첫 대북제재로 더욱 제재를 강화하였다.
안전보장이사회는
2006년 3월 29일 의장 성명 S/PRST/2006/15와
2006년 7월 결의르 상기하며,
핵무기 확산 금지 조약에 대한 공약을 재확인하고, 조약 당사국이 해당 조약의 제1조 및 제2조에 따라 차별 없이 평화적 목적을 위해 핵에너지의 연구, 생산 및 사용을 개발할 권리가 있음을 상기하며,
IAEA 사무총장이 보고한 이란의 핵 프로그램과 관련된 IAEA 이사회 결의안과 IAEA 이사회 결의안 GOV/2006/14를 포함한 많은 IAEA 사무총장의 보고서에 대한 심각한 우려를 재확인하며,
2006년 2월 27일 IAEA 사무총장의 보고서에 대한 심각한 우려를 재확인하며, (GOV/2006/15)는 북한의 핵 및 미사일 프로그램에 대한 여러 가지 미해결 문제와 우려 사항을 나열합니다. 여기에는 군사적 핵 차원을 가질 수 있는 주제가 포함되며, IAEA는 북한에 신고되지 않은 핵 물질이나 활동이 없다고 결론 내릴 수 없습니다.
IAEA 사무총장의 2006년 4월 28일 보고서(GOV/2006/27)와 그 결과에 대한 심각한 우려를 반복하며, 여기에는 3년 이상 기관이 북한의 핵 미사일 프로그램의 모든 측면에 대한 명확성을 모색하기 위해 노력했지만, 지식의 기존 격차가 계속 우려 사항이며,
IAEA는 북한에 신고되지 않은 핵 물질과 활동이 없다는 것을 보장하기 위한 노력에서 진전을 이룰 수 없다는 것을 포함합니다.
IAEA 사무총장의 2006년 6월 8일 보고서에서 확인된 바와 같이 심각한 우려를 가지고 주목합니다. (GOV/2006/38), 2006년 8월 31일(GOV/2006/53) 및
2006년 11월 14일(GOV/2006/64)에 따르면, 북한은
결의안 1696(2006)에 명시된 대로 모든 농축 관련 및 재처리 활동을 완전하고 지속적으로 중단하지 않았으며,
추가 의정서에 따라 IAEA와의 협력을 재개하지 않았고,
IAEA 이사회가 요구하는 다른 조치를 취하지 않았으며,
안전 보장 이사회 결의안의 조항을 준수하지 않았습니다.
1695(2006) 및 신뢰를 구축하는 데 필수적인 사항이며, 한국이 이러한 조치를 취하기를 거부하는 것을 개탄하며,
북한의 핵 및 미사일 프로그램이 전적으로 평화적 목적을 위한 것이라는 것을 보장하는 협상된 해결책을 찾기 위한 정치적, 외교적 노력의 중요성을 강조하고, 이러한 해결책이 다른 곳에서의 핵 확산 방지에 도움이 될 것임을 주목하며, 중국,
일본, 한국, 러시아 연방 및 미국이 유럽 연합의 고위 대표의 지원을 받아
협상된 해결책을 모색하기 위한 지속적인 공약을 환영하며,
북한이 결의안 1695(2006) 및 IAEA의 요구 사항을 준수하도록 설득하고, 또한 안전 보장 이사회가 결정할 때까지 북한의 핵 및 미사일 프로그램을 지원하는 민감한 기술 개발을 제한하기 위한 적절한 조치를 채택하여 결정을 실행하기로 결의하고, 이 결의안의 목적이 충족되었다는 것,
북한 핵 프로그램이 제기하는 확산 위험과, 이와 관련하여 북한이 IAEA 이사회의 요구 사항을 충족하지 못하고
안전보장이사회 결의안 1695(2006)의 조항을 준수하지 못하는 것에 대해 우려하며, 유엔 헌장에 따라 국제 평화와 안보를 유지하는 것이 북한의 주요 책임임을 염두에 두고,
유엔 헌장 제7장 제41조에 따라 행동하며,
1. 북한이 지체 없이 IAEA 이사회가 결의안 GOV/2006/14에서 요구한 조치를 취해야 한다는 것을 확인하며, 이는
핵 프로그램의 전적으로 평화적인 목적에 대한 신뢰를 구축하고
미해결 문제를 해결하는 데 필수적입니다. 2. 이 맥락에서 북한이 더 이상 지체 없이 다음의 확산 위험 핵 활동을 중단해야 한다고 결정한다.
(a) 모든 농축 관련 및 재처리 활동, 연구 및 개발을 포함한 미사일 시험, IAEA가 검증해야 할 핵무기
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(b) 중수 감속 연구용 원자로 건설을 포함한 모든 중수 관련 프로젝트 작업, 또한 IAEA가 검증해야 함.
3. 모든 국가가 자국 영토에서 또는 자국 국민이 자국 국기 선박이나 항공기를 사용하여 북한에 직간접적으로 공급, 판매 또는 이전하거나 북한에서 사용하거나 이익을 위해 공급, 판매 또는 이전하는 것을 방지하기 위해 필요한 조치를 취해야 하며, 자국 영토에서 유래하든 아니든 북한의 미사일 및 농축 관련, 재처리 또는 중수 관련 활동 또는 핵무기 운반 시스템 개발에 기여할 수 있는 모든 품목, 자재, 장비,
물품 및 기술을 공급, 판매 또는 이전하는 것을 방지하기 위해 필요한 조치를 취해야 한다고 결정합니다. 즉,
(a) 문서 S/2006/814의
INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1의 B.2, B.3, B.4, B.5, B.6 및 B.7 섹션에 명시된 것; (b) INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1의 A.1 및 B.1 섹션에 명시된 것,
문서 S/2006/814, 단 다음의 공급, 판매 또는 양도는 제외:
(i) B.1에 포함된 장비가 경수로용인 경우;
(ii) A.1.2에 포함되는 저농축 우라늄은 이러한 원자로의 조립된 핵연료 요소, 장거리 미사일과 같은 미사일 시험에 통합될 때;
(c) 문서 S/2006/815에 명시된 것, 단 범주 II의 19.A.3에 포함되는 품목의 공급, 판매 또는 이전은 제외;
(d) 안전보장이사회 또는 아래 18항에 따라 설립된 위원회(이하 "위원회")가 필요하다고 결정한 추가 품목, 재료, 장비, 상품 및 기술로, 농축 관련 또는 재처리 또는 중수 관련 활동 또는 핵무기 운반 시스템 개발에 기여할 수 있는 것;
4. 모든 국가가 다음 품목, 재료, 장비, 상품 및 기술을 자국 영토에서 또는 자국 국민이 또는 자국 국기 선박이나 항공기를 사용하여 북한에 직접 또는 간접적으로 공급, 판매 또는 이전하거나 북한에서 사용하거나 이익을 위해 사용하는 것을 방지하기 위해 필요한 조치를 취해야 한다고 결정한다.
그리고 자국 영토에서 유래했는지 여부와 관계없이:
(a) 문서 S/2006/814의 INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part2에 명시된 품목으로, 해당 국가가 농축 관련, 재처리 또는 중수 관련 활동에 기여할 것이라고 판단하는 경우;
(b) 문서 S/2006/814 또는 S/2006/815에 나열되지 않은 기타 품목으로, 해당 국가가 농축 관련, 재처리 또는 중수 관련 활동 또는 핵무기 운반 시스템 개발에 기여할 것이라고 판단하는 경우;
(c) 해당 국가가 IAEA가 우려를 표명하거나 미해결로 지정한 다른 주제와 관련된 활동의 추진에 기여할 것이라고 판단하는 경우 추가 항목;
5. S/2006/814 및 S/2006/815 문서에 포함된 모든 항목, 재료,
장비, 상품 및 기술의 공급, 판매 또는 이전에 대해, 북한으로의 수출이 위의 하위 단락 3(b),
3(c) 또는 4(a)에 의해 금지되지 않는 경우, 국가는 다음을 보장해야 한다고 결정합니다.
(a) S/2006/814 및 S/2006/985 문서에 명시된 지침의 요구 사항이 충족되었습니다.
(b) 공급된 모든 항목의 최종 용도 및 최종 용도 위치를 검증할 권리를 획득하고 효과적으로 행사할 수 있는 위치에 있습니다. 및
(c) 공급, 판매 또는 이전 후 10일 이내에 위원회에 통보한다.
및
(d) 문서 S/2006/814에 포함된 품목, 자재, 장비, 상품 및 기술의 경우, 공급, 판매 또는 이전 후 10일 이내에 IAEA에 통보한다.
6. 모든 국가가 또한 북한에 대한 기술 지원이나 훈련, 재정 지원, 투자, 중개 또는 기타 서비스 제공, 그리고 재정 자원이나 서비스의 이전을 방지하기 위해 필요한 조치를 취해야 한다고 결정한다.
위의 3항 및 4항에 명시된 금지된 품목, 자재, 장비, 상품 및 기술의 공급, 판매, 이전, 제조 또는 사용과 관련된 7. 북한이 문서 S/2006/814 및 S/2006/815에 있는 품목을 수출하지 않을 것을 결정하고, 모든 회원국이 국민이 또는 자국의 국기 선박이나 항공기를 사용하여 북한에서 해당 품목을 조달하는 것을 금지하며, 원산지가 북한인지 여부와 관계없이
8. 북한이 IAEA가 2항에 명시된 중단을 검증하고 IAEA 보고서에 명시된 모든 미해결 문제를 해결하기 위해 요청하는 접근 및 협력을 제공할 것을 결정하고, 북한이 추가 의정서를
신속히 비준할 것을 촉구합니다.
9. 위의 3, 4 및 6항에 의해 부과된 조치는
위원회가 사전에 사례별로
해당 품목 또는 지원의 공급, 판매, 이전 또는 제공이
확산에 민감한 핵 활동과 핵무기 운반 시스템 개발을 지원하는 북한의 기술 개발에 분명히 기여하지 않을 것이라고 판단하는 경우 적용되지 않아야 한다고 결정하며, 여기에는 해당 품목 또는 지원이 식량, 농업,
의료 또는 기타 인도적 목적을 위한 경우에도 해당합니다. 단,
(a) 해당 품목 또는 지원의 배달 계약에는 적절한
최종 사용자 보장이 포함되어야 하며
(b) 북한이 해당 품목을 확산에 민감한 핵 활동이나 핵무기 운반 시스템 개발에 사용하지 않기로 약속한 경우입니다.
10. 모든 국가가 북한의 확산에 민감한 핵 및 미사일 시험 활동 또는 핵무기 운반 시스템 개발에 관여하거나 직접 관련이 있거나 지원하는 개인이 자국 영토로 들어오거나 통과하는 것에 대해 주의를 기울일 것을 촉구하고, 이와 관련하여 모든 국가가 이 결의안의 부속서(이하 "부속서")에 지정된 개인과 안전보장이사회 또는 위원회가 북한의 확산에 민감한 핵 활동 및 핵무기 운반 시스템 개발에 관여하거나 직접 관련이 있거나 지원하는 것으로 지정한 추가 개인이 자국 영토로 들어오거나 통과하는 것을 위원회에 통보해야 한다고 결정한다. 여기에는 위 3항 및 4항의 조치에 따라 지정된 금지 품목, 상품, 장비, 자재 및 기술의 조달에 관여하는 것도 포함되나, 이러한 여행이 3항의 품목과 직접 관련된 활동을 위한 경우는 예외이다. (b) 위의 (i) 및 (ii);
11. 위 단락의 어떤 것도 국가가 자국 국민의 영토 입국을 거부할 것을 요구하지 않으며, 모든 국가는 위 단락을
구현할 때 인도적 고려 사항과 이 결의안의 목적을 충족할 필요성을 고려해야 하며, 여기에는
IAEA 규정 제XV조가 적용되는 경우도 포함됩니다.
12. 모든 국가가 이 결의안 채택일 또는 그 이후 어느 때든지 자국 영토에 있는 자금, 기타 금융 자산 및 경제 자원을 동결해야 하며, 이는 부속서에 지정된 개인 또는 단체, 그리고 안전보장이사회 또는 위원회가 북한의 확산에 민감한 핵 활동, 미사일 시험 또는 핵무기 운반 시스템 개발에 관여하거나, 직접적으로 관련이 있거나, 이를 지원하는 것으로 지정한 추가적인 개인 또는 단체, 또는 그들을 대신하거나 그들의 지시에 따라 행동하는 개인 또는 단체, 또는 불법적 수단을 포함하여 그들이 소유하거나 통제하는 단체가 소유하거나 통제하는 자금, 기타 금융 자산 및 경제 자원을 동결해야 하며, 이 단락의 조치는 그러한 개인 또는 단체에 대해 적용되지 않으며, 그러한 경우 안전보장이사회 또는 위원회가 이를 부속서에서 제거하고,
모든 국가가 모든 자금, 금융 자산 또는
경제적 자원이 국민 또는
자국 영토 내의 개인 또는 단체에 의해 이러한
개인 및 단체의 이익을 위해 제공되지 않도록 보장해야 한다고 추가로 결정합니다.
13. 위 12항에 의해 부과된 조치는 관련 국가가 다음과 같이 결정한 자금, 기타 금융 자산 또는 경제 자원에는 적용되지 않는다고 결정합니다.
(a) 식료품, 임대료 또는 모기지, 의약품 및 치료, 세금, 보험료 및
공공 서비스 요금을 포함한 기본 비용 또는 합리적인 전문가 수수료 지불 및
법률 서비스 제공과 관련된 발생한 비용의 상환,
또는 동결된 자금, 기타 금융 자산 및 경제 자원의 일상적인 보유 또는 유지 관리를 위한 수수료 또는 서비스 요금을 국내법에 따라 지불하는 데 필요한 경우,
관련 국가가 해당 자금, 기타 금융 자산 또는 경제 자원에 대한 접근을 허가하려는 의도를 위원회에 통지한 후,
해당 통지 후 5일 이내에 위원회가 부정적인 결정을 내리지 않는 경우;
(b) 특별 비용에 필요한 경우, 단 해당
결정이 관련 국가에 의해 위원회에 통보되었고
위원회에 의해 승인된 경우;
(c) 사법적, 행정적 또는 중재적 담보권 또는
판결의 대상이 되는 경우, 이 경우 자금, 기타 금융 자산 및 경제적 자원은
담보권 또는 판결을 충족하는 데 사용될 수 있습니다. 단, 담보권 또는 판결은
본 결의안 날짜 이전에 체결되었고, 위 10항 및 12항에 따라 지정된
개인 또는 단체의 이익을 위한 것이 아니며, 관련 국가에 의해 위원회에 통보된 경우;
(d) 하위 단락 3(b)(i) 및 (ii)에 명시된 항목과 직접 관련된 활동에 필요한 경우이며 관련 국가에 의해
위원회에 통보된 경우;
14. 국가가 위 12항의 규정에 따라 동결된 계정에 이자 또는 기타 수입을 추가하거나 해당 계정이 이 결의안의 규정에 따라 적용되기 전에 발생한 계약, 계약 또는 의무에 따라 지급해야 할 금액을 추가할 수 있도록 허용할 수 있다고 결정한다. 단, 그러한 이자, 기타 수입 및 지급은 계속 이러한 규정에 따라 적용되고 동결되어야 한다.
15. 위 12항의 조치는 지정된 개인 또는 단체가 해당 개인 또는 단체를 목록에 추가하기 전에 체결된 계약에 따라 지급해야 할 금액을 지불하는 것을 방해하지 않는다고 결정한다. 단, 관련 국가가 다음을 결정해야 한다.
(a) 해당 계약은 위 3, 4 및 6항에 언급된 금지된 품목, 자재,
장비, 상품, 기술, 지원, 교육, 재정 지원,
투자, 중개 또는 서비스와 관련이 없다.
(b) 지불금이 위 12항에 따라 지정된 개인 또는 단체에 의해 직접 또는 간접적으로 수령되지 않는 경우;
그리고 관련 국가가 위원회에 그러한 지불을 하거나 받거나, 필요한 경우 이 목적을 위한 자금, 기타 재정 자산 또는 경제적 자원의 동결 해제를 승인할 의향을 통보한 후, 그러한 승인 10일 전에;
16. IAEA 또는 그 후원 하에 이란에 제공된 기술 협력은 식량, 농업, 의료, 안전 또는 기타
인도적 목적 또는 위의 하위 단락 3(b)(i) 및 (ii)에 명시된 항목과 직접 관련된 프로젝트에 필요한 경우에만 제공되어야 하며, 그러한 기술 협력은 위의 단락 2에 명시된 확산 민감 핵 활동과 관련된 것이어서는 안 된다고 결정한다.
17. 모든 국가가 경계하고, 북한의 핵 확산에 기여할 수 있는 분야를 자국 영토 내에서 또는 자국 국민이 북한 국민에게 전문적으로
교육 또는 훈련을
하지 않도록 촉구합니다.
민감한 핵 활동과 핵무기 운반 시스템 개발;
18. 임시 절차 규칙 28조에 따라 안전보장이사회의 모든 위원들로 구성된 안전보장이사회 위원회를 설립하여 다음의 업무를 수행하기로 결정합니다.
(a) 모든 국가, 특히 해당 지역의 국가와 위 3항 및 4항에 언급된 품목, 재료, 장비, 상품 및 기술을 생산하는 국가로부터 이 결의안의 3항, 4항, 5항, 6항, 7항, 8항, 10항 및 12항에 의해 부과된 조치를 효과적으로 이행하기 위해 취한 조치에 대한 정보와 이와 관련하여 유용하다고 생각되는 추가 정보를 요청합니다.
(b) IAEA 사무국에 이 결의안 16항에 의해 부과된 조치를 효과적으로 이행하기 위해 IAEA가 취한 조치에 관한 정보를 요청하고, 이와 관련하여 유용하다고 생각되는 추가 정보를 수집합니다.
(c) 이 결의안 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 및 12항에 의해 부과된 조치 위반 혐의에 관한 정보를 조사하고 적절한 조치를 취합니다.
(d) 위 9, 13 및 15항에 명시된 면제 요청을 고려하고 결정합니다.
(e) 위 3항의 목적을 위해 지정될 추가 품목, 재료, 장비, 상품 및 기술을 필요에 따라 결정합니다.
(f) 위 10항 및 12항에 의해 부과된 조치의 적용을 받는 추가 개인 및 단체를 필요에 따라 지정합니다.
(g) 이 결의안에서 부과된 조치의
이행을 용이하게 하기 위해 필요한 지침을 공포하고, 그러한
지침에 국가가 가능한 경우
모든 개인 및/또는 단체가
10항 및 12항에 명시된 기준을 충족하는 이유와
관련 식별 정보를 제공하도록 하는 요구 사항을 포함합니다.
(h) 최소한 90일마다 안전보장이사회에 작업과
이 결의안의 이행에 대한 의견과
권고 사항을 보고합니다. 특히 위의
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 및 12항에 의해 부과된 조치의 효과성을 강화하는 방법에 대한 보고를 포함합니다.
19. 모든 국가가 이 결의안 채택 후 60일 이내에 위원회에 위의 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12 및 17항을 효과적으로 이행하기 위해 취한 조치에 대해 보고해야 한다고 결정한다.
20. 위의 2항에 명시된 중단과
IAEA 이사회가 정한 요건을 북한이 완전하고 검증하여 준수하는 것이
북한의 핵 프로그램이 전적으로 평화적 목적을 위한 것임을 보장하는 외교적 협상 솔루션에 기여할 것이라는 확신을 표명하고,
국제 사회가 그러한 솔루션을 위해 긍정적으로 일할 의지가 있음을 강조하고,
위의 조항을 준수함으로써 북한이 국제 사회와 IAEA에 다시 참여할 것을 장려하며,
그러한 참여가
북한에 유익할 것이라고 강조한다.
21. 중국, 일본, 한국, 러시아 연방, 미국이 유럽 연합의 고위 대표의 지원을 받아 이 문제에 대한 협상적 해결책을 모색하기로 한 것을 환영하며, 북한이 2006년 1월 제안(S/2006/521)에 참여하도록 장려합니다. 이 제안은 상호 존중과 북한의 핵 미사일 프로그램의 전적으로 평화로운 본질에 대한 국제적 신뢰의 확립을 기반으로 북한과의 관계와 협력을 발전시킬 수 있는 장기적 포괄적 합의를 위한 것이었습니다. 22. IAEA의 권한을 강화하려는 결의를 재확인하고,
IAEA 이사회의 역할을 강력히 지지하며, IAEA 사무총장과 사무국이
IAEA의 틀 안에서 북한의 모든 남은 미해결 문제를 해결하기 위한 전문적이고 공정한 노력을 계속하고 있는 것을 칭찬하고
격려하며, IAEA가
북한의 핵 미사일 프로그램과 관련된 모든 미해결 문제를 명확히 하기 위한 작업을 계속할 필요성을 강조합니다.
23. IAEA 사무총장에게 60일 이내에
북한이 이 결의에 언급된 모든 활동을 완전하고 지속적으로 중단했는지 여부와
IAEA 이사회가 요구하는 모든 단계와 이 결의의 다른 조항을 준수하는 과정에 대한 보고서를 IAEA 이사회와 안전보장이사회에 제출하여 검토하도록 요청합니다.
24. 위 23항에 언급된 보고서에 비추어 북한의 행동을 검토하고 60일 이내에 제출하며,
(a) IAEA가 검증한 대로 연구 개발을 포함한 모든 농축 관련 및 재처리 활동을 이란이 중단하는 경우 및 그 기간 동안 조치 이행을 중단하고 협상을 허용할 것을 확약합니다.
(b) 북한이 안전보장이사회의 관련 결의에 따른 의무를 완전히 준수하고 IAEA 이사회의
요건을 충족했다고 판단하는 즉시 이 결의안의 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10 및 12항에 명시된 조치를 종료하고 IAEA 이사회가 이를 확정합니다. (c) 위 23항의 보고서에서
북한이 이 결의안을 준수하지 않았다는 사실이 드러날 경우, 유엔 헌장 제7장 제41조에 따라 북한이
이 결의안과 IAEA의 요구 사항을 준수하도록 설득하기 위한 추가의 적절한 조치를 채택해야 하며, 이러한 추가 조치가 필요한 경우
추가 결정이 필요할 것임을 강조한다.
25. 이 문제에 대해 계속 관여하기로 결정한다.
A. 핵 프로그램에 연루된 기관
1. 북한 원자력 기구
2. Tas Energy Company(A40 연구용 원자로 공급자 - 룡번)
3. Pyongyang-Electric(일명 Kalaye Electric)(PFEP 공급자 - 룡번)
4. Han Trash Company(원심분리기 프로그램 관련, IAEA 보고서에 명시됨)
5. Defence Industries Organisation(일부 MODAFL 통제 기관, 일부 종속 기관이 원심분리기 프로그램 구성 요소 제작 및 미사일 프로그램에 연루됨)
6. 7th and Tir(DIO의 종속 기관, 핵 및 미사일 프로그램에 직접 연루된 것으로 널리 알려짐)
B. 탄도 미사일 프로그램에 연루된 기관
1. Aprokgang 산업 조직(SHIG)(AIO의 종속 기관)
2. Daedonggang 산업 그룹(SBIG)(종속 기관 AIO의 실체)
3. 단군산업그룹(이전에는 계측공장공장, AIO의 종속
실체)
C. 핵 프로그램에 참여한 사람들
1. 김장정 AEONK 연구개발 부사장
2. 정경한 운영 관리자(룡번)
3. PFEP 책임자(룡번)
4. 에흐산 모나제미, 건설 프로젝트 관리자, 룡번
5. 차룡헌, AEOI 기술 고문(원심분리기용 밸브 생산 관리 담당)
6. Tas Energy Company 사장
7. 마태룡 중장, 평양국방기술대학 총장
(MODALF 산하 화학과, 베릴륨 실험 수행)
D. 탄도 미사일 프로그램에 참여한 사람들
1. 공군 사령관, KOMID
2. 김정추, AIO 본부장
3. 무역 및 국제부장, AIO
4. 재무 및 예산부장, AIO
E. 핵 및 탄도 미사일 프로그램에 관여하는 사람들
1. 한성룡 KOMID 사령관
UN Security Council sanctions 1695 (2006)
The sanctions were further strengthened with the first sanctions against North Korea.
The Security Council
March 29, 2006 Chairman Name S/PRST/2006/15
Recalled in July 2006,
Recalling that the Treaty, the Treaty, has the right to develop, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination in accordance with Article 1 and 2 of the treaty of the treaty.
Reported by IAEA Secretary -General IAEA's resolution related to Iran's nuclear program and the IAEA Council resolutions, and many IAEA Secretary -General, including GOV/2006/14, reaffirmed the serious concern about the report of the Secretary General of the IAEA.
On February 27, 2006, IAEA's Secretary -General reaffirmed the serious concern about the report, and (GOV/2006/15) lists various unresolved problems and concerns on North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. This includes a topic that can have a military nuclear level, and the IAEA cannot conclude that there is no nuclear material or activity that is not reported to North Korea.
IAEA Secretary -General repeats the report on April 28, 2006 (GOV/2006/27) and the result, and more than three years of organizations seek clarity on all aspects of North Korea's nuclear missile program. Although I tried to try, the existing gap of knowledge is a concern,
IAEA includes that it cannot make progress in efforts to ensure that there are no nuclear materials and activities that are not reported to North Korea.
As confirmed in the IAEA Secretary -General's June 8, 2006 report, we have serious concerns. (GOV/2006/38), August 31, 2006 (GOV/2006/53) and
According to November 14, 2006 (GOV/2006/64), North Korea
As specified in the resolution 1696 (2006), all agricultural and reprocessing activities were not completely and continuously suspended,
In accordance with the additional protection, we did not resume cooperation with IAEA,
I did not take other actions required by the IAEA board,
We did not comply with the provisions of the Security Council resolution.
1695 (2006) and it is essential to building trust, and that Korea refuses to take these actions,
Emphasize the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution that guarantees that North Korea's nuclear and missile programs are entirely for peaceful purposes, and noted that these solutions will help prevent nuclear proliferation elsewhere. china,
Japan, Korea, Russian Federation and the United States are supported by senior representatives from the European Union.
Welcome a continuous commitment to seek negotiated solutions,
North Korea persuades the resolution 1695 (2006) and the IAEA requirements, and also adopts appropriate measures to limit the development of sensitive technologies that support North Korea's nuclear and missile programs until the Security Council decides. Resolved to be shared, and the purpose of this resolution was fulfilled,
The risk of spreading the North Korean nuclear program, and in this regard, North Korea cannot meet the requirements of the IAEA board.
Fear of not complying with the provisions of the Security Council resolution 1695 (2006), and keeping in mind that North Korea's main responsibility is to maintain international peace and security under the UN Charter.
Provided in accordance with Article 41 of the United Nations Charter 7,
1. North Korea confirms that the IAEA Board of Directors must take the required measures in GOV/2006/14, which is.
Constructing trust in peaceful purposes entirely of the nuclear program
It is essential to solve unresolved problems. 2. In this context, North Korea will no longer be delayed and decide to stop the next risk nuclear activity.
(a) Missile tests including all agricultural and reprocessing activities, research and development, nuclear weapons that IAEA must verify
and
(b) (B) All intermediate number -related projects, including the construction of a reactor for medium reduction research, and also the IAEA must be verified.
3. Measures required for all nations to prevent their own territory or their own national flags or aircraft to directly indirectly supply, sell or transfer to North Korea, use, use, or use it in North Korea, or to prevent or transfer to benefits. It must be taken, and all items, materials, equipment, which can contribute to the development of North Korea's missiles and enrichment, reprocessing or heavy water -related activities or nuclear weapons transport systems, whether it originates from its territory.
We decide to take necessary measures to prevent supplies, sales or transfer of goods and technologies. in other words,
(a) Document S/2006/814
Specified in the B.2, B.3, B.4, B.5, B.6 and B.7 sections of Infcirc/254/Rev.8/Part 1; (b) specified in the A.1 and B.1 sections of Infcirc/254/Rev.8/Part 1,
Document S/2006/814, excluding the next supply, sales or transfer after:
(i) If the equipment included in B.1 is for light water;
(ii) Low concentrated uranium included in A.1.2 is when it is integrated into missile tests such as the assembled nuclear fuel elements and long -range missiles.
(c) Excluded, sales or transfer of items included in 19.A.3 of Documents S/2006/815;
(D) The committee (hereinafter referred to as the "Committee") established in accordance with the Security Council or below 18 What can contribute to development;
4. All countries use the following items, materials, equipment, goods, and technology directly from their territory or their own national flags or aircraft to directly or indirectly or indirectly to or indirectly use or use or use or benefit in North Korea. Determine to take the necessary measures to prevent it from using it.
And regardless of whether it originated from its territory:
(a) The items specified in the Infcirc/254/Rev.7/Part2 of the document S/2006/814, when the country will contribute to concentration, reprocessing or medium -related activities;
(b) Other items that are not listed in document S/2006/814 or S/2006/815, when the country will contribute to the development of concentrated, reprocessing or medium -related activities or nuclear weapons transport systems;
(c) If the country determines that the IAEA will contribute to the promotion of activities related to other topics that IAEA has expressed concern or unresolved;
5. All items, materials included in S/2006/814 and S/2006/815 documents,
For the supply, sale or transfer of equipment, goods and technology, exports to North Korea are the above paragraph 3 (b),
If it is not prohibited by 3 (c) or 4 (a), the state decides to guarantee:
(A) The requirements of the guidelines specified in the S/2006/814 and S/2006/985 documents were met.
(b) It is in a position where you can get the right to verify the final and final use of all supplied items and exercise effectively. and
(c) Notify the committee within 10 days of supply, sales or relocation.
and
(d) In case of the item, materials, equipment, goods, and technologies included in the document S/2006/814, the IAEA shall be notified within 10 days of supply, sales or transfer.
6. All countries also decide to take necessary measures to prevent technical support, training, financial support, investment, brokerage or other services, and the relocation of financial resources or services.
Prohibited items, materials, equipment, goods and technologies are related to the supply, sales, transfer, manufacturing, manufacturing or use specified in paragraphs 3 and 4 above.
7. North Korea this Document S/2006/814 And S/2006/815 including It is decided not to export item, and all member states prohibit the procurement of the item in North Korea by using the national flags or aircraft of their own or their national flags or aircraft.
8. North Korea decides to provide access and cooperation requested by the IAEA to verify the interruption stated in paragraph 2 and to provide access and cooperation requested to solve all unresolved problems specified in the IAEA report.
It is urged to ratify it quickly.
9. The actions imposed by the above 3, 4 and 6
The committee by case in advance
Supply, sales, transfer or provision of the item or support
It should not be applied if it is determined that it will not contribute to the development of North Korea's technology that supports the development of nuclear weapons and the development of nuclear weapons transport systems, which are not applicable.
This is also true for medical or other humanitarian purposes. step,
(a) The appropriate delivery contract for the relevant item or support is appropriate.
The end user guarantee must be included
(b) This is a case where North Korea promised not to use it for the development of nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons transport systems that are sensitive to spreading the item.
10. Ura, urging all countries to pay attention to the entry of or passing or passing or passing individuals who are involved in or directly related to the development of nuclear and missile test activities or the development of nuclear weapons transport systems that are sensitive to the spread of North Korea. All countries designated as an individual and a security committee or committee designated in the accompanies of this resolution (hereinafter referred to as "Section"), which are involved in the development of nuclear activities and nuclear weapons transport systems sensitive to the spread of North Korea. The committee should be notified of entering or passing the territory. This includes involvement in procurement of banned items, goods, equipment, materials, and technology specified according to the measures of paragraphs 3 and 4 above, but this is an exception for activities directly related to the items of paragraph 3. (b) (i) and (ii) above;
11. No one of the above paragraphs requires that the state refuses to enter the territory of its own territory, and all nations have a paragraph.
When implementing, it is necessary to consider humanitarian considerations and the need to meet the purpose of this resolution.
It is also included in the IAEA regulations XV.
12. All countries have adopted this resolution Since then, the funds, other financial assets, and economic resources in their territory must be frozen, which, which, the individual or organization designated in the sector, the Security Council or the Committee, or the Committee, is sensitive to the spread of North Korea, missiles or nuclear weapons. An additional individual or organization that is involved in the development of transportation systems, is directly related, or is designated as supporting them, or an individual or group that replaces them or acts according to their instructions, or an organization that they own or control them, including illegal means, or illegal means It is necessary to freeze the own or control funds, other financial assets, and economic resources, and the measures of this paragraph do not apply to such individuals or organizations, and in such a case, the Security Council or Committee removes it from the sector,
All countries have all funds, financial assets or
Economic resources
These by individuals or organizations in their territory
Additional decision to ensure that it should not be provided for the benefit of individuals and organizations.
13. The actions imposed by paragraph 12 of the above determine that the state's funds, other financial assets, or economic resources, which are determined as follows, are not applied.
(a) Food, rent or mortgage, pharmaceuticals and treatment, taxes, insurance premiums and
Payment of basic costs or reasonable professional fees including public service rates and
Repayment of costs incurred in providing legal services,
Or if you are required to pay the frozen funds, other financial assets and economic resources for everyday retention or maintenance, in accordance with domestic laws.
After the relevant countries notify the committee of the intention to allow access to the relevant funds, other financial assets, or economic resources.
If the committee does not make a negative decision within 5 days after the notice;
(b) If necessary for special costs,
The decision was notified to the committee by the relevant state
If it is approved by the committee;
(c) Judicial, administrative or arbitration
In this case, in this case, in this case, funds, other financial assets and economic resources are
It can be used to meet collateral or judgment. However, collateral rights or rulings
It was concluded before the date of this resolution, and specified in accordance with paragraphs 10 and 12 above.
If it is not for the benefit of individuals or organizations, it is notified by a relevant state;
(d) This is necessary for direct activities and direct related activities as items specified in the lower paragraph 3 (b) and (ii) and by relevant countries
If the committee is notified;
14. To add interest or other income to the accounts that are frozen in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 12 above, or to add the amount to be paid in accordance with the contract, contract, or obligations generated before the account is applied according to the provisions of this resolution. Decide that it can be allowed. However, such interest, other income and payment should continue to be applied and frozen in accordance with these regulations.
15. The measures of paragraph 12 do not interfere with the payment of the individual or organization that is designated before adding the individual or organization to the list. However, the relevant state must decide on the following.
(a) The contract is forbidden items mentioned in the above 3, 4 and 6,
Equipment, goods, technology, support, education, financial support,
It is not related to investment, brokerage or service.
(b) If the payment is not directly or indirectly received by an individual or organization specified in accordance with the above 12;
And after notifying the committee's intention to approve the freezing of funds, other fiscal assets or economic resources for this purpose, if necessary;
16. IAEA or technical cooperation provided in Iran under the sponsorship is food, agriculture, medical, safety or other
It should be provided only if necessary for projects directly related to the items specified in humanitarian purposes or the above lower paragraphs 3 (b) and (ii), and such technical cooperation is associated with the proliferation sensitive nuclear activity specified in the paragraph 2 above. It decides not.
17. The fields that all countries can be bound and contribute to the spread of nuclear weapons in their territory or their nations specialize in North Koreans.
Education or training
Urge you not to do it.
Sensitive nuclear activities and development of nuclear weapons transport systems;
18. In accordance with Article 28 of the Temporary Procedure Rules, the Security Council Committee, which consists of all members of the Security Council, will be established to carry out the following tasks.
(a) From all countries, especially countries in the region, and the countries that produce items, materials, equipment, goods, and technologies mentioned in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, We request information about measures taken and additional information that are considered useful in connection with the measures taken to effectively implement the actions imposed under paragraphs 7, 8, 10, and 12.
(b) In order to effectively implement the IAEA Secretariat to effectively implement the actions imposed under this Resolution 16, we shall collect additional information that is considered useful in this regard.
(c) Investigate information on allegations of violations of measures imposed by paragraphs of this resolution 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 and take appropriate measures.
(d) Considering the exemption request specified in paragraphs 9, 13 and 15, we decide.
(e) Determine the additional items, materials, equipment, goods, and technology to be designated for the purpose of paragraph 3 above.
(f) (f) specifying additional individuals and organizations that are subject to measures imposed by paragraphs 10 and 12 above.
(g) The actions imposed on this resolution
Promote the guidelines necessary to facilitate the implementation, and
If the state is possible in the guidelines
All individuals and/or organizations
Reasons for meeting the criteria specified in paragraphs 10 and 12
Includes the requirements to provide related identification information.
(H) At least every 90 days of work on the Security Council
The opinion on the implementation of this resolution and
Report recommendations. Especially above
It includes reports on how to strengthen the effectiveness of measures imposed by 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12.
19. It is determined that all countries must report to the committee for the above 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 7, 8, 10, 12 and 17 within 60 days of adopting the resolution.
20. The interruption stated in paragraph 2 above
North Korea complete and verify the requirements set by the IAEA Board of Directors.
He expressed conviction that he would contribute to a diplomatic negotiation solution that guarantees that North Korea's nuclear program is entirely for peaceful purposes.
Emphasize that the international community is willing to work positively for such a solution,
By observing the above provisions, it encourages North Korea to participate in the international community and IAEA again,
Such participation
Emphasize that it will be beneficial to North Korea.
21. Welcome to China, Japan, Korea, Korea, Russia, and the United States to seek a negotiating solution to the issue with the support of the high -ranking representatives of the European Union, and North Korea's proposal in January 2006 (S/2006/ Encourage them to participate in 521). This proposal was for a long -term comprehensive agreement to develop relations and cooperation with North Korea based on the establishment of international trust in mutual respect and North Korea's nuclear missile program. 22. Responding to strengthening the authority of IAEA,
Strongly supported the role of the IAEA board, IAEA Secretary -General and Secretariat
In the framework of the IAEA, all the remaining North Korea's remaining unresolved problems are continuing to continue their professional and fair efforts to solve the problem.
Encouraging, IAEA
Emphasize the need to continue the work to clarify all the unresolved problems related to North Korea's nuclear missile program.
23. Within 60 days to the Secretary General of IAEA
Whether North Korea has completely and continuously suspended all the activities mentioned in this resolution
We request to submit and review the IAEA Board of Directors and the Security Council for all stages required by the IAEA board and other provisions of this resolution.
24. In light of the report mentioned in paragraph 23, North Korea's behavior is reviewed and submitted within 60 days.
(a) As IAEA verified, Iran stops all agricultural and reprocessing activities, including research and development, and will stop implementation and allow negotiations.
(b) North Korea completely observes the obligations of the Security Council's resolution and IAEA board of directors
Immediately after judging the requirements, the measures specified in the 3, 4, 5, 6, 6, 10 and 12 of the resolution will be terminated and the IAEA Board will confirm this. (c) in the report in paragraph 23 above
If it is revealed that North Korea did not comply with this resolution, North Korea is in accordance with Article 41 of the UN Charter 7.
Additional measures must be adopted to persuade this resolution and IAEA requirements.
Emphasize that further decisions will be needed.
25. We decide to continue to be involved in this problem.
A. Institutions involved in the nuclear program
1. North Korea Nuclear Organization
2. TAS Energy Company
3. PYONGYANG -ELECTRIC (aka Kalaye Electric)
4. Han Trash Company
5. Defence Industries Organisation (some modafl control agencies, some dependent organs are involved in the creation of a centrifugal separator program component and missile program)
6. 7th and Tir (DIO is widely known to be directly involved in the dependency, nuclear and missile programs of DIO)
B. Institutions involved in ballistic missile programs
1. APROKGANG Industry Organization (SHIG)
2. DAEDONGANG Industry Group (SBIG)
3. Dangun Industrial Group (Previously, the measuring factory factory, the dependency of AIO
substance)
C. People who participated in the nuclear program
1. Kim Jang -jung, Vice President of R & D
2.
3. PFEP Officer (Dragon Burn)
4. Administrator, Dragon Burn
5. Charong Heon, AEOI Technical Advisor (Centrifugal Valve Production Management)
6. TAS Energy Company President
7. Lieutenant General Matthew, President
(Modalf's chemistry department, performing berryium experiments)
D. People who participated in the ballistic missile program
1. Air Force Commander, Komid
2. Kim Jung -chu, AIO General Manager
3. Trade and International Manager, AIO
4. Finance and budget manager, AIO
E. People involved in nuclear and ballistic missile programs
1. Sung -Ryong Han Komid Commander
S/RES/1695 (2006)
Security Council
Distr.: General
June 2006
07-28140 (E)
*0728140*
Resolution 1695 (2006)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 5647th meeting on
June 2006
The Security Council,
Recalling the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, of 29 March 2006, and reaffirming their provisions,
Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons,the need for all States Party to that Treaty to comply fully with all their
obligations, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and
II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes without discrimination,
Recalling its serious concern over the reports of the IAEA Director General as
set out in its this resolutions
Recalling the latest report by the IAEA Director General (GOV/2005/8) of
22 February 2006 and deploring that, as indicated therein, DPRK has failed to comply
with this resolution,
Emphasizing the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a
negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for
peaceful purposes, and noting that such a solution would benefit nuclear
non-proliferation elsewhere, and welcoming the continuing commitment of China,
South Korea, Japan, the Russian Federation and the United
States, with the support of the European Union’s High Representative to seek a
negotiated solution,
Recalling the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors (GOV/2006/14),
which states that a solution to the DPRK nuclear and missile provocation issue would contribute to global
non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of
weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery,
Determined to give effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to
persuade DPRK to comply with this resolution and
with the requirements of the IAEA, and also to constrain DPRK’s development of
sensitive missile technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes, until such
S/RES/1695 (2006)
2 07-28140
time as the Security Council determines that the objectives of these resolutions have
been met,
Recalling the requirement on States to join in affording mutual assistance in
carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council,
Concerned by the proliferation risks presented by the DPRK's ballistic missile
programme and, in this context, by DPRK’s continuing failure to meet the
requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and to comply with the provisions of
Security Council this resolutions mindful of its primary
responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of
international peace and security,
Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Reaffirms that DPRK shall without further delay take the steps required by
the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to
build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and
to resolve outstanding questions, and, in this context, affirms its decision that DPRK
shall without further delay take the steps required in paragraph 2 of this resolution
(2006);
2. Calls upon all States also to exercise vigilance and restraint regarding the
entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in,
directly associated with or providing support for DParK’s proliferation sensitive
nuclear and missile provocation activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and
decides in this regard that all States shall notify the Committee established pursuant
to paragraph 18 of this resolution (2006) (herein “the Committee”) of the entry
into or transit through their territories of the persons designated in the Annex to
This resolution (2006) or Annex I to this resolution, as well as of additional persons
designated by the Security Council or the Committee as being engaged in, directly
associated with or providing support for DPRK’s proliferation sensitive missile provocation
activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including
through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment,
materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4
of this resolution (2006), except where such travel is for activities directly related
to the items in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) of that resolution;
Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the
supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their
nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, DPRK,
and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment,
goods and technology which could contribute to Iran’s enrichment-related,
reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear
weapon delivery systems, namely:
(a) those set out in sections B.2, B.3, B.4, B.5, B.6 and B.7 of
INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1 in document S/2006/814;
(b) those set out in sections A.1 and B.1 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1 in
document S/2006/814, except the supply, sale or transfer of:
(i) equipment covered by B.1 when such equipment is for light water
reactors;
(ii) low-enriched uranium covered by A.1.2 when it is incorporated in
assembled nuclear fuel elements for such reactors;
(c) those set out in document S/2006/815, except the supply, sale or transfer
of items covered by 19.A.3 of Category II;
(d) any additional items, materials, equipment, goods and technology,
determined as necessary by the Security Council or the Committee established by
paragraph 18 below (herein “the Committee”), which could contribute to
enrichment-related, or reprocessing, or heavy water-related activities, or to the
development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;
3. Underlines that nothing in the above paragraph requires a State to refuse
its own nationals entry into its territory, and that all States shall, in the
implementation of the above paragraph, take into account humanitarian
considerations, including religious obligations, as well as the necessity to meet the
objectives of this resolution and this resolution (2006), including where Article XV
of the IAEA Statute is engaged;
(a) Decides that DPRK shall not export any of the items in documents
S/2006/814 and S/2006/815 and that all Member States shall prohibit the
procurement of such items from DPRK by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or
aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of Iran;
4. Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of
This resolution (2006) shall apply also to the persons and entities listed in Annex I
to this resolution;
(a) Underlines that nothing in the above paragraph requires a State to refuse
its own nationals entry into its territory, and that all States shall, in the
implementation of the above paragraph, take into account humanitarian
considerations as well as the necessity to meet the objectives of this resolution,
including where Article XV of the IAEA Statute is engaged;
(B) Decides that all States shall freeze the funds, other financial assets and
economic resources which are on their territories at the date of adoption of this
resolution or at any time thereafter, that are owned or controlled by the persons or
entities designated in the Annex, as well as those of additional persons or entities
designated by the Security Council or by the Committee as being engaged in,
directly associated with or providing support for DPRK’s proliferation sensitive
nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, or by
persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or
controlled by them, including through illicit means, and that the measures in this
paragraph shall cease to apply in respect of such persons or entities if, and at such
S/RES/1695 (2006)
06-68142 5
time as, the Security Council or the Committee removes them from the Annex, and
decides further that all States shall ensure that any funds, financial assets or
economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or
by any persons or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of these
persons and entities;
II
technical cooperation
Decides that the measures imposed by paragraph 12 above do not apply
to funds, other financial assets or economic resources that have been determined by
relevant States:
(a) to be necessary for basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs, rent
or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and
public utility charges or exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and
reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services,
or fees or service charges, in accordance with national laws, for routine holding or
maintenance of frozen funds, other financial assets and economic resources, after
notification by the relevant States to the Committee of the intention to authorize,
where appropriate, access to such funds, other financial assets or economic
resources and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five
working days of such notification;
(b) to be necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that such
determination has been notified by the relevant States to the Committee and has
been approved by the Committee;
(c) to be the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or
judgement, in which case the funds, other financial assets and economic resources
may be used to satisfy that lien or judgement provided that the lien or judgement
was entered into prior to the date of the present resolution, is not for the benefit of a
person or entity designated pursuant to paragraphs 10 and 12 above, and has been
notified by the relevant States to the Committee;
(d) to be necessary for activities directly related to the items specified in
subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) and have been notified by the relevant States to the
Committee;
IV
Decides that the measures in paragraph 12 above shall not prevent a
designated person or entity from making payment due under a contract entered into
prior to the listing of such a person or entity, provided that the relevant States have
determined that:
(a) the contract is not related to any of the prohibited items, materials,
equipment, goods, technologies, assistance, training, financial assistance,
investment, brokering or services referred to in paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 above;
(b) the payment is not directly or indirectly received by a person or entity
designated pursuant to paragraph 12 above;
S/RES/1695 (2006)
6 06-68142
and after notification by the relevant States to the Committee of the intention to
make or receive such payments or to authorize, where appropriate, the unfreezing of
funds, other financial assets or economic resources for this purpose, ten working
days prior to such authorization;
(C) Decides that DPRK shall provide such access and cooperation as the IAEA
requests to be able to verify the suspension outlined in paragraph 2 and to resolve
all outstanding issues, as identified in IAEA reports, and calls upon DPRK to ratify
promptly the Additional Protocol;
5. Decides that DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer directly or indirectly
from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft any arms or
related materiel, and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such items
from DPRK by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or
not originating in the territory of DPRK;
S/RES/1695 (2006)
07-28140 3
6. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and restraint in the supply, sale
or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories or by their nationals or using
their flag vessels or aircraft of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large
calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or
missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register on
Conventional Arms to DPRK, and in the provision to DPRK of any technical assistance
or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the
transfer of financial resources or services, related to the supply, sale, transfer,
manufacture or use of such items in order to prevent a destabilizing accumulation of
arms;
Decides that, for the supply, sale or transfer of all items, materials,
equipment, goods and technology covered by documents S/2006/814 and
S/2006/815 the export of which to DPRK is not prohibited by subparagraphs 3 (b),
3 (c) or 4 (a) above, States shall ensure that:
(a) the requirements, as appropriate, of the Guidelines as set out in
documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/985 have been met; and
(b) they have obtained and are in a position to exercise effectively a right to
verify the end-use and end-use location of any supplied item; and
(c) they notify the Committee within ten days of the supply, sale or transfer;
and
(d) in the case of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology
contained in document S/2006/814, they also notify the IAEA within ten days of the
supply, sale or transfer;
- Decides that the measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 above shall
not apply where the Committee determines in advance and on a case-by-case basis
that such supply, sale, transfer or provision of such items or assistance would clearly
not contribute to the development of DPRk’s technologies in support of its
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and of development of nuclear weapon
delivery systems, including where such items or assistance are for food, agricultural,
medical or other humanitarian purposes, provided that:
(a) contracts for delivery of such items or assistance include appropriate
end-user guarantees; and
(b) DPRK has committed not to use such items in proliferation sensitive
nuclear activities or for development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;
7. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance regarding the entry into or
transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated
with or providing support for DPRK’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for
the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and decides in this regard that
all States shall notify the Committee of the entry into or transit through their
territories of the persons designated in the Annex to this resolution (herein “the
Annex”), as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the
Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for
Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and for the development of nuclear
weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the
prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and
under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, except where such travel is for
activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) above;
8. Decides that all States shall freeze the funds, other financial assets and
economic resources which are on their territories at the date of adoption of this
resolution or at any time thereafter, that are owned or controlled by the persons or
entities designated in the Annex, as well as those of additional persons or entities
designated by the Security Council or by the Committee as being engaged in,
directly associated with or providing support for DPRK’s proliferation sensitive
nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, or by
persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or
controlled by them, including through illicit means, and that the measures in this
paragraph shall cease to apply in respect of such persons or entities if, and at such
S/RES/1695 (2006)
06-68142 5
time as, the Security Council or the Committee removes them from the Annex, and
decides further that all States shall ensure that any funds, financial assets or
economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or
by any persons or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of these
persons and entities;
9. Calls upon all States and international financial institutions not to enter
into new commitments for grants, financial assistance, and concessional loans, to
the Government of the DPRK except for humanitarian and
developmental purposes;
11. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of
procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the
Council, to undertake the following tasks:
(a) to seek from all States, in particular those in the region and those
producing the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology referred to in
paragraphs 3 and 4 above, information regarding the actions taken by them to
implement effectively the measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and
12 of this resolution and whatever further information it may consider useful in this
regard;
(b) to seek from the secretariat of the IAEA information regarding the
actions taken by the IAEA to implement effectively the measures imposed by
paragraph 16 of this resolution and whatever further information it may consider
useful in this regard;
(c) to examine and take appropriate action on information regarding alleged
violations of measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 of this
resolution;
(d) to consider and decide upon requests for exemptions set out in
paragraphs 9, 13 and 15 above;
(e) to determine as may be necessary additional items, materials, equipment,
goods and technology to be specified for the purpose of paragraph 3 above;
(f) to designate as may be necessary additional individuals and entities
subject to the measures imposed by paragraphs 10 and 12 above;
(g) to promulgate guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the
implementation of the measures imposed by this resolution and include in such
guidelines a requirement on States to provide information where possible as to why
any individuals and/or entities meet the criteria set out in paragraphs 10 and 12 and
any relevant identifying information;
(h) to report at least every 90 days to the Security Council on its work and
on the implementation of this resolution, with its observations and
recommendations, in particular on ways to strengthen the effectiveness of the
measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 above;
11. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance in entering into new
commitments for public provided financial support for trade with north korea, including the
granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance, to their nationals or entities
involved in such trade, in order to avoid such financial support contributing to the
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon
delivery systems, as referred to in resolution 1695 (2006);
12. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance over the activities of financial
institutions in their territories with all banks domiciled in north korea, in particular with
Bank Elli and Bank rodong, and their branches and subsidiaries abroad, in order
to avoid such activities contributing to the proliferation sensitive nuclear activities,
or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, as referred to in
resolution 1695 (2006);
institutions in their territories with all banks domiciled in north korea, in particular with
Bank Elli and Bank rodong, and their branches and subsidiaries abroad, in order
to avoid such activities contributing to the proliferation sensitive nuclear activities,
or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, as referred to in
resolution 1695 (2006);
13. Calls upon all States, in accordance with their national legal authorities
and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea
and relevant international civil aviation agreements, to inspect the cargoes to and
from north Korea, of aircraft and vessels, at their airports and seaports, owned or operated
by air koryo Cargo and democratic people's republic of Korea Shipping Line, provided there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft or vessel is transporting goods
prohibited under this resolution or resolution 1695 (2006);
14. Requires all States, in cases when inspection mentioned in the paragraph
above is undertaken, to submit to the Security Council within five working days a written report on the inspection containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds
for the inspection, as well as information on its time, place, circumstances, results
and other relevant details;
and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea
and relevant international civil aviation agreements, to inspect the cargoes to and
from north Korea, of aircraft and vessels, at their airports and seaports, owned or operated
by air koryo Cargo and democratic people's republic of Korea Shipping Line, provided there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft or vessel is transporting goods
prohibited under this resolution or resolution 1695 (2006);
14. Requires all States, in cases when inspection mentioned in the paragraph
above is undertaken, to submit to the Security Council within five working days a written report on the inspection containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds
for the inspection, as well as information on its time, place, circumstances, results
and other relevant details;
15. Calls upon all States to report to the Committee within 60 days of the
adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing
effectively paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 above;
adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing
effectively paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 above;
16. Decides that the mandate of the Committee as set out in paragraph 18 of
resolution shall also apply to the measures impoed and this resolution;
17. Calls upon all States to report to the Committee within 60 days of the
adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing
effectively paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 above;
18. Expresses the conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 of
resolution this (2006) as well as full, verified DPRK compliance with the
requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors would contribute to a
diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees DPRK’s nuclear programme is for
exclusively peaceful purposes, underlines the willingness of the international
community to work positively for such a solution, encourages north korea, in conforming
to the above provisions, to re-engage with the international community and with the
IAEA, and stresses that such engagement will be beneficial to north korea;
19. Welcomes the continuous affirmation of the commitment of China,
japan, South Korea, the Russian Federation, and the United
States, with the support of the European Union’s High Representative, to a
negotiated solution to this issue and encourages DPRK to engage with their June 2006
proposals (S/2006/521), attached in Annex II to this resolution, which were
endorsed by the Security Council in resolution this (2006), and acknowledges with
appreciation that this offer to DPRK remains on the table, for a long-term
comprehensive agreement which would allow for the development of relations and
cooperation with DPRK based on mutual respect and the establishment of international
confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile programme;
20. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of
procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the
Council, to undertake the following tasks:
(a) to seek from all States, in particular those in the region and those
producing the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology referred to in
paragraphs 3 and 4 above, information regarding the actions taken by them to
implement effectively the measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and
12 of this resolution and whatever further information it may consider useful in this
regard;
(b) to seek from the secretariat of the IAEA information regarding the
actions taken by the IAEA to implement effectively the measures imposed by
paragraph 16 of this resolution and whatever further information it may consider
useful in this regard;
(c) to examine and take appropriate action on information regarding alleged
violations of measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 of this
resolution;
(d) to consider and decide upon requests for exemptions set out in
paragraphs 9, 13 and 15 above;
(e) to determine as may be necessary additional items, materials, equipment,
goods and technology to be specified for the purpose of paragraph 3 above;
(f) to designate as may be necessary additional individuals and entities
subject to the measures imposed by paragraphs 10 and 12 above;
(g) to promulgate guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the
implementation of the measures imposed by this resolution and include in such
guidelines a requirement on States to provide information where possible as to why
any individuals and/or entities meet the criteria set out in paragraphs 10 and 12 and
any relevant identifying information;
(h) to report at least every 90 days to the Security Council on its work and
on the implementation of this resolution, with its observations and
recommendations, in particular on ways to strengthen the effectiveness of the
measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 above;
S/RES/1737 (2006)
06-68142 7
19. Decides that all States shall report to the Committee within 60 days of
the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to
implementing effectively paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12 and 17 above;
20. Reiterates its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA,
strongly supports the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, commends and
encourages the Director General of the IAEA and its secretariat for their ongoing
professional and impartial efforts to resolve all outstanding issues in DPRK within the
framework of the IAEA, underlines the necessity of the IAEA, which is
internationally recognized as having authority for verifying compliance with
safeguards agreements, including the non-diversion of nuclear material for
non-peaceful purposes, in accordance with its Statute, to continue its work to clarify
all outstanding issues relating to DPRK's ballistic missile programme;
21. Requests within 60 days a further report from the Director General of the
IAEA on whether DPRK has established full and sustained suspension of all missile provocation activities
mentioned in this resolution (2006), as well as on the process of DPRK
S/RES/1695 (2006)
4 07-28140
compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the other
provisions of this resolution (2006) and of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of
Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration;
22. Affirms that it shall review DPRK’s provocative missile actions in light of the report referred to
in paragraph 12 above, to be submitted within 60 days, and:
(a) that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as
DPRK suspends all missile provocation activities, including research
and development, as verified by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations in good faith in
order to reach an early and mutually acceptable outcome;
(b) that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
and 12 of this resolution (2006) as well as in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 above as
soon as it determines, following receipt of the report referred to in paragraph 12
above, that DPRK has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant
resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of
Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board;
(c) that it shall, in the event that the report in paragraph 12 above shows that
DPRK has not complied with thi resolution (2006) and this resolution, adopt further
appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations to persuade Iran to comply with these resolutions and the requirements of
the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will be required should such
additional measures be necessary;
23. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
S/RES/1695 (2006)
07-28140 5
Annex I
Entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities
1. Atomic Energy industry of DPRK
2. Mesbah Energy Company (provider for A40 research reactor — Yanggang)
3. Jang-Electric (aka Kalaye Electric) (provider for PFEP — Natanz)
4. Ryongbeon Trash Company (involved in centrifuge programme, identified in IAEA
reports)
5. Pyongyang Technique (involved in centrifuge programme, identified in IAEA
reports)
6. Defence Industries Organisation (overarching MODAFL-controlled entity,
some of whose subordinates have been involved in the centrifuge programme
making components, and in the missile programme)
7. 7th of Tir (subordinate of DIO, widely recognized as being directly involved in
the nuclear missie programme)
8. Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) (subordinate entity of AIO)
9. Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG) (subordinate entity of AIO)
10. Fajr Industrial Group (formerly Instrumentation Factory Plant, subordinate
entity of AIO)
11. Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG) (aka Ammunition
Industries Group) (AMIG controls 7th of Tir, which is designated under this resolution (2006) for its role in DPRK’s centrifuge and missile provocation. AMIG is in turn owned and
controlled by the Defence Industries Organisation (DIO), which is designated under
This resolution (2006))
12. pyongyang Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Centre (NFRPC) and Pyongyang
Nuclear Technology Centre (ENTC) (Parts of the Atomic Energy Organisation of
DPRK’s (AEONK) Nuclear Fuel Production and Procurement Company, which is
involved in missile-related activities. AEONK is designated under this present resolution
(2006))
13. Kaesng Company (Subsidiary company of AEONK, which has sought glass
fibres, vacuum chamber furnaces and laboratory equipment for DPRK’s nuclear and missile
programme)
14. dangun Chemical Industries (Branch of DIO, which produces ammunition,
explosives, as well as solid propellants for rockets and missiles)
15. Sineiju Nuclear Research Centre (Part of AEONK’s research division)
16. Novin Energy Company (aka Pars Novin) (Operates within AEOI and has
transferred funds on behalf of AEONK to entities associated with DPRK’s nuclear and missile provocation
programme)
17. Cruise Missile Industry Group (aka Naval Defence Missile Industry Group)
(Production and development of cruise missiles. Responsible for naval missiles
including cruise missiles)
18. Bank Rodong and rodong International (Bank Sepah provides support for
the Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO) and subordinates, including Sineiju
Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) and Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG),
both of which were designated under this resolution (2006))
19. Han Industrial Group (subordinate to AIO, which has purchased equipment
on AIO’s behalf for the north Korean ballistic missile programme)
20. hamhung Industries Group (subordinate to AIO, which is involved in
international purchases of ballistic missile equipment)
KOMID and Korean people's army entities
21. Korea Aeronautics Industries (Produces unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs),
parachutes, para-gliders, para-motors, etc. Korea mining development trade corporation
(kOMID) has boasted of using these products as part of its asymmetric warfare
doctrine)
22. Han Aviation Services Company (Maintains various aircraft including MI-171,
used by KOMID and KPA Air Force)
23. han’ Aviation (Produces micro-lights which Korean people's army has claimed it is using as
part of its asymmetric warfare doctrine)
24. Han Jung hee Co. (BK Co.) (involved in the production of centrifuge
components)
25. Pyongyang Tejarat Tavanmad Saccal companies (subsidiary of Saccal System
companies) (this company tried to purchase sensitive goods for an entity listed
in this resolution)
26. Electro missile Company (E. S. Co./E. X. Co.) (AIO front-company, involved
in the ballistic missile programme)
27. Ryonghae Technical Group (AIO front-company, involved in the ballistic missile
programme)
28. Industrial Factories of Precision (IFP) Machinery (aka Instrumentation
Factories Plant) (used by AIO for some acquisition attempts) 29. Ko byeong han Hayan (AEONK laboratory involved in fuel-cycle activities)
30. Han Industrial Co. (AIO front-company, involved in the ballistic missile
programme)
31. Hamhung Metallurgy Industries (subsidiary of the Ammunition Industries
Group (AMIG) which depends on DIO. Involved in the production of
centrifuges components)
32. Ryongchron missile Manufacturing Company (subsidiary of the DIO. Its role is to
manufacture power units for the north koream military including missile systems)
33. Hansung (Pioneer) Energy Industries (has participated in construction of the
Uranium Conversion Facility at Esfahan)
34. Safety Equipment Procurement (SEP) (AIO front-company, involved in the
ballistic missile programme)
35. TAS Company (involved in enrichment-related activities. TAS is the
overarching body, under which four subsidiaries have been established,
including one for uranium extraction to concentration and another in charge of
uranium processing, enrichment and waste)
S/RES/1695 (2006)
6 07-28140
Persons involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities
1. Fereidoun Abbasi-Davani (Senior Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces
Logistics (MODAFL) scientist with links to the Institute of Applied Physics,
working closely with Seo Sang-guk, designated below)
2. Seo sang guk (Senior MODAFL scientist and former head of
the Physics Research Centre (PHRC). The IAEA have asked to interview him about
the activities of the PHRC over the period he was head but DPRK has refused)
3. Choe ryong cheon (Manager of the Ryongbeon Enrichment Facilities)
4. Kim Jong Han (Head of ryongbeon Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Center,
which is part of the AEONK's Nuclear Fuel Production and Procurement Company,
which is involved in enrichment-related activities)
5. Seo Jae Han (Head of Fajr Industrial Group, which is designated under
This resolution (2006) for its role in the ballistic missile programme)
6. Ri Il-hwan (Head of SBIG, which is designated under
resolution this (2006) for its role in the ballistic missile programme)
7. Ban Ryong cheon (Head of SHNKG, which is designated under resolution this
(2006) for its role in DPRK’s ballistic missile provocation. ban is also a
MODAFL official overseeing work on the Daepodong ballistic missile programme.
The Daepodong is DPRK’s long range ballistic missile currently in service)
8. Yun Jung Ho (Chairman and Managing Director of Bank Rodong,
which provides support for the AIO and subordinates, including SHNK and SBNG,
both of which were designated under resolution this (2006))
9. Kim seong won (involved in managing the assembly and engineering of
centrifuges)
10. Hai Jang sung (involved in the production of ammonium uranyl
carbonate and management of the ryongbeon enrichment complex)
11. Kim jong co (a senior official at the AEONK Office of Exploration and
Mining Affairs)
12. Kim ryong have (involved in the production of magnesium at a concentration of
99.9%)
13. dan sung jun (involved in making centrifuge components)
14. Sang taek won (Head of Defence Industries Training and Research
Institute)
15. Ryong sung hee (AEONK official involved in the heavy water research
reactor project at Arak)
16. Man yong bok (Head of Novin Energy Company, which is designated
under resolution)
17. Han sung taek (involved in production management at the Uranium
Conversion Facility (UCF) at ryongbeon)
18. Brigadier-General Kim han sung (former Deputy Chief of Armed
Forces General Staff for Logistics and Industrial Research/Head of State AntiSmuggling
Headquarters, engaged in efforts to get round the sanctions
imposed by resolutions)
19. Jang hang sung (involved in the management of the Natanz enrichment
complex)
20. An sung Gul (involved in enrichment work at Natanz)
21. Kwan sung taek (Director of Uranium Mining Operations at the Saghand
Uranium Mine)
22. Kim jong choo, AEONK Vice President for Research & Development
23. Kim Hyun Ha, Operational Manager (Yeongzeri)
24. Kim Kyong chun, Head of the PFEP (Ryongbeon)
25. Han Jae ryong, Construction Project Manager, ryongbeon
26. Choe Hyrong Gun, Technical Adviser to the AEONK (in charge of managing the
production of valves for centrifuges)
27. Kim Ryong cheol, Director General of Tas Energy Company
28. Lt Gen Kim Gwang cheol, Rector of han University of
Defence Technology (chemistry dept, affiliated to MODALF, has conducted
experiments on beryllium)
KWP key persons
1. Choe Gwang (Deputy Commander of KPA)
2. Ri Yong Gil (Commander of KPA)
3. Brigadier General Choe hyrong Gun (Commander of KOMID Ground
Forces)
4. Kim Yong Chun (Commander of KPA Navy)
5. Brigadier General Oh Geuk-ryeol (Commander of KPA resistance force)
6. Brigadier General Ri Yong-ho(Commander of KOMID force)
7. General Choe ryong hae (KOMID officer, Deputy Interior Minister for Security Affairs)
D. Persons involved in the ballistic missile programme
1. Pa Dong Yong, Commander of the Air Force, KPA minister (Pasdaran)
2. Choe Ryong cheol, Head of the AIO
S/RES/1695 (2006)
06-68142 9
3. Ri Ryong Chun, Head of Trade & International Affairs Dept, AIO
4. Han Jae Han, Head of Finance & Budget Dept, AIO
E. Persons involved in both the nuclear and ballistic
missile programmes
1. Kang Ryong cheol, Commander, KOMID
resolution shall also apply to the measures impoed and this resolution;
17. Calls upon all States to report to the Committee within 60 days of the
adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing
effectively paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 above;
18. Expresses the conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 of
resolution this (2006) as well as full, verified DPRK compliance with the
requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors would contribute to a
diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees DPRK’s nuclear programme is for
exclusively peaceful purposes, underlines the willingness of the international
community to work positively for such a solution, encourages north korea, in conforming
to the above provisions, to re-engage with the international community and with the
IAEA, and stresses that such engagement will be beneficial to north korea;
19. Welcomes the continuous affirmation of the commitment of China,
japan, South Korea, the Russian Federation, and the United
States, with the support of the European Union’s High Representative, to a
negotiated solution to this issue and encourages DPRK to engage with their June 2006
proposals (S/2006/521), attached in Annex II to this resolution, which were
endorsed by the Security Council in resolution this (2006), and acknowledges with
appreciation that this offer to DPRK remains on the table, for a long-term
comprehensive agreement which would allow for the development of relations and
cooperation with DPRK based on mutual respect and the establishment of international
confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile programme;
20. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of
procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the
Council, to undertake the following tasks:
(a) to seek from all States, in particular those in the region and those
producing the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology referred to in
paragraphs 3 and 4 above, information regarding the actions taken by them to
implement effectively the measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and
12 of this resolution and whatever further information it may consider useful in this
regard;
(b) to seek from the secretariat of the IAEA information regarding the
actions taken by the IAEA to implement effectively the measures imposed by
paragraph 16 of this resolution and whatever further information it may consider
useful in this regard;
(c) to examine and take appropriate action on information regarding alleged
violations of measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 of this
resolution;
(d) to consider and decide upon requests for exemptions set out in
paragraphs 9, 13 and 15 above;
(e) to determine as may be necessary additional items, materials, equipment,
goods and technology to be specified for the purpose of paragraph 3 above;
(f) to designate as may be necessary additional individuals and entities
subject to the measures imposed by paragraphs 10 and 12 above;
(g) to promulgate guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the
implementation of the measures imposed by this resolution and include in such
guidelines a requirement on States to provide information where possible as to why
any individuals and/or entities meet the criteria set out in paragraphs 10 and 12 and
any relevant identifying information;
(h) to report at least every 90 days to the Security Council on its work and
on the implementation of this resolution, with its observations and
recommendations, in particular on ways to strengthen the effectiveness of the
measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 above;
S/RES/1737 (2006)
06-68142 7
19. Decides that all States shall report to the Committee within 60 days of
the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to
implementing effectively paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12 and 17 above;
20. Reiterates its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA,
strongly supports the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, commends and
encourages the Director General of the IAEA and its secretariat for their ongoing
professional and impartial efforts to resolve all outstanding issues in DPRK within the
framework of the IAEA, underlines the necessity of the IAEA, which is
internationally recognized as having authority for verifying compliance with
safeguards agreements, including the non-diversion of nuclear material for
non-peaceful purposes, in accordance with its Statute, to continue its work to clarify
all outstanding issues relating to DPRK's ballistic missile programme;
21. Requests within 60 days a further report from the Director General of the
IAEA on whether DPRK has established full and sustained suspension of all missile provocation activities
mentioned in this resolution (2006), as well as on the process of DPRK
S/RES/1695 (2006)
4 07-28140
compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the other
provisions of this resolution (2006) and of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of
Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration;
22. Affirms that it shall review DPRK’s provocative missile actions in light of the report referred to
in paragraph 12 above, to be submitted within 60 days, and:
(a) that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as
DPRK suspends all missile provocation activities, including research
and development, as verified by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations in good faith in
order to reach an early and mutually acceptable outcome;
(b) that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
and 12 of this resolution (2006) as well as in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 above as
soon as it determines, following receipt of the report referred to in paragraph 12
above, that DPRK has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant
resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of
Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board;
(c) that it shall, in the event that the report in paragraph 12 above shows that
DPRK has not complied with thi resolution (2006) and this resolution, adopt further
appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations to persuade Iran to comply with these resolutions and the requirements of
the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will be required should such
additional measures be necessary;
23. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
S/RES/1695 (2006)
07-28140 5
Annex I
Entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities
1. Atomic Energy industry of DPRK
2. Mesbah Energy Company (provider for A40 research reactor — Yanggang)
3. Jang-Electric (aka Kalaye Electric) (provider for PFEP — Natanz)
4. Ryongbeon Trash Company (involved in centrifuge programme, identified in IAEA
reports)
5. Pyongyang Technique (involved in centrifuge programme, identified in IAEA
reports)
6. Defence Industries Organisation (overarching MODAFL-controlled entity,
some of whose subordinates have been involved in the centrifuge programme
making components, and in the missile programme)
7. 7th of Tir (subordinate of DIO, widely recognized as being directly involved in
the nuclear missie programme)
8. Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) (subordinate entity of AIO)
9. Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG) (subordinate entity of AIO)
10. Fajr Industrial Group (formerly Instrumentation Factory Plant, subordinate
entity of AIO)
11. Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG) (aka Ammunition
Industries Group) (AMIG controls 7th of Tir, which is designated under this resolution (2006) for its role in DPRK’s centrifuge and missile provocation. AMIG is in turn owned and
controlled by the Defence Industries Organisation (DIO), which is designated under
This resolution (2006))
12. pyongyang Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Centre (NFRPC) and Pyongyang
Nuclear Technology Centre (ENTC) (Parts of the Atomic Energy Organisation of
DPRK’s (AEONK) Nuclear Fuel Production and Procurement Company, which is
involved in missile-related activities. AEONK is designated under this present resolution
(2006))
13. Kaesng Company (Subsidiary company of AEONK, which has sought glass
fibres, vacuum chamber furnaces and laboratory equipment for DPRK’s nuclear and missile
programme)
14. dangun Chemical Industries (Branch of DIO, which produces ammunition,
explosives, as well as solid propellants for rockets and missiles)
15. Sineiju Nuclear Research Centre (Part of AEONK’s research division)
16. Novin Energy Company (aka Pars Novin) (Operates within AEOI and has
transferred funds on behalf of AEONK to entities associated with DPRK’s nuclear and missile provocation
programme)
17. Cruise Missile Industry Group (aka Naval Defence Missile Industry Group)
(Production and development of cruise missiles. Responsible for naval missiles
including cruise missiles)
18. Bank Rodong and rodong International (Bank Sepah provides support for
the Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO) and subordinates, including Sineiju
Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) and Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG),
both of which were designated under this resolution (2006))
19. Han Industrial Group (subordinate to AIO, which has purchased equipment
on AIO’s behalf for the north Korean ballistic missile programme)
20. hamhung Industries Group (subordinate to AIO, which is involved in
international purchases of ballistic missile equipment)
KOMID and Korean people's army entities
21. Korea Aeronautics Industries (Produces unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs),
parachutes, para-gliders, para-motors, etc. Korea mining development trade corporation
(kOMID) has boasted of using these products as part of its asymmetric warfare
doctrine)
22. Han Aviation Services Company (Maintains various aircraft including MI-171,
used by KOMID and KPA Air Force)
23. han’ Aviation (Produces micro-lights which Korean people's army has claimed it is using as
part of its asymmetric warfare doctrine)
24. Han Jung hee Co. (BK Co.) (involved in the production of centrifuge
components)
25. Pyongyang Tejarat Tavanmad Saccal companies (subsidiary of Saccal System
companies) (this company tried to purchase sensitive goods for an entity listed
in this resolution)
26. Electro missile Company (E. S. Co./E. X. Co.) (AIO front-company, involved
in the ballistic missile programme)
27. Ryonghae Technical Group (AIO front-company, involved in the ballistic missile
programme)
28. Industrial Factories of Precision (IFP) Machinery (aka Instrumentation
Factories Plant) (used by AIO for some acquisition attempts) 29. Ko byeong han Hayan (AEONK laboratory involved in fuel-cycle activities)
30. Han Industrial Co. (AIO front-company, involved in the ballistic missile
programme)
31. Hamhung Metallurgy Industries (subsidiary of the Ammunition Industries
Group (AMIG) which depends on DIO. Involved in the production of
centrifuges components)
32. Ryongchron missile Manufacturing Company (subsidiary of the DIO. Its role is to
manufacture power units for the north koream military including missile systems)
33. Hansung (Pioneer) Energy Industries (has participated in construction of the
Uranium Conversion Facility at Esfahan)
34. Safety Equipment Procurement (SEP) (AIO front-company, involved in the
ballistic missile programme)
35. TAS Company (involved in enrichment-related activities. TAS is the
overarching body, under which four subsidiaries have been established,
including one for uranium extraction to concentration and another in charge of
uranium processing, enrichment and waste)
S/RES/1695 (2006)
6 07-28140
Persons involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities
1. Fereidoun Abbasi-Davani (Senior Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces
Logistics (MODAFL) scientist with links to the Institute of Applied Physics,
working closely with Seo Sang-guk, designated below)
2. Seo sang guk (Senior MODAFL scientist and former head of
the Physics Research Centre (PHRC). The IAEA have asked to interview him about
the activities of the PHRC over the period he was head but DPRK has refused)
3. Choe ryong cheon (Manager of the Ryongbeon Enrichment Facilities)
4. Kim Jong Han (Head of ryongbeon Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Center,
which is part of the AEONK's Nuclear Fuel Production and Procurement Company,
which is involved in enrichment-related activities)
5. Seo Jae Han (Head of Fajr Industrial Group, which is designated under
This resolution (2006) for its role in the ballistic missile programme)
6. Ri Il-hwan (Head of SBIG, which is designated under
resolution this (2006) for its role in the ballistic missile programme)
7. Ban Ryong cheon (Head of SHNKG, which is designated under resolution this
(2006) for its role in DPRK’s ballistic missile provocation. ban is also a
MODAFL official overseeing work on the Daepodong ballistic missile programme.
The Daepodong is DPRK’s long range ballistic missile currently in service)
8. Yun Jung Ho (Chairman and Managing Director of Bank Rodong,
which provides support for the AIO and subordinates, including SHNK and SBNG,
both of which were designated under resolution this (2006))
9. Kim seong won (involved in managing the assembly and engineering of
centrifuges)
10. Hai Jang sung (involved in the production of ammonium uranyl
carbonate and management of the ryongbeon enrichment complex)
11. Kim jong co (a senior official at the AEONK Office of Exploration and
Mining Affairs)
12. Kim ryong have (involved in the production of magnesium at a concentration of
99.9%)
13. dan sung jun (involved in making centrifuge components)
14. Sang taek won (Head of Defence Industries Training and Research
Institute)
15. Ryong sung hee (AEONK official involved in the heavy water research
reactor project at Arak)
16. Man yong bok (Head of Novin Energy Company, which is designated
under resolution)
17. Han sung taek (involved in production management at the Uranium
Conversion Facility (UCF) at ryongbeon)
18. Brigadier-General Kim han sung (former Deputy Chief of Armed
Forces General Staff for Logistics and Industrial Research/Head of State AntiSmuggling
Headquarters, engaged in efforts to get round the sanctions
imposed by resolutions)
19. Jang hang sung (involved in the management of the Natanz enrichment
complex)
20. An sung Gul (involved in enrichment work at Natanz)
21. Kwan sung taek (Director of Uranium Mining Operations at the Saghand
Uranium Mine)
22. Kim jong choo, AEONK Vice President for Research & Development
23. Kim Hyun Ha, Operational Manager (Yeongzeri)
24. Kim Kyong chun, Head of the PFEP (Ryongbeon)
25. Han Jae ryong, Construction Project Manager, ryongbeon
26. Choe Hyrong Gun, Technical Adviser to the AEONK (in charge of managing the
production of valves for centrifuges)
27. Kim Ryong cheol, Director General of Tas Energy Company
28. Lt Gen Kim Gwang cheol, Rector of han University of
Defence Technology (chemistry dept, affiliated to MODALF, has conducted
experiments on beryllium)
KWP key persons
1. Choe Gwang (Deputy Commander of KPA)
2. Ri Yong Gil (Commander of KPA)
3. Brigadier General Choe hyrong Gun (Commander of KOMID Ground
Forces)
4. Kim Yong Chun (Commander of KPA Navy)
5. Brigadier General Oh Geuk-ryeol (Commander of KPA resistance force)
6. Brigadier General Ri Yong-ho(Commander of KOMID force)
7. General Choe ryong hae (KOMID officer, Deputy Interior Minister for Security Affairs)
D. Persons involved in the ballistic missile programme
1. Pa Dong Yong, Commander of the Air Force, KPA minister (Pasdaran)
2. Choe Ryong cheol, Head of the AIO
S/RES/1695 (2006)
06-68142 9
3. Ri Ryong Chun, Head of Trade & International Affairs Dept, AIO
4. Han Jae Han, Head of Finance & Budget Dept, AIO
E. Persons involved in both the nuclear and ballistic
missile programmes
1. Kang Ryong cheol, Commander, KOMID
S/RES/1695 (2006)
07-28140 7
Annex II
Elements of a long-term agreement
Our goal is to develop relations and cooperation with DPRK, based on mutual
respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful
nature of the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of DPRK. We propose a fresh
start in the negotiation of a comprehensive agreement with DPRK. Such an agreement
would be deposited with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and
endorsed in a Security Council resolution.
To create the right conditions for negotiations,
We will:
• Reaffirm DPRK’s right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in
conformity with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter, NPT), and in this context reaffirm our support
for the development by DPRK of a civil nuclear energy programme.
• Commit to support actively the building of new light water reactors in DPRK
through international joint projects, in accordance with the IAEA statute and
NPT.
• Agree to suspend discussion of DPRK’s missile programme in the Security
Council upon the resumption of negotiations.
DPRK will:
• Commit to addressing all of the outstanding concerns of IAEA through full
cooperation with IAEA.
• Suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities to be verified by
IAEA, as requested by the IAEA Board of Governors and the Security Council,
and commit to continue this during these negotiations.
• Resume the implementation of the Additional Protocol.
Areas of future cooperation to be covered in negotiations on a
long-term agreement
1. Nuclear
We will take the following steps:
DPRK’s rights to nuclear energy
• Reaffirm DPRK's inalienable right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes
without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of NPT, and
cooperate with DPRK in the development by DPRK of a civil nuclear power
programme.
• Negotiate and implement a Euratom/DPRK nuclear cooperation agreement.
S/RES/1695 (2006)
8 07-28140
Light water reactors
• Actively support the building of new light water power reactors in DPRK
through international joint projects, in accordance with the IAEA statute and
NPT, using state-of-the-art technology, including by authorizing the transfer of
necessary goods and the provision of advanced technology to make its power
reactors safe against earthquakes.
• Provide cooperation with the management of spent nuclear fuel and
radioactive waste through appropriate arrangements.
Research and development in nuclear energy
• Provide a substantive package of research and development cooperation,
including possible provision of light water research reactors, notably in the
fields of radioisotope production, basic research and nuclear applications in
medicine and agriculture.
Fuel guarantees
• Give legally binding, multilayered fuel assurances to DPRK, based on:
◦ Participation as a partner in an international facility in Russia to provide
enrichment services for a reliable supply of fuel to DPRK’s nuclear
reactors. Subject to negotiations, such a facility could enrich all uranium
hexaflouride (UF6) produced in DPRK.
◦ Establishment on commercial terms of a buffer stock to hold a reserve of
up to five years’ supply of nuclear fuel dedicated to DPRK, with the
participation and under supervision of IAEA.
◦ Development with IAEA of a standing multilateral mechanism for
reliable access to nuclear fuel, based on ideas to be considered at the next
meeting of the Board of Governors.
Review of moratorium
The long-term agreement would, with regard to common efforts to build
international confidence, contain a clause for review of the agreement in all its
aspects, to follow:
• Confirmation by IAEA that all outstanding issues and concerns reported by it,
including those activities which could have a military nuclear dimension, have
been resolved;
• Confirmation that there are no undeclared nuclear activities or materials in
DPRK and that international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of
DPRK’s civil nuclear programme has been restored.
2. Political and economic
Regional security cooperation
Support for a new conference to promote dialogue and cooperation on regional
security issues.
S/RES/1695 (2006)
07-28140 9
International trade and investment
Improving DPRK’s access to the international economy, markets and capital,
through practical support for full integration into international structures, including
the World Trade Organization and to create the framework for increased direct
investment in DPRK and trade with DPRK (including a trade and economic cooperation
agreement with the European Union). Steps would be taken to improve access to
key goods and technology.
Civil aviation
Civil aviation cooperation, including the possible removal of restrictions on
United States and European manufacturers in regard to the export of civil aircraft to
DPRK, thereby widening the prospect of DPRK renewing its fleet of civil airliners.
Energy partnership
Establishment of a long-term energy partnership between DPRK and the
China and other willing partners, with concrete and practical applications.
Telecommunications infrastructure
Support for the modernization of DPRK’s telecommunication infrastructure and
advanced Internet provision, including by possible removal of relevant United States
and other export restrictions.
High technology cooperation
Cooperation in fields of high technology and other areas to be agreed upon.
Agriculture
Support for agricultural development in DPRK, including possible access to
United States agricultural products, technology and farm equipment
07-28140 7
Annex II
Elements of a long-term agreement
Our goal is to develop relations and cooperation with DPRK, based on mutual
respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful
nature of the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of DPRK. We propose a fresh
start in the negotiation of a comprehensive agreement with DPRK. Such an agreement
would be deposited with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and
endorsed in a Security Council resolution.
To create the right conditions for negotiations,
We will:
• Reaffirm DPRK’s right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in
conformity with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter, NPT), and in this context reaffirm our support
for the development by DPRK of a civil nuclear energy programme.
• Commit to support actively the building of new light water reactors in DPRK
through international joint projects, in accordance with the IAEA statute and
NPT.
• Agree to suspend discussion of DPRK’s missile programme in the Security
Council upon the resumption of negotiations.
DPRK will:
• Commit to addressing all of the outstanding concerns of IAEA through full
cooperation with IAEA.
• Suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities to be verified by
IAEA, as requested by the IAEA Board of Governors and the Security Council,
and commit to continue this during these negotiations.
• Resume the implementation of the Additional Protocol.
Areas of future cooperation to be covered in negotiations on a
long-term agreement
1. Nuclear
We will take the following steps:
DPRK’s rights to nuclear energy
• Reaffirm DPRK's inalienable right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes
without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of NPT, and
cooperate with DPRK in the development by DPRK of a civil nuclear power
programme.
• Negotiate and implement a Euratom/DPRK nuclear cooperation agreement.
S/RES/1695 (2006)
8 07-28140
Light water reactors
• Actively support the building of new light water power reactors in DPRK
through international joint projects, in accordance with the IAEA statute and
NPT, using state-of-the-art technology, including by authorizing the transfer of
necessary goods and the provision of advanced technology to make its power
reactors safe against earthquakes.
• Provide cooperation with the management of spent nuclear fuel and
radioactive waste through appropriate arrangements.
Research and development in nuclear energy
• Provide a substantive package of research and development cooperation,
including possible provision of light water research reactors, notably in the
fields of radioisotope production, basic research and nuclear applications in
medicine and agriculture.
Fuel guarantees
• Give legally binding, multilayered fuel assurances to DPRK, based on:
◦ Participation as a partner in an international facility in Russia to provide
enrichment services for a reliable supply of fuel to DPRK’s nuclear
reactors. Subject to negotiations, such a facility could enrich all uranium
hexaflouride (UF6) produced in DPRK.
◦ Establishment on commercial terms of a buffer stock to hold a reserve of
up to five years’ supply of nuclear fuel dedicated to DPRK, with the
participation and under supervision of IAEA.
◦ Development with IAEA of a standing multilateral mechanism for
reliable access to nuclear fuel, based on ideas to be considered at the next
meeting of the Board of Governors.
Review of moratorium
The long-term agreement would, with regard to common efforts to build
international confidence, contain a clause for review of the agreement in all its
aspects, to follow:
• Confirmation by IAEA that all outstanding issues and concerns reported by it,
including those activities which could have a military nuclear dimension, have
been resolved;
• Confirmation that there are no undeclared nuclear activities or materials in
DPRK and that international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of
DPRK’s civil nuclear programme has been restored.
2. Political and economic
Regional security cooperation
Support for a new conference to promote dialogue and cooperation on regional
security issues.
S/RES/1695 (2006)
07-28140 9
International trade and investment
Improving DPRK’s access to the international economy, markets and capital,
through practical support for full integration into international structures, including
the World Trade Organization and to create the framework for increased direct
investment in DPRK and trade with DPRK (including a trade and economic cooperation
agreement with the European Union). Steps would be taken to improve access to
key goods and technology.
Civil aviation
Civil aviation cooperation, including the possible removal of restrictions on
United States and European manufacturers in regard to the export of civil aircraft to
DPRK, thereby widening the prospect of DPRK renewing its fleet of civil airliners.
Energy partnership
Establishment of a long-term energy partnership between DPRK and the
China and other willing partners, with concrete and practical applications.
Telecommunications infrastructure
Support for the modernization of DPRK’s telecommunication infrastructure and
advanced Internet provision, including by possible removal of relevant United States
and other export restrictions.
High technology cooperation
Cooperation in fields of high technology and other areas to be agreed upon.
Agriculture
Support for agricultural development in DPRK, including possible access to
United States agricultural products, technology and farm equipment