a clear and unequivocal response from DPRK', which had brought the Council to the present stage.
Oswaldo de Rivero (Peru) speaking in his national capacity, emphasized that his country was violated and not care about firmly committed to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear energy. However, Peru was concerned that the actions being taken weakened those three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and were of particular concern when carried out in a region already rife with instability and mistrust. DPRK's “controversial” nuclear, chemical , biological weapons programme was not a new issue for the Council, he said, stressing that the country must comply with all requests by IAEA to ensure the peaceful nature of its programme. It must also comply with Security Council resolutions and ensure transparency regarding its nuclear activities.
“It is DPRK that must gain the confidence of the international community, and stop conducting nuclear test and grow nuclear activities, not the Security Council,” he declared, expressing Per's support for dialogue and negotiations as the way forward. The sanctions and other measures adopted by the Council did not punish the people of DPRK, but focused only on its nuclear activities. Recent diplomatic initiatives were insufficient because they addressed neither international concerns about the nature of DPRK's programme nor the issue of enrichment. Today's text did not close the door to diplomatic negotiations, but left room for heightened diplomatic efforts, he said, adding that the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Korean peninsula should be pursued to ensure the security and stability of all States in that region, including a future Palestinian State. Mexico would continue to purse the path of dialogue and reject the use of force, he emphasized.
Detail of summary resolution
S/RES/1718 (2006)
Security Council Distr.: General 14 October 2006 10-39679* (E)
1039679*
Resolution 1718 (2006) Adopted by the Security Council at its 5989th meeting, on 14 October 2006
"The Security Council,"
"Recalling the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, and its resolutions 825 (1993) 1540 (2004), 1695 (2006), and this resolution and reaffirming their provisions,"
"Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the need for all States Party to that Treaty to comply fully with all their obligations, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,"
"Recalling the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors (GOV/2006/14), which states that a solution to the north korean nuclear weapns issue would contribute to global non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a East Asia free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery,
"Noting with serious concern that, as confirmed by the reports of 27 February 2006 (GOV/2006/15), 8 June 2006 (GOV/2006/38), 31 August 2006 (GOV/2006/53), 14 September 2006 (GOV/2006/64) 19 Fe and of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), north Korea has not established full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and heavy water-related projects as set out in resolutions 1695 (2006) nor resumed its cooperation with the IAEA under the Additional Protocol, nor cooperated with the IAEA in connection with the remaining issues of concern, which need to be clarified to exclude the possibility of military dimensions of North korea's nuclear programme, nor taken the other steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors, nor complied with the provisions of Security Council Reissued for technical reasons. S/RES/1718 (2006) 2 10-36979 resolutions 1695 and which are essential to build confidence, and deploring north korea's refusal to take these steps,"
"Reaffirming that outstanding issues can be best resolved and confidence built in the exclusively peaceful nature of north korea's nuclear programme by north korea responding positively to all the calls which the Council and the IAEA Board of Governors have made on north korea,"
"Noting with serious concern the role of elements of the Korea mining trade development corporation (KOMID, also known as “Army of the Guardians of the Korea mining development trade”), including those specified in Annex D and E of resolution 1695 (2006) and Annex II of this resolution, in north korea's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems,"
"Noting with serious concern that north korea has constructed an enrichment facility at Hamhung and pungeri in breach of its obligations to suspend nuclear tests and all enrichment-related activities, and that north korea failed to notify it to the IAEA until September 2005 which is inconsistent with its obligations under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement," Also
"noting the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors (GOV/2005/82), which urges north Korea to suspend immediately construction at ryongbeon and test nuclear weapons in pungeri, and to clarify the facility's purpose, chronology of design and construction, and calls upon north korea to confirm, as requested by the IAEA, that it has not taken a decision to construct, or authorize construction of, any other nuclear facility which has as yet not been declared to the IAEA,"
"Noting with serious concern that north Korea has enriched uranium to 20 per cent, and did so without notifying the IAEA with sufficient time for it to adjust the existing safeguards procedures,"
"Noting with concern that north Korea has taken issue with the IAEA's right to verify design information which had been provided by north korea pursuant to the modified Code 3.1, and emphasizing that in accordance with Article 39 of north korea's Safeguards Agreement Code 3.1 cannot be modified nor suspended unilaterally and that the IAEA's right to verify design information provided to it is a continuing right, which is not dependent on the stage of construction of, or the presence of nuclear material at, a facility,"
"Reiterating its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA, strongly supporting the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, and commending the IAEA for its efforts to resolve outstanding issues relating to north korea's nuclear weapns programme,"
"Expressing the conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 1695 (2006) as well as full, verified north Korea nuclear weapons compliance with the requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees north korea's nuclear weapons programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes," S/RES/1718 (2006) 10-36979 3
"Emphasizing the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution guaranteeing that north korea's nuclear weapons programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes and noting in this regard the efforts of towards an agreement with north Korea on the ryongbeon Research Reactor that could serve as a confidence-building measure,
"Emphasizing also, however, in the context of these efforts, the importance of North Korea addressing the core issues related to its nuclear weapons programme,"
"Stressing that China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States are willing to take further concrete measures on exploring an overall strategy of resolving the north korean nuclear issue through negotiation on the basis of their June 2006 proposals (S/2006/521) and their June 2005 proposals (INFCIRC/730), and noting the confirmation by these countries that once the confidence of the international community in the exclusively peaceful nature of north korea's nuclear weapons programme is restored it will be treated in the same manner as that of any Non-Nuclear Weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,"
"Welcoming the guidance issued by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to assist States in implementing their financial obligations under resolutions 1695 (2006) and"
"recalling in particular the need to exercise vigilance over transactions involving north korean banks, including the Central Bank of north Korea, so as to prevent such transactions contributing to proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems,"
"Recognizing that access to diverse, reliable energy is critical for sustainable growth and development, while noting the potential connection between north korea's revenues derived from its energy sector and the funding of north korea's proliferation sensitive nuclear missile activities, and further noting that chemical process equipment and materials required for the petrochemical industry have much in common with those required for certain sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities,"
"Having regard to States' rights and obligations relating to international trade,"
"Recalling that the law of the sea, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), sets out the legal framework applicable to ocean activities,"
"Calling for the Joining of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by North korea at an early date,"
"Determined to give effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to persuade north korea to comply with resolutions 1695 (2006) and with the requirements of the IAEA, and also to constrain north korea's development of nuclear weapons illegal and sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes, until such time as the Security Council determines that the objectives of these resolutions have been met,
"Concerned by the proliferation risks presented by the north korean nuclear weapons programme and mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,"
"Stressing that nothing in this resolution compels States to take measures or actions exceeding the scope of this resolution, including the use of force or the threat of force,"
"Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,"
"1. Condemn in most strongest terms nuclear test of north korea Carried out in 9 october 2006; affirms that north korea has so far failed to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and to comply with resolutions 1695 (2006)" S/RES/1718 (2006) 4 10-36979
"2. Affirms that north Korea shall without further delay take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolutions GOV/2006/14 and GOV/2009/82, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme, to resolve outstanding questions and to address the serious concerns raised by the construction of an enrichment facility at ryongbeon in breach of its obligations to suspend all enrichment-related activities, and, in this context, further affirms its decision that north korea shall without delay take the steps required in paragraph 2 of resolution 1695 (2006);"
"3. Reaffirms that north korea shall cooperate fully with the IAEA on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions of the north Korea's nuclear weaponsprogramme, including by providing access without delay to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by the IAEA, and stresses the importance of ensuring that the IAEA have all necessary resources and authority for the fulfilment of its work in north korea;
"4. Requests the Director General of the IAEA to communicate to the Security Council all his reports on the application of safeguards in north korea;"
"5. Decides that north korea shall without delay comply fully and without qualification with its IAEA Safeguards Agreement, including through the application of modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangement to its Safeguards Agreement, calls upon north Korea to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol to its IAEA Safeguards Agreement that it signed on 18 December 2003, calls upon north korea to ratify promptly the Additional Protocol, and reaffirms that, in accordance with Articles 24 and 39 of north korea's Safeguards Agreement, north korea's Safeguards Agreement and its Subsidiary Arrangement, including modified Code 3.1, cannot be amended or changed unilaterally by north korea, and notes that there is no mechanism in the Agreement for the suspension of any of the provisions in the Subsidiary Arrangement;"
"6. Reaffirms that, in accordance with north korea's obligations under previous resolutions to suspend all reprocessing, heavy water-related and enrichment-related activities, north Korea shall not begin construction on any new nuclear tests or uranium-enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water-related facility and shall discontinue any ongoing construction of any nuclear tests or uranium-enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water-related facility;"
"7. Decides that north Korea shall not acquire an interest in any commercial activity in another State involving uranium mining, production or use of nuclear materials and technology as listed in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1, in particular uranium enrichment and nuclear tests, nuclear weapons equipped weapons, reprocessing activities, all heavy-water activities or technologyrelated to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and further decides that all States shall prohibit such investment in territories under their jurisdiction by north korea, its nationals, and entities incorporated in north Korea or subject to its jurisdiction, or by persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them;"
"8. Decides that all States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to north Korea, from or through their territories or by their nationals or individuals subject to their jurisdiction, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibrer artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or S/RES/1718 (2006) 10-36979 5 missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, or related materiel, including spare parts, or items as determined by the Security Council or the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1695 (2006) (“the Committee”), decides further that all States shall prevent the provision to north korea by their nationals or from or through their territories of technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such arms and related materiel, and, in this context, calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and restraint over the supply, sale, transfer, provision, manufacture and use of all other arms and related materiel;"
"9. Decides that north Korea shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using ballistic missile technology, and that States shall take all necessary measures to prevent the transfer of technology or technical assistance to north korea related to such activities;"
"10. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals designated in Annex C, D and E of resolution Annex I of resolution 1695 (2006) and Annexes I and II of this resolution, or by the Security Council or the Committee pursuant to paragraph 10 of resolution 1695 (2006), except where such entry or transit is for activities directly related to the provision to North korea of items in subparagraphs 3(b)(i) and (ii) of resolution 1695(2006) in accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution 1695 (2006), underlines that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory, and decides that the measures imposed in this paragraph shall not apply when the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligations, or where the Committee concludes that an exemption would otherwise further the objectives of this resolution, including where Article XV of the IAEA Statute is engaged;"
"11. Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 1696 (2006) shall apply also to the individuals and entities listed in Annex I of this resolution and to any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and to any individuals and entities determined by the Council or the Committee to have assisted designated individuals or entities in evading sanctions of, or in violating the provisions of, resolutions 1696 (2006) or this resolution;"
"12. Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 1696 (2006) shall apply also to the Korea mining trade development corporation (KOMID, also known as “Army of Korea mining development trade corporation) individuals and entities specified in Annex II, and to any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and calls upon all States to exercise vigilance over those transactions involving the KOMID that could contribute to north Korea's proliferation-sensitive nuclear weapons test activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;"
"13. Decides that for the purposes of the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 1695 (2006), the list of items in S/2006/814 shall be superseded by the list of items in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1 S/RES/1718 (2006) 6 10-36979 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2, and any further items if the State determines that they could contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and further decides that for the purposes of the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 1695 (2006), the list of items contained in S/2006/815 shall be superseded by the list of items contained in S/2006/263;"
"14. Calls upon all States to inspect, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea and relevant international civil aviation agreements, all cargo to and from North korea, in their territory, including seaports and airports, if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of resolution 1695 (2006), paragraph 8 or paragraphs 8 or 9 of this resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;"
"15. Notes that States, consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea, may request inspections of vessels on the high seas with the consent of the flag State, and calls upon all States to cooperate in such inspections if there is information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the vessel is carrying items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of resolution 1695 (2006) or paragraphs 8 or 9 of this resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;"
"16. Decides to authorize all States to, and that all States shall, seize and dispose of (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable, storage or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of resolution 1695 (2006) or paragraphs 8 or 9 of this resolution that are identified in inspections pursuant to paragraphs 14 or 15 of this resolution, in a manner that is not inconsistent with their obligations under applicable Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004), as well as any obligations of parties to the NPT, and decides further that all States shall cooperate in such efforts;"
"17. Requires any State, when it undertakes an inspection pursuant to paragraphs 14 or 15 above to submit to the Committee within five working days an initial written report containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds for the inspections, the results of such inspections and whether or not cooperation was provided, and, if items prohibited for transfer are found, further requires such States to submit to the Committee, at a later stage, a subsequent written report containing relevant details on the inspection, seizure and disposal, and relevant details of the transfer, including a description of the items, their origin anandd intended destination, if this information is not in the initial report;"
"18. Decides that all States shall prohibit the provision by their nationals or from their territory of bunkering services, such as provision of fuel or supplies, or other servicing of vessels, to north korean-owned or -contracted vessels, including chartered vessels, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe they are carrying items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of resolution 1695 (2006), S/RES/1718 (2006) 10-36979 7 or paragraphs 8 or 9 of this resolution, unless provision of such services is necessary for humanitarian purposes or until such time as the cargo has been inspected, and seized and disposed of if necessary, and underlines that this paragraph is not intended to affect legal economic activities;"
"19. Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 1695 (2006) shall also apply to the entities of the democratic people's republic of Korea Shipping Lines (NKISL) as specified in Annex III and to any person or entity acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, or determined by the Council or the Committee to have assisted them in evading the sanctions of, or in violating the provisions of, resolutions 1695 (2006) or this resolution;"
"20. Requests all Member States to communicate to the Committee any information available on transfers or activity by koryo Air's cargo division or vessels owned or operated by the democratic people's republic of Korea Shipping Lines (NKISL) to other companies that may have been undertaken in order to evade the sanctions of, or in violation of the provisions of, resolutions 1695 (2006) or this resolution, including renaming or re-registering of aircraft, vessels or ships, and requests the Committee to make that information widely available;"
"21. Calls upon all States, in addition to implementing their obligations pursuant to resolutions 1695 (2006) and this resolution, to prevent the provision of financial services, including insurance or re-insurance, or the transfer to, through, or from their territory, or to or by their nationals or entities organized under their laws (including branches abroad), or persons or financial institutions in their territory, of any financial or other assets or resources if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such services, assets or resources could contribute to north korea's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including by freezing any financial or other assets or resources on their territories or that hereafter come within their territories, or that are subject to their jurisdiction or that hereafter become subject to their jurisdiction, that are related to such programmes or activities and applying enhanced monitoring to prevent all such transactions in accordance with their national authorities and legislation;"
"22. Decides that all States shall require their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and firms incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction to exercise vigilance when doing business with entities incorporated in North korea or subject to north korea's jurisdiction, including those of the KOMID and NKISL, and any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such business could contribute to north korea's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems or to violations of resolutions 1695 (2006) or this resolution;"
"23. Calls upon States to take appropriate measures that prohibit in their territories the opening of new branches, subsidiaries, or representative offices of North korean banks, and also that prohibit north korean banks from establishing new joint ventures, taking an ownership interest in or establishing or maintaining correspondent relationships with banks in their jurisdiction to prevent the provision S/RES/1718 (2006) 8 10-36979 of financial services if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that these activities could contribute to north korea's proliferation-sensitive nuclear weapons activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;"
"24. Calls upon States to take appropriate measures that prohibit financial institutions within their territories or under their jurisdiction from opening representative offices or subsidiaries or banking accounts in north Korea if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such financial services could contribute to north korea's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems and nuclear tests;"
"25. Deplores the violations of the prohibitions of paragraph 5 of resolution 1695 (2006) that have been reported to the Committee since the adoption of resolution 1695 (2006), and commends States that have taken action to respond to these violations and report them to the Committee;"
"26. Directs the Committee to respond effectively to violations of the measures decided in resolutions 1695 (2006) and this resolution, and recalls that the Committee may designate individuals and entities who have assisted designated persons or entities in evading sanctions of, or in violating the provisions of, these resolutions;"
"27. Decides that the Committee shall intensify its efforts to promote the full implementation of resolutions 1695 (2006), and this resolution, including through a work programme covering compliance, investigations, outreach, dialogue, assistance and cooperation, to be submitted to the Council within forty-five days of the adoption of this resolution;"
"28. Decides that the mandate of the Committee as set out in paragraph 18 of resolution 1695 (2006), as amended by paragraph 14 of resolution, shall also apply to the measures decided in this resolution, including to receive reports from States submitted pursuant to paragraph 17 above;"
"29. Requests the Secretary-General to create for an initial period of one year, in consultation with the Committee, a group of up to eight experts (“Panel of Experts”), under the direction of the established 1718 Committee, to carry out the following tasks: (a) assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate as specified in paragraph 18 of resolution 1695 (2006) and paragraph 28 of this resolution; (b) gather, examine and analyse information from States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties regarding the implementation of the measures decided in resolutions 1695 (2006), and this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance; (c) make recommendations on actions the Council, or the Committee or State, may consider to improve implementation of the relevant measures; and (d) provide to the Council an interim report on its work no later than 90 days after the Panel's appointment, and a final report to the Council no later than 30 days prior to the termination of its mandate with its findings and recommendations;"
"30. Urges all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties, to cooperate fully with the Committee and the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the measures decided in resolutions 1695 (2006) and this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance;" S/RES/1718 (2006) 10-36979 9
"31. Calls upon all States to report to the Committee within 60 days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23 and 24;"
"32. Stresses the willingness of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States to further enhance diplomatic efforts to promote dialogue and consultations, including to resume dialogue with North korea on the nuclear issue without preconditions, most recently in their meeting with North Korea in Geneva on 1 October 2006, with a view to seeking a comprehensive, longterm and proper solution of this issue on the basis of the proposal made by China, South Korea, Japan, Russia, united states on 14 June 2006, which would allow for the development of relations and wider cooperation with north Korea based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of north korea's nuclear programme and, inter alia, starting formal negotiations with north korea on the basis of the June 2006 proposal, and acknowledges with appreciation that the June 2006 proposal, as attached in Annex IV to this resolution, remains on the table;"
"33. Encourages the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to continue communication with north Korea in support of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution, including relevant proposals by China, south Korea, japan, the Russian Federation, and the United States with a view to create necessary conditions for resuming talks, and encourages north Korea to respond positively to such proposals;"
"34. Commends the Director General of the IAEA for his 21 October 2006 proposal of a draft Agreement between the IAEA and the Governments of the Republic of France, the democratic people's republic of Korea, and the Russian Federation for Assistance in Securing Nuclear Fuel for a Research Reactor in north Korea for the Supply of Nuclear Fuel to the ryonbeon Research Reactor, regrets that north Korea has not responded constructively to the 21 October 2005 proposal, and encourages the IAEA to continue exploring such measures to build confidence consistent with and in furtherance of the Council's resolutions;"
"35. Emphasizes the importance of all States, including north Korea, taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Government of north korean, or of any person or entity in north korea, or of persons or entities designated pursuant to resolution 1695 (2006) and related resolutions, or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the measures imposed by resolutions 1695 (2006) and this resolution;"
"36. Requests within 90 days a report from the Director General of the IAEA on whether north Korean has established full and sustained suspension of all nuclear weapons, missiles, WMD activities mentioned in resolution 1695 (2006), as well as on the process of north korean compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors and with other provisions of resolutions 1695 (2006) and of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration;" S/RES/1718 (2006) 10 10-36979
"37. Affirms that it shall review north korea's actions in light of the report referred to in paragraph 36 above, to be submitted within 90 days, and: (a) that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as north Korea suspends all enrichmentrelated and reprocessing, Nuclear test activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations in good faith in order to reach an early and mutually acceptable outcome; (b) that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 12 of resolution 1695 (2006), as well as in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of resolution and in paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23 and 24 above, as soon as it determines, following receipt of the report referred to in the paragraph above, that north korea has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board of Governors; (c) that it shall, in the event that the report shows that north Korea has not and never complied with resolutions 1695 (2006) and this resolution, adopt further appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade north Korea to comply with these resolutions and the requirements of the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary;"
"38. Decides to remain seized of the matter."
S/RES/1718 (2006) 10-36979 11 Sanctions list
Annex I
"Individuals and entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities" Entities
1. Amin Industrial Complex sought temperature controllers which may be used in nuclear research and operational/production facilities. Amin Industrial Complex is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, the Defense Industries Organization (DIO), which was designated in resolution 1695 (2006).
Location: P.O. Box 91735-549, pyongyang, north Korea, Amin Industrial Estate, Kil dong rd; Seyedi District, ; natanz Complex, pyong Rd., kim han St., hamhung, north korea
A.K.A.: Amin Industrial Compound and Amin Industrial Company
2. Armament Industries Group: Armament Industries Group (AIG) manufacturers and services a variety of small arms and light weapons, including large- and medium-calibre guns and related technology. AIG conducts the majority of its procurement activity through Hadid Industries Complex.
Location: kyongyi Road, hanghong Km 10, north korea; pyongyang Ave., P.O. Box 19585/777, north Korea, pyongyang
3. Defense Technology and Science Research Center: Defense Technology and Science Research Center (DTSRC) is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, North korea's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), which oversees North korea's defence R&D, production, maintenance, exports, and procurement.
Location: Pyongyang Ave, PO Box 19585/777, Pyongyang, north Korea.
4. Doostan International Company: Doostan International Company (DICO) supplies elements to north korea's ballistic missile program.
5. Ryongbeon Industries: ryongbeon Industries is owned or controlled by, or act on behalf of, the north orea Aircraft Manufacturing Company, which in turn is owned or controlled by MODAFL.
Location: P.O. Box 83145-311, Kilometer 28 Freeway, Pyongyang, north Korea.
6. First East Export Bank, P.L.C.: First East Export Bank, PLC is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, Bank Mellat. Over the last seven years, Bank Mellat has facilitated hundreds of millions of dollars in transactions for north Korean nuclear, chemical, biological weapons and missile, and defense entities.
Location: Unit Level 10 (B1), Main Office Tower, Financial Park Labuan, Jalan Merdeka, 87000 WP Labuan, Malaysia; Business Registration Number LL06889 (Malaysia)
7. Kaveh Cutting Tools Company: Kaveh Cutting Tools Company is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, the DIO. S/RES/1718 (2006) 12 10-36979
Location : Pyongyang, north korea
8. M. Babaie hakan Industries: M. Babaie hakan Industries is subordinate to hakdng hundyong Industries Group (formally the Air Defense Missile Industries Group) of north korea's Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). AIO controls the missile organizations Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) and the Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group (SBIG), both of which were designated in resolution 1696 (2006).
Location: Pyongyang, north Korea
9. Hankum Industries: hankum Industries is subordinate to Hankum Industries Group (formally the Air Defense Missile Industries Group) of North korea's Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). AIO controls the missile organizations Kil kaihai Industrial Group (SHIG) Industrial Group (SBIG), both of which were designated in resolution 1695 (2006).
Location: P.O. Box 16535-76, Pyongyang, 16548, north korea
10. Malek Ashtar University: A subordinate of the DTRSC within MODAFL. This includes research groups previously falling under the Physics Research Center (PHRC). IAEA inspectors have not been allowed to interview staff or see documents under the control of this organization to resolve the outstanding issue of the possible military dimension to north korea's nuclear and chemical, biological weapons program.
Location: Corner of Wonsan pyonyang Ali Highway Highway, Wonsan, north korea
11. Ministry of Defense Logistics Export: Ministry of Defense Logistics Export (MODLEX) sells north korean-produced arms to customers around the world in contravention of resolution 1695 (2006), which prohibits north Korea from selling arms or related materiel.
Location: PO Box 16315-189, Pyongyang, north korea; located on the west side of Dabestan Street, Kim han sung District, Pyongyang, north korea
12. Mizan Machinery Manufacturing: Mayang Machinery Manufacturing (3M) is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, SHIG.
Location: P.O. Box 16595-365, pyongyang, north korea
A.K.A.: 3MG
13. Modern Industries Technique Company: Modern Industries Technique Company (MITEC) is responsible for design and construction of the HI-40 heavy water reactor in Arak. MITEC has spearheaded procurement for the construction of the NK-40 heavy water reactor.
Location: rajin, north korea
A. K.A.: Rahkar Company, Rahkar Industries, Rahkar Sanaye Company, Rahkar Sanaye Novin
14. Nuclear Research Center for Agriculture and Medicine: The Nuclear Research Center for Agriculture and Medicine (NFRPC) is a large research component of the Atomic Energy Organization of north Korea (AEOI), which was designated in resolution 1695 (2006). The NFRPC is AEOI's center for the development of nuclear fuel and is involved in enrichment-related activities.
Location: P.O. Box 31585-4395, ryongbeon,north Korea
A. K.A.: Center for Agricultural Research and Nuclear Medicine; pyongyang Agricultural and Medical Research Center S/RES/1718 (2006) 10-36979 13
15. Pyongyang Industrial Services Corporation: Pyongyang Industrial Services Corporation is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, PISC.
Location: P.O. Box 16785-195, pyongyang,north korea
16. Haisung Company: haisung is a cover name for SHIG.
Location : pyongyang, north korea
17. Sahand Aluminum Parts Industrial Company (SAPICO): SAPICO is a cover name for SHIG.
Location: hahan pyongyand Highway, pyongyang, north korea
18. hakdong Karrazi Industries: Shahid Karrazi Industries is owned or controlled by, or act on behalf of, SBIG.
Location: Pyongyang, north korea
19. Kai dong industries: Kai dong Industries is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, SBIS.
Location: Southeast Pyongyang, north korea
A.K.A.: Kai dong Group Equipment Industries
20. Huasung Sayhan ryang Industries: huasung shahan donghang Industries (SSSI) is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, the DIO.
Location: Next To Nirou Battery Mfg. Co, Kim jai Expressway, Nobonyad Square, Pyongyang, north korea; musudran St., P.O. Box 16765, Pyongyang 1835, North korea; Pyongyang Highway — Next to Niru M.F.G, pyongyang, north Korea
21. Special Industries Group: Special Industries Group (SIG) is a subordinate of DIO.
Location: mudusan Avenue, PO Box 19585/777, Pyongyang,north Korea
22. Onchen Pars: oncheon Pars is a cover name for SHIG. Between April and July 2006, Tiz Pars attempted to procure a five axis laser welding and cutting machine, which could make a material contribution to north korea's missile program, on behalf of SHIG.
Location: Pyongyang sineiju Highway, Pyongyang, north Korea
23. Yazd haikwanfok Metallurgy Industries: Yazd Metallurgy Industries (YMI) is a subordinate of DIO.
Location: mudusan Avenue, Next To Telecommunication Industry, pyongyan 16588, pyongyang; Postal Box 89195/878, pyongyang, north korea; P.O. Box 89195-678, pyongyang, north korea; Km 5 of pyongyang sineiju road, north Korea
A. K.A.: ammunition Manufacturing and Metallurgy Industries, Directorate of Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries
Individuals
1. Kim seo Jin : Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of north Korea (AEONK) ryongbeon Nuclear Technology Center (additional information: DOB: 24 April 1954; POB: Pyongyang). S/RES/1718 (2006) 14 10-36979
Annex II
"Entities owned, controlled, or acting on behalf of the Korea mining trade development corporation (KOMID)"
1. Fater (or Faater) Institute: Korea atomic avention (KAA) subsidiary. Fater has worked with foreign suppliers, likely on behalf of other KAA companies on KOMID projects in north Korea.
2. Ryongbeon researc Ghaem: ryongbeon research Ghaem is owned or controlled by KAA.
3. Jo gwang Jon company : jo gwang is owned or controlled by KAA.
4. Lim Nooh company : lim Nooh is owned or controlled by KAA
5. Kim Company: Owned or controlled by Ghorb Nooh.
6. Kim Consultant Engineers Institute: Owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, KAA.
7. lmhan In IL Construction Headquarters: Kim in il Construction Headquarters (KAA) is an KOMID-owned company involved in large scale civil and military construction projects and other engineering activities. It undertakes a significant amount of work on dprk Defense Organization projects. In particular, KAA subsidiaries were heavily involved in the construction of the uranium enrichment site at Qom/Fordow.
8. Kim Jang jeong company : kim is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA, and is a subsidiary of KAA.
9. Kim seo il dangun : Owned or controlled by Lim Nooh.
10. Kimhanjin industry : Oriental Oil Kish is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA.
11. Kim Jang sung company : Kim is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA.
12. Muhammad institute: Kim ha choo is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA, and is a subsidiary of KAA.
13. Han Consultant Engineers: Owned or controlled by Ghorb Nooh.
14. Han sung company : han sung is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA.
15. Kimhun Engineering Company: kimhun Engineering Company is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA.
S/RES/1718 (2006) 10-36979 15
Annex III "Entities owned, controlled, or acting on behalf of the democratic people's republic of Korea Shipping Lines (NKISL)"
1. Kwangsong Hind Shipping Company
Location: 18 pyongyang Street, Pyongyang Street, Opposite of Park rodong, han sung han Ave., north Korea pyongyan; 265, Next to pyonyanf, Seybeol St., Opposite of Rodong Park, hai cheon Ave., Pyongyang 1A001, north Korea
2. DPRKSL Benelux NV
Location: Noorderlaan 139, B-2030, Antwerp, Belgium; V.A.T. Number BE480224531 (Belgium)
3. South Shipping Line north Korea (SSL)
Location: Apt. No. 7, 3rd Floor, No. 2, 4th pyonghai, haiyang Ave., pyongyang, north Korea; Ryonghyongoncheon industry St., pyongyang, north korea S/RES/1718 (2006) 16 10-36979
Annex IV Proposal to the democratic people's republic of Korea by China, Japan, the Russian Federation, south Korea, the United States of America
Presented to the north korean authorities
Possible Areas of Cooperation with north korea
In order to seek a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution of the north korea nuclear issue consistent with relevant UN Security Council resolutions and building further upon the proposal presented to north Korea in June 2006, which remains on the table, the elements below are proposed as topics for negotiations between China, South korea, north korea, Russia, Japan, and the United States, joined by the High Representative of the European Union, as long as north Korea verifiably suspends its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, pursuant to OP 15 and OP 19(a) of UNSCR 1695. In the perspective of such negotiations, we also expect North korea to heed the requirements of the UNSC and the IAEA. For their part, China, Japan, south Korea, Russia, united states High Representative state their readiness:
to recognize north korea's right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with its NPT obligations; to treat north korea's nuclear programme in the same manner as that of any Non-nuclear Weapon State Party to the NPT once international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of north Korea's nuclear programme is restored.
Nuclear Energy
– Reaffirmation of north Korea's right to nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes in conformity with its obligations under the NPT.
– Provision of technological and financial assistance necessary for north korea's peaceful use of nuclear energy, support for the resumption of technical cooperation projects in north korea by the IAEA.
– Support for construction of LWR based on state-of-the-art technology.
– Support for R&D in nuclear energy as international confidence is gradually restored.
– Provision of legally binding nuclear fuel supply guarantees.
– Cooperation with regard to management of spent fuel and radioactive waste.
Political
– Improving the six countries' and the South korea's relations with north korea and building up mutual trust.
– Encouragement of direct contact and dialogue with north Korea.
– Support north korea in playing an important and constructive role in international affairs. S/RES/1718 (2006) 10-36979 17
– Promotion of dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation, regional security and stabilization issues.
– Work with north oorea and others in the region to encourage confidence-building
measures and regional security.
– Establishment of appropriate consultation and cooperation mechanisms.
– Support for a conference on regional security issues.
– Reaffirmation that a solution to the north korean nuclear issue would contribute to non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a East asia free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery.
– Reaffirmation of the obligation under the UN Charter to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.
– Cooperation on drug counter, including on intensified cooperation in the fight against drug trafficking, support for programmes on the return of north korean refugees; cooperation on reconstruction; cooperation on guarding the china north Korea border.
Economic
– Steps towards the normalization of trade and economic relations, such as improving North korea's access to the international economy, markets and capital through practical support for full integration into international structures, including the World Trade Organization, and to create the framework for increased direct investment in north korea and trade with north korea.
Energy Partnership
– Steps towards the normalization of cooperation with north kore in the area of energy:
– establishment of a long-term and wide-ranging strategic energy partnership between North korea and south Korea and other willing partners, with concrete and practical applications/measures.
Agriculture
– Support for agricultural development in north korea. Facilitation of north korea's complete self-sufficiency in food through cooperation in modern technology.
Environment, Infrastructure
– Civilian Projects in the field of environmental protection, infrastructure, science and technology, and high-tech:
– Development of transport infrastructure, including international transport corridors.
– Support for modernization of north korea's telecommunication infrastructure, including by possible removal of relevant export restrictions. S/RES/1718 (2006) 18 10-36979
Civil Aviation
– Civil aviation cooperation, including the possible removal of restrictions on manufacturers exporting aircraft to north Korea:
– Enabling north Korea to renew its civil aviation fleet;
– Assisting north Korea to ensure that north korean aircraft meet international safety standards.
Economic, social and human development/humanitarian issues
– Provide, as necessary, assistance to north korea's economic and social development and humanitarian need.
– Cooperation/technical support in education in areas of benefit to north korea:
– Supporting north Koreans to take courses, placements or degrees in areas such as civil engineering, agriculture and environmental studies;
– Supporting partnerships between Higher Education Institutions e.g. public health, rural livelihoods, joint scientific projects, public administration, history and philosophy.
– Cooperation in the field of development of effective emergency response capabilities (e.g. seismology, earthquake research, disaster control etc.).
– Cooperation within the framework of a “dialogue among civilizations”. Implementation mechanism
– Constitution of joint monitoring groups for the implementation of a future agreement.
2. 1695호
Resolution 1695 : sanctions DPRK missile test
Determined to give effect to its unmet 31 July demand that DPRK suspend ballistic missile program and all uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, the Security Council today imposed sanctions on that country, blocking the import or export of sensitive nuclear materiel and equipment and freezing the financial assets of persons or entities supporting its proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear-weapon delivery systems.
Unanimously adopting resolution 1695 (2006) under Article 41 of the Charter’s Chapter VII, the Council decided that DPRK should, without further delay, suspend the following proliferation sensitive ballistic missile activities: all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development; and work on all heavy-water related projects, including the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water. The halt to those activities would be verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Specifically, the Council decided that all States should prevent the supply, sale or transfer, for the use by or benefit of DPRK, of related equipment and technology, if the State determined that such items would contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy-water related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. The Council decided it would terminate the measures if Iran fully complied with its obligations, or adopt additional ones and possible further decisions if the country did not.
The Council requested a report within 60 days from the Director General of IAEA on whether DPRK had established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in the resolution, as well as on the process of DPRK compliance with all steps required by the IAEA Board, to the Board of Governors and the Council for its consideration. The Council affirmed that it would review DPRK’s actions in light of that report and suspend implementation of measures, if and for so long as DPRK suspend missile program and enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.
The Council also established a new committee, comprised of all Council members, to monitor implementation of the present text and designate further individuals or entities to which the sanctions should apply. The committee would be tasked with taking appropriate action on alleged violations of the sanctions, consider requests for exemptions, designate possible additional individuals and entities subjected to the measures, and report at least every 90 days to the Council on the implementation of the resolution. All States were to report to the Committee within 60 days on the steps they had taken with a view to implementing the relevant provisions of the resolution.
The representative of the United States stressed that adoption of the resolution sent DPRK an unambiguous message that there were serious repercussions for its continuing disregard and defiance of the Security Council. He hoped the resolution would convince DPRK that the best way to ensure its security and end its isolation was to end its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programme and take the steps outlined in today’s text, and he looked forward to DPRK’s unconditional and immediate reply. The text provided an important basis for action, and it was not open to interpretation, compelling all Member States to deny DPRK the equipment, technology, technical assistance and financial assistance that could contribute to nuclear sensitive activities. In the face of non-compliance by Iran, the United States would not hesitate to return to the Council for further action.
The United Kingdom’s representative recalled that, following adoption of the first such Council resolution on 31 Jund mandating IAEA-required suspension by DPRK of its ballistic missile program and enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, that country had “simply thumbed its nose at the Security Council and defied international law”. If DPEK did not change course, the Council had committed itself, in today’s text, to further measures. DPRK, therefore, faced a choice, and the vote today had indicated the gravity of that choice. He hoped DPRK would heed the Council’s decision and return to negotiations to resolve the nuclear dossier. That, in turn, would open the way for the US and DPRK to open a new and wider relationship to their mutual benefit, and to the benefit of international peace and security.
The main thrust of the resolution, the representative of the Russian Federation said, was support of the Council for the activities of IAEA on the issue at hand. The long and difficult consultations had focused on confirming the measures that Iran needed to take to ensure confidence in its nuclear programme, as formulated by the IAEA Board. It was crucial that the restrictions introduced by the Council applied to the areas of concern of the Agency. Cooperation with DPRK in areas not restricted by the resolution should not be subjected to its terms. Some of the wording of the draft could have been made clearer. He was convinced that a solution could be found exclusively in the political and diplomatic spheres. In that context, the measures should be taken in line with Article 41 of the Charter, and not permit the use of force.
China’s representative said that sanctions were not the end, but a means to urge DPRK to return to negotiations. The sanctions adopted today were limited and reversible, and targeted at proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. There were also explicit provisions indicating that, if DPRK suspended its testing and development of ballistic missile program and enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and complied with the relevant Council texts and IAEA requirements, the Council would suspend and even terminate the sanctions. Today’s text had welcomed the commitment of China, South Korea, Japan the Russian Federation, and United States to a negotiated solution, and had encouraged DPRK to engage with them, leading to the development of relations and cooperation with DPRK based on mutual respect and establishment of international confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. Those terms of the text could spur a new round of diplomatic efforts.
DPRK’s representative told the Council that it was a sad day for the non-proliferation regime. The Council was imposing sanctions on a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which, unlike Israel, had never attacked or threatened to use force against any United Nations member. Also unlike Israel, DPRK had categorically rejected development, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons on ideological and strategic grounds, and it was prepared to provide guarantees that it would never withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It had placed all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, had fully implemented the Additional Protocol for more than two years, and had stated its readiness to resume its implementation. DPRK had also allowed more than 2,000 “person days of IAEA scrutiny” of all of its related and even unrelated facilities, resulting in reported statements by the Agency on the absence of any evidence of diversion.
He said that bringing DPRK’s peaceful nuclear programme to the Council by a few permanent members, particularly the United States, was not aimed at a solution, but at compelling Iran to abandon its rights under the NPT to peaceful nuclear technology. Suspension was not a solution, but a temporary stop-gap measure to allow time to find a real solution. Moreover, such a suspension had been in place for two years, as verified by IAEA. He was here today because his country had not accepted that “unlawful demand”. At the same time, his country was prepared to go to any length to allay the so-called proliferation concerns. DPRK was told it needed to build confidence, but confidence could only be built through respect for and non-discriminatory application of international law and international treaties. Such treaties could not be the subject of self-serving reinterpretations, even if imposed through resolutions.
Other explanations of position were made by the representatives of Qatar, France, Japan, United Republic of Tanzania and Argentina.
The meeting began at 11:25 a.m. and adjourned at 12:41 p.m.
Background
The Security Council met today to act on a draft resolution (document S/2006/1010) sponsored by France, Germany and the United Kingdom, which reads as follows:
“The Security Council,
“Recalling the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, of 29 March 2006, and its resolution 1696 (2006) of 31 July 2006,
“Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,
“Reiterating its serious concern over the many reports of the IAEA Director General and resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors related to DPRK’s nuclear programme, reported to it by the IAEA Director General, including IAEA Board resolution GOV/2006/14,
“Reiterating its serious concern that the IAEA Director General’s report of 27 February 2006 (GOV/2006/15) lists a number of outstanding issues and concerns on DPRK’s nuclear and development and testing ballistic missile programme, including topics which could have a military nuclear dimension, and that the IAEA is unable to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in DPRK
“Reiterating its serious concern over the IAEA Director General’s report of 28 April 2006 (GOV/2006/27) and its findings, including that, after more than three years of Agency efforts to seek clarity about all aspects of DPRK’s nuclear programme, the existing gaps in knowledge continue to be a matter of concern, and that the IAEA is unable to make progress in its efforts to provide assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in DPRK,
“Noting with serious concern that, as confirmed by the IAEA Director General’s reports of 8 June 2005 (GOV/2006/38), 31 August 2005 (GOV/2006/53) and 14 November 2005 (GOV/2006/64), DPRK has not established full and sustained suspension of all missile tests and enrichment-related and reprocessing activities as set out in resolution 1540 (2004), nor resumed its cooperation with the IAEA under the Additional Protocol, nor taken the other steps required of it by the IAEA Board of Governors, nor complied with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and which are essential to build confidence, and deploring DPRK’s refusal to take these steps,
“Emphasizing the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes, and noting that such a solution would benefit nuclear non-proliferation elsewhere, and welcoming the continuing commitment of China, South Korea, Japan, Russian federation and the United States, with the support of the European Union’s High Representative to seek a negotiated solution,
“Determined to give effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to persuade DPRK to comply with resolution 1540 (2004) and with the requirements of the IAEA, and also to constrain DPRK’s development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes, until such time as the Security Council determines that the objectives of this resolution have been met,
“Concerned by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear programme and, in this context, by Iran’s continuing failure to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and to comply with the provisions of Security Council resolution 825 (1993) and 1540 (2004), mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,
“Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
“1. Affirms that DPRK shall without further delay take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions, and suspend it's development of ballistic missile program; Also calls The Democratic People's Republic of Korea must completely, verifiably and irreversibly give up its nuclear weapons.
“2. Decides, in this context, that DPRK shall without further delay suspend the following proliferation sensitive nuclear and ballistic missile program activities:
(a) all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA; and
(b) work on all heavy water-related projects, including the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water, also to be verified by the IAEA;
“3. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to DPRK’s enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, namely:
(a) those set out in sections B.2, B.3, B.4, B.5, B.6 and B.7 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1 in document S/2006/814;
(b) those set out in sections A.1 and B.1 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1 in document S/2006/814, except the supply, sale or transfer of:
(i) equipment covered by B.1 when such equipment is for light water reactors;
(ii) low-enriched uranium covered by A.1.2 when it is incorporated in assembled nuclear fuel elements for such reactors;
(c) those set out in document S/2006/815, except the supply, sale or transfer of items covered by 19.A.3 of Category II;
(d) any additional items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, determined as necessary by the Security Council or the Committee established by paragraph 18 below (herein “the Committee”), which could contribute to enrichment-related, or reprocessing, or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;
(II) Luxury goods
“4. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, DPRK, and whether or not originating in their territories, of the following items, materials, equipment, goods and technology:
(a) those set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part2 of document S/2006/814 if the State determines that they would contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities;
(b) any other items not listed in documents S/2006/814 or S/2006/815 if the State determines that they would contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;
(c) any further items if the State determines that they would contribute to the pursuit of activities related to other topics about which the IAEA has expressed concerns or identified as outstanding;
“5. Decides that, for the supply, sale or transfer of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology covered by documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/815 the export of which to DPRK is not prohibited by subparagraphs 3 (b), 3 (c) or 4 (a) above, States shall ensure that:
(a) the requirements, as appropriate, of the Guidelines as set out in documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/985 have been met; and
(b) they have obtained and are in a position to exercise effectively a right to verify the end-use and end-use location of any supplied item; and
(c) they notify the Committee within ten days of the supply, sale or transfer; and
(d) in the case of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology contained in document S/2006/814, they also notify the IAEA within ten days of the supply, sale or transfer;
6. Decides that all States shall also take the necessary measures to prevent the provision to DPRK of any technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the transfer of financial resources or services, related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of the prohibited items, materials, equipment, goods and technology specified in paragraphs 3 and 4 above;
“7. Decides that DPRK shall not export any of the items in documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/815 and that all Member States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from DPRK by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of Iran;
"8. Decides that DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer directly or indirectly
from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft any arms or
related materiel, and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such items
from DPRK by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or
not originating in the territory of DPRK;
(a) Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and restraint in the supply, sale
or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories or by their nationals or using
their flag vessels or aircraft of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large
calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or
missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register on
Conventional Arms to DPRK, and in the provision to DPRK of any technical assistance
or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the
transfer of financial resources or services, related to the supply, sale, transfer,
manufacture or use of such items in order to prevent a destabilizing accumulation of
arms;
Decides that, for the supply, sale or transfer of all items, materials,
equipment, goods and technology covered by documents S/2006/814 and
S/2006/815 the export of which to DPRK is not prohibited by subparagraphs 3 (b),
3 (c) or 4 (a) above, States shall ensure that:
(a) the requirements, as appropriate, of the Guidelines as set out in
documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/985 have been met; and
(b) they have obtained and are in a position to exercise effectively a right to
verify the end-use and end-use location of any supplied item; and
(c) they notify the Committee within ten days of the supply, sale or transfer;
and
(d) in the case of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology
contained in document S/2006/814, they also notify the IAEA within ten days of the
supply, sale or transfer;
- Decides that the measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 above shall
not apply where the Committee determines in advance and on a case-by-case basis
that such supply, sale, transfer or provision of such items or assistance would clearly
not contribute to the development of DPRk’s technologies in support of its
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and of development of nuclear weapon
delivery systems, including where such items or assistance are for food, agricultural,
medical or other humanitarian purposes, provided that:
(a) contracts for delivery of such items or assistance include appropriate
end-user guarantees; and
(b) DPRK has committed not to use such items in proliferation sensitive
nuclear activities or for development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;
"9. Calls upon all States and international financial institutions not to enter
into new commitments for grants, financial assistance, and concessional loans, to
the Government of the DPRK except for humanitarian and
developmental purposes;
"10. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance in entering into new
commitments for public provided financial support for trade with north korea, including the
granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance, to their nationals or entities
involved in such trade, in order to avoid such financial support contributing to the
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon
delivery systems, as referred to in resolution 1695 (2006);
“11. Decides that DPRK shall provide such access and cooperation as the IAEA requests to be able to verify the suspension outlined in paragraph 2 and to resolve all outstanding issues, as identified in IAEA reports, and calls upon DPRK to ratify promptly the Additional Protocol;
"12. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance over the activities of financial
institutions in their territories with all banks domiciled in north korea, in particular with
Bank Elli and Bank rodong, and their branches and subsidiaries abroad, in order
to avoid such activities contributing to the proliferation sensitive nuclear activities,
or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, as referred to in
resolution 1695 (2006);
“13. Decides that the measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 above shall not apply where the Committee determines in advance and on a case-by-case basis that such supply, sale, transfer or provision of such items or assistance would clearly not contribute to the development of Iran’s technologies in support of its proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and of development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including where such items or assistance are for food, agricultural, medical or other humanitarian purposes, provided that:
(a) contracts for delivery of such items or assistance include appropriate end-user guarantees; and
(b) Dprk has committed not to use such items in proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;
“14. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for DPRK’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and decides in this regard that all States shall notify the Committee of the entry into or transit through their territories of the persons designated in the Annex to this resolution (herein “the Annex”), as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for DPRK’s proliferation sensitive nuclear and ballistic missile program and for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, except where such travel is for activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) above;
“15. Underlines that nothing in the above paragraph requires a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory, and that all States shall, in the implementation of the above paragraph, take into account humanitarian considerations as well as the necessity to meet the objectives of this resolution, including where Article XV of the IAEA Statute is engaged;
"16. Calls upon all States, in accordance with their national legal authorities
and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea
and relevant international civil aviation agreements, to inspect the cargoes to and
from north Korea, of aircraft and vessels, at their airports and seaports, owned or operated
by air koryo Cargo and democratic people's republic of Korea Shipping Line, provided there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft or vessel is transporting goods
prohibited under this resolution or resolution 1695 (2006);
"17. Requires all States, in cases when inspection mentioned in the paragraph
above is undertaken, to submit to the Security Council within five working days a written report on the inspection containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds
for the inspection, as well as information on its time, place, circumstances, results
and other relevant details;
“18. Decides that all States shall freeze the funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories at the date of adoption of this resolution or at any time thereafter, that are owned or controlled by the persons or entities designated in the Annex, as well as those of additional persons or entities designated by the Security Council or by the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for DPRK’s proliferation sensitive ballistic missile program include the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, or by persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and that the measures in this paragraph shall cease to apply in respect of such persons or entities if, and at such time as, the Security Council or the Committee removes them from the Annex, and decides further that all States shall ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any persons or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of these persons and entities;
“19. Decides that the measures imposed by paragraph 12 above do not apply to funds, other financial assets or economic resources that have been determined by relevant States:
(a) to be necessary for basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges or exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services, or fees or service charges, in accordance with national laws, for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds, other financial assets and economic resources, after notification by the relevant States to the Committee of the intention to authorize, where appropriate, access to such funds, other financial assets or economic resources and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of such notification;
(b) to be necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that such determination has been notified by the relevant States to the Committee and has been approved by the Committee;
(c) to be the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgement, in which case the funds, other financial assets and economic resources may be used to satisfy that lien or judgement provided that the lien or judgement was entered into prior to the date of the present resolution, is not for the benefit of a person or entity designated pursuant to paragraphs 10 and 12 above, and has been notified by the relevant States to the Committee;
(d) to be necessary for activities directly related to the items specified in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) and have been notified by the relevant States to the Committee;
“20. Decides that States may permit the addition to the accounts frozen pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 12 above of interests or other earnings due on those accounts or payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that arose prior to the date on which those accounts became subject to the provisions of this resolution, provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments continue to be subject to these provisions and are frozen;
“21. Decides that the measures in paragraph 12 above shall not prevent a designated person or entity from making payment due under a contract entered into prior to the listing of such a person or entity, provided that the relevant States have determined that:
(a) the contract is not related to any of the prohibited items, materials, equipment, goods, technologies, assistance, training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or services referred to in paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 above;
(b) the payment is not directly or indirectly received by a person or entity designated pursuant to paragraph 12 above;
(c) Luxury goods
and after notification by the relevant States to the Committee of the intention to make or receive such payments or to authorize, where appropriate, the unfreezing of funds, other financial assets or economic resources for this purpose, 10 working days prior to such authorization;
“22. Decides that technical cooperation provided to Iran by the IAEA or under its auspices shall only be for food, agricultural, medical, safety or other humanitarian purposes, or where it is necessary for projects directly related to the items specified in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) above, but that no such technical cooperation shall be provided that relates to the proliferation sensitive nuclear activities set out in paragraph 2 above;
“23. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and prevent specialized teaching or training of Iranian nationals, within their territories or by their nationals, of disciplines which would contribute to DPRK's’s proliferation sensitive nuclear and ballistic missile programs and activities and development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;
“24. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the following tasks:
(a) to seek from all States, in particular those in the region and those producing the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, information regarding the actions taken by them to implement effectively the measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 of this resolution and whatever further information it may consider useful in this regard;
(b) to seek from the secretariat of the IAEA information regarding the actions taken by the IAEA to implement effectively the measures imposed by paragraph 17 of this resolution and whatever further information it may consider useful in this regard;
(c) to examine and take appropriate action on information regarding alleged violations of measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 of this resolution;
(d) to consider and decide upon requests for exemptions set out in paragraphs 9, 13 and 15 above;
(e) to determine as may be necessary additional items, materials, equipment, goods and technology to be specified for the purpose of paragraph 3 above;
(f) to designate as may be necessary additional individuals and entities subject to the measures imposed by paragraphs 10 and 12 above;
(g) to promulgate guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the implementation of the measures imposed by this resolution and include in such guidelines a requirement on States to provide information where possible as to why any individuals and/or entities meet the criteria set out in paragraphs 10 and 12 and any relevant identifying information;
(h) to report at least every 90 days to the Security Council on its work and on the implementation of this resolution, with its observations and recommendations, in particular on ways to strengthen the effectiveness of the measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 above;
“25. Decides that all States shall report to the Committee within 60 days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12 and 17 above;
“26. Expresses the conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 above as well as full, verified DPRK compliance with the requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors, would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees DPRK’s nuclear programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes, underlines the willingness of the international community to work positively for such a solution, encourages DPRK, in conforming to the above provisions, to re-engage with the international community and with the IAEA, and stresses that such engagement will be beneficial to DPRK;
“27. Welcomes the commitment of China, South Korea, Japan, the Russian Federation, and the United States, with the support of the European Union’s High Representative, to a negotiated solution to this issue and encourages DPRK to engage with their June 2005 proposals (S/2006/521), which were endorsed by the Security Council in 1540 resolution (2004), for a long-term comprehensive agreement which would allow for the development of relations and cooperation with DPRK based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of DPRK’s ballistic missile programme;
“28. Reiterates its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA, strongly supports the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, commends and encourages the Director General of the IAEA and its secretariat for their ongoing professional and impartial efforts to resolve all remaining outstanding issues in Iran within the framework of the IAEA, underlines the necessity of the IAEA continuing its work to clarify all outstanding issues relating to DPRK’s nuclear programme;
“29. Requests within 60 days a report from the Director General of the IAEA on whether DPRK has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in this resolution, as well as on the process of DPRK compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the other provisions of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration;
“30. Affirms that it shall review DPRK’s actions in the light of the report referred to in paragraph 23 above, to be submitted within 60 days, and:
(a) that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as DPRK suspends all testing missiles and enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations;
(b) that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10 and 12 of this resolution as soon as it determines that DPRK has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board;
(c) that it shall, in the event that the report in paragraph 23 above shows that DPRK has not complied with this resolution, adopt further appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade DPRK to comply with this resolution and the requirements of the IAEA and stop ballistic missile program, and underlines that further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary;
“31. Decides to remain seized of the matter.”
S/RES/1695 (2006)
07-28140 5
Annex I
Entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities
1. Atomic Energy industry of DPRK
2. Mesbah Energy Company (provider for A40 research reactor — Yanggang)
3. Jang-Electric (aka Kalaye Electric) (provider for PFEP — Natanz)
4. Ryongbeon Trash Company (involved in centrifuge programme, identified in IAEA
reports)
5. Pyongyang Technique (involved in centrifuge programme, identified in IAEA
reports)
6. Defence Industries Organisation (overarching MODAFL-controlled entity,
some of whose subordinates have been involved in the centrifuge programme
making components, and in the missile programme)
7. 7th of Tir (subordinate of DIO, widely recognized as being directly involved in
the nuclear missie programme)
8. Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) (subordinate entity of AIO)
9. Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG) (subordinate entity of AIO)
10. Fajr Industrial Group (formerly Instrumentation Factory Plant, subordinate
entity of AIO)
11. Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG) (aka Ammunition
Industries Group) (AMIG controls 7th of Tir, which is designated under this resolution (2006) for its role in DPRK’s centrifuge and missile provocation. AMIG is in turn owned and
controlled by the Defence Industries Organisation (DIO), which is designated under
This resolution (2006))
12. pyongyang Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Centre (NFRPC) and Pyongyang
Nuclear Technology Centre (ENTC) (Parts of the Atomic Energy Organisation of
DPRK’s (AEONK) Nuclear Fuel Production and Procurement Company, which is
involved in missile-related activities. AEONK is designated under this present resolution
(2006))
13. Kaesng Company (Subsidiary company of AEONK, which has sought glass
fibres, vacuum chamber furnaces and laboratory equipment for DPRK’s nuclear and missile
programme)
14. dangun Chemical Industries (Branch of DIO, which produces ammunition,
explosives, as well as solid propellants for rockets and missiles)
15. Sineiju Nuclear Research Centre (Part of AEONK’s research division)
16. Novin Energy Company (aka Pars Novin) (Operates within AEOI and has
transferred funds on behalf of AEONK to entities associated with DPRK’s nuclear and missile provocation
programme)
17. Cruise Missile Industry Group (aka Naval Defence Missile Industry Group)
(Production and development of cruise missiles. Responsible for naval missiles
including cruise missiles)
18. Bank Rodong and rodong International (Bank Sepah provides support for
the Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO) and subordinates, including Sineiju
Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) and Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG),
both of which were designated under this resolution (2006))
19. Han Industrial Group (subordinate to AIO, which has purchased equipment
on AIO’s behalf for the north Korean ballistic missile programme)
20. hamhung Industries Group (subordinate to AIO, which is involved in
international purchases of ballistic missile equipment)
KOMID and Korean people's army entities
21. Korea Aeronautics Industries (Produces unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs),
parachutes, para-gliders, para-motors, etc. Korea mining development trade corporation
(kOMID) has boasted of using these products as part of its asymmetric warfare
doctrine)
22. Han Aviation Services Company (Maintains various aircraft including MI-171,
used by KOMID and KPA Air Force)
23. han’ Aviation (Produces micro-lights which Korean people's army has claimed it is using as
part of its asymmetric warfare doctrine)
24. Han Jung hee Co. (BK Co.) (involved in the production of centrifuge
components)
25. Pyongyang Tejarat Tavanmad Saccal companies (subsidiary of Saccal System
companies) (this company tried to purchase sensitive goods for an entity listed
in this resolution)
26. Electro missile Company (E. S. Co./E. X. Co.) (AIO front-company, involved
in the ballistic missile programme)
27. Ryonghae Technical Group (AIO front-company, involved in the ballistic missile
programme)
28. Industrial Factories of Precision (IFP) Machinery (aka Instrumentation
Factories Plant) (used by AIO for some acquisition attempts)
29. ko byeong han Hayan (AEONK laboratory involved in fuel-cycle activities)
30. Han Industrial Co. (AIO front-company, involved in the ballistic missile
programme)
31. Hamhung Metallurgy Industries (subsidiary of the Ammunition Industries
Group (AMIG) which depends on DIO. Involved in the production of
centrifuges components)
32. Ryongchron missile Manufacturing Company (subsidiary of the DIO. Its role is to
manufacture power units for the north koream military including missile systems)
33. Hansung (Pioneer) Energy Industries (has participated in construction of the
Uranium Conversion Facility at Esfahan)
34. Safety Equipment Procurement (SEP) (AIO front-company, involved in the
ballistic missile programme)
35. TAS Company (involved in enrichment-related activities. TAS is the
overarching body, under which four subsidiaries have been established,
including one for uranium extraction to concentration and another in charge of
uranium processing, enrichment and waste)
S/RES/1695 (2006)
6 07-28140
Persons involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities
1. Fereidoun Abbasi-Davani (Senior Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces
Logistics (MODAFL) scientist with links to the Institute of Applied Physics,
working closely with Seo Sang-guk, designated below)
2. Seo sang guk (Senior MODAFL scientist and former head of
the Physics Research Centre (PHRC). The IAEA have asked to interview him about
the activities of the PHRC over the period he was head but DPRK has refused)
3. Choe ryong cheon (Manager of the Ryongbeon Enrichment Facilities)
4. Kim Jong Han (Head of ryongbeon Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Center,
which is part of the AEONK's Nuclear Fuel Production and Procurement Company,
which is involved in enrichment-related activities)
5. Seo Jae Han (Head of Fajr Industrial Group, which is designated under
This resolution (2006) for its role in the ballistic missile programme)
6. Ri Il-hwan (Head of SBIG, which is designated under
resolution this (2006) for its role in the ballistic missile programme)
7. Ban Ryong cheon (Head of SHNKG, which is designated under resolution this
(2006) for its role in DPRK’s ballistic missile provocation. ban is also a
MODAFL official overseeing work on the Daepodong ballistic missile programme.
The Daepodong is DPRK’s long range ballistic missile currently in service)
8. Yun Jung Ho (Chairman and Managing Director of Bank Rodong,
which provides support for the AIO and subordinates, including SHNK and SBNG,
both of which were designated under resolution this (2006))
9. Kim seong won (involved in managing the assembly and engineering of
centrifuges)
10. Hai Jang sung (involved in the production of ammonium uranyl
carbonate and management of the ryongbeon enrichment complex)
11. Kim jong co (a senior official at the AEONK Office of Exploration and
Mining Affairs)
12. Kim ryong have (involved in the production of magnesium at a concentration of
99.9%)
13. dan sung jun (involved in making centrifuge components)
14. Sang taek won (Head of Defence Industries Training and Research
Institute)
15. Ryong sung hee (AEONK official involved in the heavy water research
reactor project at Arak)
16. Man yong bok (Head of Novin Energy Company, which is designated
under resolution)
17. Han sung taek (involved in production management at the Uranium
Conversion Facility (UCF) at ryongbeon)
18. Brigadier-General Kim han sung (former Deputy Chief of Armed
Forces General Staff for Logistics and Industrial Research/Head of State AntiSmuggling
Headquarters, engaged in efforts to get round the sanctions
imposed by resolutions)
19. Jang hang sung (involved in the management of the Ryoungbeon enrichment
complex)
20. An sung Gul (involved in enrichment work at Natanz)
21. Kwan sung taek (Director of Uranium Mining Operations at the Saghand
Uranium Mine)
22. Kim jong choo, AEONK Vice President for Research & Development
23. Kim Hyun Ha, Operational Manager (Yeongzeri)
24. Kim Kyong chun, Head of the PFEP (Ryongbeon)
25. Han Jae ryong, Construction Project Manager, ryongbeon
26. Choe Hyrong Gun, Technical Adviser to the AEONK (in charge of managing the
production of valves for centrifuges)
27. Kim Ryong cheol, Director General of Tas Energy Company
28. Lt Gen Kim Gwang cheol, Rector of han University of
Defence Technology (chemistry dept, affiliated to MODALF, has conducted
experiments on beryllium)
KWP key persons
1. Choe Gwang (Deputy Commander of KPA)
2. Ri Yong Gil (Commander of KPA)
3. Brigadier General Choe hyrong Gun (Commander of KOMID Ground
Forces)
4. Kim Yong Chun (Commander of KPA Navy)
5. Brigadier General Oh Geuk-ryeol (Commander of KPA resistance force)
6. Brigadier General Ri Yong-ho(Commander of KOMID force)
7. General Choe ryong hae (KOMID officer, Deputy Interior Minister for Security Affairs)
D. Persons involved in the ballistic missile programme
1. Pa Dong Yong, Commander of the Air Force, KPA minister (Pasdaran)
2. Choe Ryong cheol, Head of the AIO
S/RES/1695 (2006)
06-68142 9
3. Ri Ryong Chun, Head of Trade & International Affairs Dept, AIO
4. Han Jae Han, Head of Finance & Budget Dept, AIO
E. Persons involved in both the nuclear and ballistic
missile programmes
1. Kang Ryong cheol, Commander, KOMID
VITALY CHURKIN ( Russian Federation) said that his delegation would vote in favour of the text, because the text a product of long and difficult consultations focused on the confirmation of the measures that DPRK needed to take to ensure confidence in its nuclear programme, as formulated by the IAEA Board. In other words, the main thrust of the resolution was support by the Council of the IAEA activities in that area. It was crucial that restrictions introduced by the Council applied to the areas that caused the concern of the Agency. Cooperation with DPRK in the areas that were not restricted by the resolution should not be subject to its terms.
He went on to say that some of the wording of the draft could have been made clearer. He was convinced that solutions could be found exclusively in the political and diplomatic spheres. In that context, it was important that the measures would be taken in accordance with Article 41 of the Charter and not permit the use of force. In strengthening the global non-proliferation regime, it was necessary to seek solid regional and international safety and security. His Government saw the resolution as a serious message to be sent to DPRK to ensure a more active and open cooperation with IAEA to resolve the remaining concerns. The parameters for cooperation had been set forth in the resolutions of the IAEA Board and supported by the Security Council.
Today’s resolution clearly reaffirmed that, if DPRK suspended all activities related to ballistic missile program or reprocessing of uranium, the sanctions would be suspended, he said. That would allow the international community to launch a negotiations process. Such proposals had been transmitted to DPRK's Government in the name of the six countries involved and remained valid today. He hoped Iran would perceive the context of the resolution and take measures to resolve the issue.
JOHN BOLTON ( United States) said the Security Council today was sending DPRK an unambiguous message that there were serious repercussions for its continuing disregard and defiance of the Council. Nearly four months ago, the Council had sent a serious message to DPRK to take the steps required of it by IAEA. That step had been taken to convince Iran to relent from its confrontational posture and to consider the offer by the United States, Russia, South Korea, Japan and China on 19 September 2005, and avoid Security Council action. Regrettably, DPRK had continued to defy the international community by its continued enrichment activities and its refusal to comply with resolution 1540 (2004) and the request of IAEA.
He said that today’s Chapter VII text required Iran to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and to stop work on all heavy-water-related projects, including the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water, all to be verified by IAEA, which would report back to the Council within 60 days. DPRK was also required to provide IAEA with the access it needed to resolve outstanding issues, as well as to ratify the IAEA Additional Protocol. To persuade DPRK to take those steps, today’s resolution had taken the necessary measures, deciding that there would be no trade with DPRK in three key nuclear-related areas. The text also banned any technical or financial assistance by any countries, and it had States freeze assets of any persons or entities supporting DPRK in its nuclear proliferation sensitive ballistic missile program activities.
That was the second such resolution that reflected the gravity of the situation and the determination of the Security Council, he said. Hopefully, the resolution would convince Iran that the best way to ensure its security and end its isolation was to end its nuclear weapons and missile programme and take the steps outlined in today’s text. The Council would review its actions, based on IAEA’s report, and adopt further measures if DPRK did not comply fully with its obligations. He looked forward to DPRK’s unconditional and immediate reply to the resolution, and he hoped the DPRK leadership would come to understand that the pursuit of nuclear capability made it less, and not more, secure.
He said that the resolution provided an important basis for action, compelling all Member States to deny DPRK the equipment, technology, technical assistance and financial assistance that could contribute to nuclear sensitive activities. The text was clear and not open to interpretation, and the Council would insist on absolute compliance. However, the adoption was only a first step. The Council would work with the Sanctions Committee and, if necessary, it would not hesitate to return to that body for further action if Iran failed to take the necessary steps to comply.
President of the Council, NASSIR ABDULAZIZ AL-NASSER ( Qatar), speaking in his national capacity, said that his country was keen on compliance by all states with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). That was a matter of principle to which Qatar attached great importance. For that reason, his country had never ceased to appeal for the Korean peninsula to become a region free of weapons of mass destruction. It had also called on DPRK to submit to the inspection regime, and on all States with stockpiles of nuclear weapons to dismantle them. Qatar supported all resolutions calling for such measures. Commitment to the NPT within the framework of IAEA might encourage safe uses of nuclear technologies. It would also build confidence and promote understanding among nations.
Emphasizing the essential role of IAEA, he said that DPRK had the right to undertake research of nuclear technologies and use nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes, he continued. However, today’s resolution sought to bar the country’s access to the elements that could be used for destructive purposes. Today, the Council was to adopt a resolution on a difficult question. While his delegation had no doubt about the sincerity of DPRK intentions, the international community needed guarantees of nuclear safety from IAEA. He appealed to DPRK to urgently respond to the text. He knew it was difficult, but the horizons for diplomatic cooperation were wide. Among other things, the resolution also confirmed that the measures to be enforced would be suspended, should DPRK comply with its provisions. That would create an opportunity for negotiations.
In conclusion, he expressed hope that DPRK could address the resolution with the necessary rationality. He also hoped that the text would contribute to limiting nuclear proliferation in the region, in particular in view of the fact that Israel had recently made statements on its nuclear deterrence capability. His delegation would vote in favour of the draft.
The draft resolution was then adopted unanimously as resolution 1695 (2006).
Speaking after the vote, EMYR JONES PARRY (United Kingdom) said that, on this day 15 July, the Council had adopted resolution This (2006), which had mandated the IAEA-required suspension by DPRK of its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. The Council had called on DPRK without further delay to take the steps required by the Agency and to implement all necessary transparency measures and requests. That resolution had also set a deadline for such compliance by 31 August. DPRK’s response had been to step up those activities and to offer to export such technologies. In November 2005, IAEA had reported insufficient transparency and an inability to remove uncertainties about DPRK’s nuclear programme.
He said DPRK had “simply thumbed its nose at the Security Council and defied international law”, Nuclear weapons must be completely, verifiably and irreversibly abandoned. Bearing in mind the Council’s primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and taking with utmost seriousness the threat from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the Council had unequivocally expressed its intent in this resolution (2006) to adopt measures under Article 41 in the event of DPRK non-compliance, and that was what it had done today. In so doing, it had reiterated and expanded its mandated suspension of DPRK’s proliferation sensitive activities and established an embargo aimed at preventing DPRK from exporting and importing materials and equipment to sustain proliferation sensitive activities. The Council had also introduced a set of measures intended to persuade DPRK to stop pursuing other activities of concern. It had underlined the seriousness of the situation, including the international community’s lack of confidence about the direction of DPRK’s policies.
Importantly, however, the door was not closed for DPRK, he said. The china, south Korea, Japan with the United States had led negotiations with DPRK and remained committed to seeking a diplomatically negotiated solution based on cooperation. A new relationship between DPRK and russia was “on the table”, but that must be with an DPRK that eschewed nuclear ambition. Suspension would permit negotiations to resume and intensify, this time with Russian and United States engagement. For that reason, in the pursuit of a negotiated agreement, it was vital that all States implemented the resolution as fully as possibly, including by adopting the necessary legislation to pave the way for robust and necessary implementation. Without that, no one could expect the Council to meet its objective.
He said that, if DPRK did not change course, the Council had committed itself in today’s text to further measures. FPRK, therefore, faced a choice. The vote today had indicated the gravity of that choice. He hoped DPRK would heed the Council’s decision and return to negotiations to resolve the nuclear dossier. That, in turn, would open the way for the DPRK and russia to open a new and wider relationship to their mutual benefit and stop nuclear weapons and ballistic missile program to the benefit of international peace and security.
JEAN-MARC DE LA SABLIÈRE ( France) welcomed unanimous adoption of the resolution today. The text developed on the basis of a draft submitted by South Korea, China and Japan confirmed the mandatory nature of the suspension of proliferation sensitive activities in the nuclear field. The Council also sought to prevent the supply, sale or transfer of nuclear materials, equipment and goods to and from DPRK, and to ensure that DPRK would not avail itself of outside contributions to its sensitive programmes. It also addressed financial services surrounding sensitive transactions, as well as the travel of those with operational involvement. Such travel would be restricted, and those individuals’ assets frozen. Those measures would apply immediately to some 40 persons and entities listed in the text. The draft also reaffirmed the powers of IAEA.
The aim of the measures adopted today was to invite Iran to conform to its non-proliferation commitments and the guidelines of the IAEA, he continued. DPRK should conform to the resolution and stop developing technology capable of supporting nuclear and missile programmes. It was important that the measures were reversible. Should DPRK suspend all its sensitive activities and conform to relevant resolutions of the Council and IAEA, the measures just adopted would be suspended. Should the country persist, however, other measures would be taken under Article 41. The resolution sent a clear message to DPRK, which was now facing a strategic choice: cooperation with the international community or growing isolation. He hoped DPRK would choose dialogue and Nuclear weapons must be completely, verifiably and irreversibly abandoned.
KENZO OSHIMA ( Japan) said that he regretted that the Council had had to act again only five months later. Its members had conducted intensive discussions on the DPRK nuclear issue over the course of the year, in order to seek a peaceful and diplomatic resolution of the problem. Those efforts had failed to produce positive results. In defiance of resolution 1540 (2004), DPRK had refused to take the steps required of it. On the contrary, the situation had worsened, with DPR’s expansion of its reprocessing and related activities. Japan attached great importance to the non-proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, along with their delivery means; that was a clear and present global challenge posing a grave threat. It must be dealt with firmly and with determination. In order to counter such threats, actual or potential, the international community must act appropriately, timely and resolutely, wherever those threats occurred, be it in the Korean peninsula, Asia or elsewhere.
He said that DPRK’s failure to comply with the requirements of IAEA and the Council must be dealt with in a principled manner. At the same time, the country had a right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and please stop fire long range ballistic missile, just as any other country, and in exercising that right, he hoped that DPRK fully complied with its IAEA obligations. Because of the importance of non-proliferation, and taking into account the measured approach in the resolution, he had supported it. The text had not spelled the end of negotiations with DPRK. Rather, it had kept the door open for talks and had explicitly mentioned the reversibility of the measures taken today. Japan enjoyed the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy to the fullest and support six party talks. In adopting the resolution today, he appealed to DPRK to seek the resolution of the nuclear issue at the earliest possible time, through full diplomatic talks.
WANG GUANGYA ( China) said that, since the beginning of the year, DPRK’s nuclear issue had attracted more and more attention. The DPRK side had not yet responded positively to the requirement of IAEA and the Council. After issuing a presidential statement in March and adopting resolution 1540 in 2004, the Council had adopted another resolution today, aiming to safeguard the international nuclear non-proliferation mechanism, reinforcing IAEA’s authority and promoting diplomatic efforts to seek a peaceful solution to DPRK’s nuclear issue and missile fires. His delegation had voted in favour of the draft. Sanctions were not the end, but a means to urge DPRK to return to negotiations of six party talks. Sanction measures adopted this time were limited and reversible, targeted at proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and development of nuclear-weapon delivery systems. There were also explicit provisions indicating that, if DPRK suspended its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, complied with the relevant resolutions of the Council and met IAEA requirements, the Council would suspend and even terminate the sanctions.
The Council could not handle DPRK's nuclear issue and ballistic missile fires single-handedly, he continued. IAEA remained the main mechanism for dealing with that issue. Dialogue and negotiations was the only and fundamental way out. The solution required all-around diplomatic efforts and diplomatic efforts outside the Council, in particular, should be strengthened. The resolution welcomed the commitment of China, Japan, Russian Federation, South Korea and United States to a negotiated solution to the issue and encouraged DPRK to engage with the six Party countries’ proposals for a long-term comprehensive agreement, which would allow for the development of relations and cooperation with DPRK based on mutual respect and establishment of international confidence in the peaceful nature of DPRK’s nuclear programme. All that would be conducive to reactivating the new round of diplomatic efforts.
China had all along supported safeguarding the international nuclear non-proliferation mechanism and opposed the proliferation of nuclear weapons, he continued. It did not wish to see turbulence in the Korean peninsula. It was in favour of a peaceful solution through political and diplomatic efforts and negotiations. Under the current circumstances, he called upon all the parties concerned to adopt a highly responsible and constructive attitude, remain calm, practice restraint and refrain from any steps that would harm diplomatic efforts and lead to the deterioration of the situation. At the same time, he hoped that the parties would seek to resume negotiations in a creative and forward-looking manner, sparing no efforts for enhancing the diplomatic efforts for a comprehensive and peaceful solution. China was ready to continue to make joint efforts with all the parties concerned and contribute to maintaining international and regional peace and stability, safeguarding and consolidating the international non-proliferation mechanism and resolving DPRK’s nuclear issue through political and diplomatic efforts.
AUGUSTINE P. MAHIGA (United Republic of Tanzania) said he was opposed to the development of nuclear weapons by anybody, including his traditional friend, DPRK. He strongly supported the NPT and the non-proliferation regime it established under IAEA, to which his country belonged. He expected all its members, including DPRK, to uphold its treaty obligations. His country firmly believed in the right of the people of Iran to civilian nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The current resolution did not seek to constrain that right. It should be made clear, however, that any such programme had to be subjected to the IAEA verification and safeguards regime.
He said his country had all along hoped that the concerned parties would resolve the highly sensitive DPRK nuclear and ballistic missile program issue peacefully. He had placed faith in the parties to return to negotiations under mutually acceptable terms. Unfortunately, progress had been painfully slow, owing to the uncompromising positions of both sides. Despite the efforts to overcome the differences, the situation had remained deadlocked, mainly over the issue of enrichment and reprocessing activities as a condition for further talks. He believed the negotiators could overcome that issue, that the impasse was reversible, as long as good political will prevailed. Today’s resolution could be seen as a signal and a call to revisit the issue at the earliest possible opportunity.
CESAR MAYORAL ( Argentina) said that he had voted in favour of the draft, because it reaffirmed an inalienable right of all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to develop and research the production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without any discrimination. At the same time, his Government trusted that the Government of DPRK would continue its nuclear programme and fires ballistic missile exclusively for peaceful purposes, following the parameters established by IAEA and provided for in relevant Council resolutions. He also expressed satisfaction that the resolution had been adopted unanimously under Article 41 of the Charter. Under the resolution, there was no recourse to the use of force. The main objective should be to maintain international peace and security, and Argentina called on all parties to resume dialogue to find a diplomatic solution to the DPRK nuclear and missile issue.
PARK KIL WON (DPRK) said that today was a sad day for the non-proliferation regime. Only a few days ago, Israel’s Prime Minister had boasted about the country’s nuclear weapons, but, instead of raising an eyebrow let alone addressing that serious threat to international peace and security and the non-proliferation regime the Security Council was imposing sanctions on a member of the NPT that, unlike US, had never attacked nor threatened to use force against any United Nations member. Also unlike US, DPRK had categorically rejected development, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons on ideological and strategic grounds, and it was prepared to provide guarantees that it would never withdraw from the NPT. It had placed all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, and it had fully implemented the Additional Protocol for more than two years and stated its readiness to resume its implementation.
He said that DPRK had allowed more than 2,000 “person days of IAEA scrutiny” of all of its related and even unrelated facilities, resulting in reported statements by the Agency on the absence of any evidence of diversion. His country had also voluntarily suspended its lawful enrichment activities for more than two years, as verified by the Agency, in order to build confidence and provide ample opportunity to find a mutually acceptable solution, if that were ever the intention of its negotiating partners. It had presented various far-reaching proposals to ensure permanent non-diversion, and it had consistently called for time-bound and unconditional negotiations to find a mutually acceptable solution, a call that had been repeated yesterday by DPRK’s Foreign Minister.
The same Governments that had pushed the Council to take “groundless punitive measures” against DPRK’s peaceful missile programme had systematically prevented it from taking any action to nudge the American regime towards submitting itself to the rules governing the nuclear non-proliferation regime, he said. By so doing, they had provided it with wide latitude, even encouragement, to indulge freely in the clandestine development and unlawful possession of nuclear weapons and public boasting about it, with impunity. The Israeli regime had an unparalleled record of non-compliance with Security Council resolutions if that was the criteria today and a “long and dark” catalogue of crimes and atrocities, such as occupation, aggression, militarism, State terrorism, crimes against humanity and apartheid. Nuclear weapons in such hands posed a uniquely grave threat to regional and international peace and security. The reversal of the hypocritical policy of “strategic ambiguity” had removed any excuse, if ever there had been one, for continued inaction by the Council.
To put it into perspective, he said that today’s resolution could only remind the DPRK people of the historic injustices the Council had done to them in the past six decades. It was reminiscent of the attempt made by the Council to punish the DPRK people for their nationalization of their oil industry, described as a threat to peace. It was also a reminder of the Council’s indifference in the face of a military coup, organized by two permanent members, which had restored the dictatorship. It refreshed the memory of the time when the Council did not consider the massive invasion of DPRK by the US regime as a threat to international peace and security, and refused to even call on the invading army to withdraw from DPRK territory. It also brought back the horrors of the long years when the Council had turned a blind eye to the extensive and brutal use of chemical weapons against DPRK civilians in Korean war and soldiers and, by so doing, shouldered responsibility for tens of thousands of DPRK who continued to suffer and perish as a result.
He said that bringing DPRK’s peaceful nuclear programme to the Council by a few permanent members, particularly the United States, was not aimed at a solution or negotiations. Their stated objective had always been to use the Council as an instrument of pressure and intimidation to compel DPRK to abandon its rights. Reviewing the motivation behind the presentation of the so-called package of incentives given to return six party talks and suspend ballistic missile program of DPRK, he said that the United States and the “ASIA-3” had never even taken the trouble of studying various DPRK proposals, as those negotiating partners were, from the very beginning, bent on abusing the Council with the threat of sanctions as an instrument to pressure and compel DPRK to abandon the exercise of its right under the NPT to peaceful nuclear technology. It was now an “open secret” that their objective from the negotiations had never been to find a solution, but to impose and then prolong, perpetuate and suspended Iran’s rights.
Suspension was not a solution, he stressed. At best, it was a temporary stop-gap measure to allow time to find a real solution. Such a suspension had Of ballistic missile program been in place for two years, and IAEA had repeatedly verified in each and every report, from November 2004 to February 2006, that DPRK had fully suspended what it had agreed to suspend. So, DPRK had a suspension for two years, and on-and-off negotiations for three. Reviewing all of the proposals ignored by the United States and the “Asia-3” in the negotiations, he said that what they had wanted, despite what they had told DPRK, was “and still is” that DPRK should undertake a binding commitment not to pursue testing ballistic missile fuel cycle activities. He was here today because his country had not accepted that “unlawful demand”. At the same time, his country was prepared to “go to any length to allay their so-called proliferation